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Abstract
This thesis consists of three theoretical essays that examine the role of organizational architec-
ture in facilitating organizational adaptation to a changing environment.
Chapter 1 develops a model of coordinated adaptation where an organization needs to
respond to incoming information about its environment while at the same time retaining co-
ordination between its activities. It analyzes how the allocation of decision rights inside the
organization impacts the quality of decision-making and the accuracy of information transmis-
sion when information is both soft and distributed inside the organization. The results show
that, contrary to the common intuition, the performance differential between centralized and
decentralized decision-making is non-monotone in the importance of coordination. Further,
both of these common structures are dominated by asymmetric structures in sufficiently asym-
metric environments. Finally, if the incentive conflicts between the participants can be made
sufficiently small, centralized decision-making is always dominated by decentralized decision-
making.
Chapter 2 extends the model developed in Chapter 1 to account for the endogeneity of
incoming information and the use of monetary incentives to manage incentive conflicts inside
the organization. Focusing on the distinction between centralized and decentralized decision-
making, the chapter examines how monetary incentives and the allocation of decision rights can
be used to together to motivate information acquisition, support accurate communication and
to guide decision-making. The results illustrate the robustness of the conclusions of Chapter
1 to the introduction of monetary incentives. In particular, centralization of decision-making
authority is preferred only when coordination is sufficiently important and incentive alignment
is too costly in terms of the compromised quality of incoming information.
Chapter 3 analyzes a simplified two-party decision-making problem with a single decision
and examines how environmental uncertainty, quality of available performance measures and
interim access to information influence the joint determination of the allocation of authority,
use of performance pay and direct controls. It uses the results from the model to cast light on
(i) the conflicting empirical evidence on the risk-incentives trade-off found in work on execu-
tive compensation and franchising, (ii) complementarities in organizational design and (iii) the
determinants of the choice to delegate.
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Chapter 1
Governing Adaptation
Abstract
To remain competitive, an organization needs to continuously respond to incoming in-
formation about its environment while at the same time retaining coordination between its
activities. We analyze how the allocation of decision rights within an organizational hier-
archy influences the organization's ability to solve such problems of coordinated adaptation
when decision-relevant information is both soft and distributed inside the organization. By
modeling the organizational participants as strategic actors, we endogenize both the equi-
librium decisions and the quality of information, as driven by the allocation of decision
rights and the relative importance of coordination. The results show that, contrary to
the common intuition, the performance differential between centralized and decentralized
decision-making is non-monotone in the importance of coordination. Further, both of these
common structures are dominated by asymmetric structures in sufficiently asymmetric envi-
ronments. Finally, if the incentive conflicts between the participants can be made sufficiently
small, centralized decision-making is always dominated by decentralized decision-making.
1.1 Introduction
To remain competitive, an organization needs to continuously respond to incoming information
about its environment while at the same time retaining coordination between its activities. As
an example, consider the problem of product development and positioning faced by a multi-
product firm. To reap the benefits of specialization, each product is managed by a dedicated
division, headed by a division manager. In the course of their duties, each division manager
learns information about her customers, technological developments and market conditions.
Now, a unilateral response to such information, say, in terms of new product offerings, can
clearly be profitable, but additional benefits can be realized by coordinating the responses of
the various divisions. First, cost economies can be realized by coordinating manufacturing,
marketing and distribution. Second, if the products are complements, then ensuring that the
related products work well together increases the customers' valuation of the products. Third,
if the products are substitutes, then coordination is needed to ensure that the products are
sufficiently far apart to avoid unnecessary cannibalization. Fourth, even if the products are
independent, coordinating the product offerings can help the firm to maintain or generate
brand value. Thus, while unilateral adaptation can be profitable, coordinated adaptation is
typically even more valuable.
Achieving such coordinated adaptation poses an organizational challenge because three fac-
tors interact. First, specialization (by technology, region, customer group, or the like) means
that decision-relevant information is distributed inside the organization, rather than being di-
rectly accessible to any single potential decision-maker. Second, much of that information is
"soft," rather than communicable as hard facts. Third, different members of the organization
are likely to have conflicting preferences over the possible courses of action. The distributed
nature of information necessitates the transmission of information from the informed agents
to the decision-maker(s). Misalignment of preferences between the informed agents and the
decision-maker(s) generates the problem of strategic communication, which in turn is ampli-
fied by the prominence of soft information. Similarly, any misalignment of the preferences of
the decision-maker(s) with the organizational objectives will lead to suboptimal decisions, even
conditional on the information available.
Returning to our example, the optimal positioning of each product will depend on infor-
mation held by all division managers (distributed information). Communicating one's opinion
about customer preferences may be relatively easy, whereas providing verifiable information is
significantly harder (soft information). Finally, the division managers are likely to prefer, even
at the expense of overall firm profitability, product offerings that are particularly profitable
for their own division, because of both private benefits and existing compensation structures
(conflicting preferences).
This paper constructs a model of such problems of coordinated adaptation and analyzes
how the importance of coordination among the organization's activities impacts the relative
performance of different governance structures. We consider an organization in which two
activities need to balance responding to local conditions and being coordinated with each other.
Control of the activities can be allocated among two privately informed but biased local agents
(division managers) and an uninformed but unbiased central manager (headquarters). We
analyze four distinct governance structures. Under decentralized authority, each local agent
retains the decision right over his own activity, while under centralized authority, both decision
rights are allocated to the central manager. These two governance structures accord well with
what are commonly discussed as decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. In
addition to these symmetric structures, we also analyze the solution under partial centralization,
where one of the decision rights is allocated to the central manager, while the other remains in
the hands of a local agent, and directional authority, where both decision rights are allocated
to one of the local agents.
Under any governance structure, the local agents first learn their local conditions, after which
they communicate with the decision-maker(s), followed by decision-making. By considering
strategic behavior by the organizational participants, we endogenize both the quality of decision-
making, conditional on the information available to the decision-maker(s), and the accuracy of
information transmission, as influenced by the allocation of decision rights and the underlying
environment. Motivated by the importance of soft information, communication is modeled as
a cheap-talk game. While we build on the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982), in our
framework, the degree of incentive conflict between the sender and the receiver (and so the
quality of communication) arises endogenously from the allocation of decision rights and the
relative importance of coordination.
We show how all four governance structures can be characterized by a single solution that
takes as its primitives the allocation of decision rights and the pairwise incentive conflicts
between the organizational participants. A key feature of the solution is the linking of the
value and quality of information transmission with the equilibrium decisions, which allows us
to analyze the expected performance of each governance structure simply in terms of the quality
of decision-making and the value and quality of communication. The focus of the analysis is
then on understanding how these two dimensions of performance are influenced by the relative
importance of coordination for each of the two activities under each governance structure.
The results offer three qualifications to the common intuition that centralized decision-
making is needed when coordination is sufficiently important and, in consequence, suggest that
the term "importance of coordination" is too coarse for deriving organizational implications.
First, coordination poses an organizational challenge only when it needs to balance conflict-
ing demands for adaptation. This observation is highlighted by the result that while centralized
authority does dominate decentralized authority whenever coordination is sufficiently important
to either activity, the performance differential itself is non-monotone, with the two solutions
converging both when coordination becomes unimportant and when coordination becomes the
overriding concern. When coordination becomes unimportant, the vertical conflict (between a
local agent and the manager) is reduced and the local agents become increasingly able to com-
municate accurately with the manager, thus eliminating the initial informational advantage
of decentralized authority. Alternatively, when coordination becomes the primary concern for
at least one of the activities, the horizontal conflict (between the two local agents) is reduced
and the local agents become increasingly able to coordinate their behavior under decentralized
authority, thus eliminating the decisional advantage of centralized authority.
Second, one needs to account for potentially asymmetric interdependencies between ac-
tivities, because such asymmetries impact the relative value of accurate communication and
decision-making for the two divisions. This observation is highlighted by the result that both
centralized and decentralized authority are dominated by one or both of the asymmetric gover-
nance structures in sufficiently asymmetric environments. Partial centralization can be optimal
under two conditions: centralizing the activity with lower importance of coordination can be
used to improve decision-making relative to decentralized authority while compromising the
overall adaptiveness less than under centralized authority; alternatively, centralizing the activ-
ity with higher importance of coordination can be used to facilitate communication by increasing
the bias in the equilibrium decisions. And directional authority can be opimal when one activity
cares primarily about coordination, in which case both decision rights are allocated to the agent
with lower importance of coordination to eliminate any residual coordination failures, even if
this improvement is achieved at the cost of even more biased decisions.
Third, one needs to account for the distribution of the costs and benefits of coordination
among the organizational participants themselves (as separate from the underlying environ-
ment), because this distribution influences the participants' alignment of interests both with
each other and with the organizational objectives. This observation is highlighted by the re-
sult that incentive alignment and centralization are substitutes: while both centralized and
decentralized authority benefit from increased incentive alignment, with both benefiting from
more accurate communication and decentralized authority enjoying the added advantage of
improved decision-making, the rate of improvement is higher under decentralized authority.
Indeed, centralized authority is eliminated as an equilibrium outcome strictly before perfect
incentive alignment is achieved.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related liter-
ature and section 3 describes the model. Section 4 derives the solution under decentralized
authority. Drawing on the general solution presented in Appendix A, section 5 repeats the
analysis for the alternative governance structures, focusing on how the solutions differ from the
solution under decentralized authority. The results are then brought together in section 6 for
comparative institutional analysis. Section 7 discusses some extensions, including the impact of
incentive alignment on the relative performance of the analyzed governance structures. Section
8 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
In viewing the organizational problem as one of coordinated adaptation under distributed in-
formation, the paper is intellectually indebted to the analysis of decision-making, authority
and adaptation by, among others, Barnard (1938), Simon (1947), Cyert and March (1963) and
Williamson (1975).1 However, these descriptive theories are significantly broader in scope and
blend in their discussion incentive conflicts, bounded rationality and technological considera-
tions. In contrast, our analysis focuses purely on the impact that incentive conflicts among the
organizational participants have on decision-making and communication in organizations and
thus on the choice of governance structure.
Methodologically, we build on the seminal work of Crawford and Sobel (1982) (henceforth
CS) on cheap talk. We maintain the assumption that the actors are unable to commit to a
decision rule ex ante, but instead of examining information transmission from an informed agent
with a known, fixed preference bias to an uninformed principal, we analyze a setting where the
preference bias is random and where the use of a "principal" is a governance choice. In allowing
the possibility of full agreement between the sender and the receiver(s), the communication
equilibrium is analogous to Stein (1989) and Melumad and Shibano (1991). In our focus on
multiple senders, we are closer to Battaglini (2002), but instead of each sender observing full,
multidimensional information, the agents in our model observe only partial and independent
information, making truth-telling impossible. Further, since we allow the agents to communicate
also with each other, our model distiguishes between vertical and horizontal communication.
A number of recent papers are closely related to ours in their focus on organizational design
and, in particular, on the roles of private information and communication in influencing the
optimal allocation of decision rights. Dessein (2002) analyzes the CS setting and illustrates how
delegation of the decision right is often preferred over the communication equilibrium because
1And similar considerations within the modern capabilities literature, especially Langlois and Robertson
(1993,1995).
the cost of inaccurate information caused by strategic communication is often higher than the
cost of biased decision-making. However, by focusing on a single decision, the model remains
silent on issues of coordination. Alonso (2006) illustrates how sharing control of complementary
decisions improves communication between an informed agent and an uninformed principal.
However, the model does not allow for distributed information, which is central to our model.
Dessein and Santos (2006) examine a team-theoretic model that focuses on the limitations
that the need for coordinated adaptation imposes on task specialization. However, by taking a
team-theoretic approach with a fixed quality of communication, the model has no explicit role
for authority.2 In contrast, our model is about how different allocations of authority influence
the organization's ability to achieve coordinated adaptation, given the degree of specialization.
Athey and Roberts (2001), Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2005) and Friebel and Raith
(2006) provide complementary perspectives on organizational design.3 Athey and Roberts
(2001) examine an incentive provision problem where two agents need to be induced to provide
productive effort and make good project choices. By allocating the right to choose projects to a
third party, the inherent multitasking problem can be relaxed. Dessein, Garicano and Gertner
(2005) examine how the optimal allocation of a synergy implementation decision among a
functional manager (who learns the value of potential synergies) and two product managers (who
learn the cost of synergy implementation in terms of compromised local adaptation) depends
on the value of synergies, the value of local adaptation and the importance of productive effort
exerted by the agents. Friebel and Raith (2006) examine a resource allocation problem, where
two local agents exert effort to generate high-quality projects and the amount of resources
available to them can be determined either ex ante (decentralization) or ex post by a central
agent (centralization). In all three models, the basic tension is between strong local incentives
to induce effort and balanced global incentives to induce truthful communication and/or good
decisions. However, none of these models contain multiple, interdependent decisions and thus
do not capture the inherent give-and-take process of strategic decision-making that is at the
heart of our model.
Finally, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006) (henceforth ADM) have independently
developed a model that is very similar to ours but analyze only the case of symmetric importance
of coordination. Our results generalize the framework to allow for asymmetric importance
of coordination and the general solution provides a unified treatment of the four governance
structures. In consequence, we focus more on the impact that asymmetries in the importance of
coordination have on the choice of governance structure, while the focus in ADM is on impact
of the degree of incentive alignment. Further, the explicit separation of the importance of
coordination to the two activities allows us to gain a more detailed understanding of how the
two activities interact, both in the decision-making and in the communication stages. Chapter
2 of this thesis extends the present framework to account for endogeous incentive alignment
and active information acquisition.
2Team-theoretic models have been used to examine organizational structures and hierarchies from various
different angles: information processing (e.g. Marshak and Radner (1972), Bolton and Dewatripont (1994)),
problem-solving (e.g. Garicano (2000)), screening for interdependencies (Harris and Raviv (2002)), asset utiliza-
tion (Hart and Moore (2005)) and coordination and experimentation (Qian, Ronald and Xu (2006)).3See also Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Hart and Holmstrom (2002).
1.3 The model
1.3.1 Payoffs, actors and feasible governance structures
We examine the problem of coordinating the decision-making processes of two activities, i and
j. The ex post loss incurred in the performance of activity i (and borne by agent i) is given by
Li = (1 - ri) (Oi -di) 2 + ri (dj - di )2,
where di and dj stand for the decisions chosen for activities i and j, and 0i - U [-Oi, Ii]
indexes the locally optimal decision, with 0i and 0j independently distributed. The exogenous
variable of interest in the analysis is ri E (0, 1), which captures the degree of interdependence of
activity i on activity j and so the relative importance of coordination to activity i. We will refer
to ri as the degree of dependency of activity i.5 We will refer to (Oi - di) 2 as the adaptation
component and to (dj - di) 2 as the coordination component of the loss Li.
Associated with each activity is a local agent (i and j, respectively). Only agent i has direct
access to information about Oi and his ex post loss is given by Li. In addition to the local agents,
there exists a central agent whom we will call the manager (indexed by M). The manager has
no direct access to information about either Oi or Oj and her objective is to minimize Li + Lj.
Four observations are worth making regarding the payoff structure. First, while we measure
coordination by the decisions being close together, being "close" can conceptually mean both
being sufficiently close (to realize functional complementarities) and being sufficiently far apart
(to avoid cannibalization). Second, there is no additional focal point for coordination. Instead,
the hypothetical ideal point is given simply by the joint realization of 0i and 0j. This approach
is used to capture the idea that especially with demand-side interdependencies, to realize the
benefits of coordination, the amount of coordination typically matters more than the focal point
for coordination. Note that this argument is not saying that the focal point of coordination
does not matter for the overall payoffs. What it is saying is that the ideal point of coordination
is determined by the private information held by the local agents rather than by any outside
considerations. 6 Third, the local agents do benefit directly from coordination. However, they
don't internalize the costs and benefits of coordination to the other agent and it is this external-
ity that leads the local agents to disagree on both the focal point and the degree of coordination
and that generates the problems of strategic communication and decision-making. Fourth, to
keep the intuition behind the results simple, we will discuss the results in detail only under the
assumption of maximal degree of incentive conflict (agent i cares only about Li). We return to
the role of incentive alignment in section 7.3.
Within this framework, we analyze four distinct governance structures, which are summa-
rized in figure 1-1. Letting dk denote the set of decision rights allocated to an agent, with
4 Since minimizing loss is equivalent to maximizing profit, this loss formulation is identical to an ex post profit
formulation of IIf = Ki - (1 - r1 ) (Oi - di) 2 - ri (di - dj) 2 , as long as Ki is sufficiently large so that the activity
is worth undertaking. To simplify the notation, we focus on the loss formulation.
5 The setting where the weights are not constrained to add up to one is discussed in Appendix B.
6 For example, a brand can be built around product i or product j. The ideal location and the strength of
the brand is likely to depend more on the consumers' valuations of different types of product i and product j
(realized O0 and 0j) than any outside considerations.
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Figure 1-1: Alternative governance structures
k e {i, j, M}, the alternatives are: decentralized authority, where each local agent decides how
their activity is to be performed (di = {d,} ,d = {dj} ,d M  = {0}); centralized authority,
where both decision rights are allocated to the manager (di = {0}, d = {0}, dM = {di, dj });
partial centralization, where one decision right is centralized while the other is left local (d' =
{di} , di = {0} }, =dM  {d }); and directional authority, where both decision rights are allocated
to one of the local agents (d i = {di, dj }, di = {0}, dM = {0}).78 These governance structures
are indexed by g E {dec, cent, part(j), dir(i)}. In the case of partial centralization, j refers to
the centralized activity, while in the case of directional authority, i refers to the local agent
gaining control over both activities.
7These four governance structures span the set of single-agent, unconditional decision-making structures that
can arise in equilibrium. Governance structures where agent i would control dj without also controlling di are
never optimal in our model.
8 This somewhat unorthodox terminology is adapted because under partial centralization, decision-making
is decentralized in the sense that the two decisions are made by two different actors, and under directional
authority, decision-making is centralized in the sense that the two decisions are made by the same agent. Since
these solutions are qualitatively different from centralized and decentralized authority, we cannot simply talk
about differences between centralized and decentralized decision-making.
t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4
I I I I
Governance structure (Oi, Oj) Communication Decisions are
chosen learned by the via one round of made
respective agents simultaneous
cheap talk
Figure 1-2: Timing of events
1.3.2 Timing of events
The timing of events and the actions available to the agents are summarized in figure 1-2. At
t = 4, decisions are made by the actors controlling the decision rights in the chosen governance
structure. Let mi and mj be the messages sent by the local agents (regarding the realization
of Oi and Oj, respectively) at t = 3 to the decision-maker(s). Then, the local agent i solves
minE (Li j9, mi, mij) ,
di
where d' is the (potentially empty) set of decision-rights held by agent i under a given gover-
nance structure. Similarly, the manager solves
minE (Li + Lj Imi, mj) ,
dM
where dM is the (potentially empty) set of decision-rights held by the manager under a given
governance structure.9
At t = 3, communication takes place, which is modeled as one round of simultaneous cheap
talk.10 Foreseeing how equilibrium decisions are formed at t = 4 and how they are influenced
by additional information, the local agents strategically send non-verifiable messages to the
decision-maker(s) in an attempt to induce a more favorable equilibrium outcome. No interim
contracting on the decisions or renegotiation of the governance structure is allowed. At t = 2,
the local conditions Oi and Oj are learned by the respective local agents.
For each governance structure, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game:
in each stage, the actions of the agents need to be optimal given their beliefs and those beliefs
need to be correct in equilibrium. At t = 1, the governance structure is chosen to minimize the
9Results allowing for the possibility of sequential decision-making are available from the author on request.
While sequential decision-making can under some environments be used to improve the outcome under both
decentralized authority and partial centralization, the qualitative results regarding the relative performance of
the different governance structures are not strongly affected. The main difference is that sequential decision-
making under decentralized authority always dominates directional authority.
'oResults allowing for the possibility of sequential communication are available from the author on request.
Sequential communication is not preferred over simultaneous communication unless the variances are extremely
asymmetric, in which case sequential decision-making would do even better. Further, the intended first-mover
prefers to talk first over talking simultaneously only when sequential communication performs worse, making
beneficial sequential communication not incentive-compatible.
total expected loss E(Li + Lj). We follow the incomplete contracting tradition in assuming that
no state- or message-contingent contracts on either decisions or decision rights are available at
t= 1.
1.4 Decentralized authority
We will begin the analysis by deriving the solution under decentralized authority, where each
local agent retains control over his activity. We first solve for the equilibrium decisions given
the information available to the agents. Having the equilibrium decisions, we then solve for the
highest sustainable quality of communication, which is directly dependent on the equilibrium
decisions. Having the equilibrium decisions and the quality of communication, we will then
analyze the expected performance of decentralized authority relative to the first-best outcome
(decisions that minimize E (Li + Lj) under perfect information). Section 5 repeats this exercise
for the alternative governance structures. The comparative analysis of the governance structures
is summarized in section 6. Throughout sections 4 and 5, we analyze E (N + Lq) under the
assumption that 0i = 9j. The impact of asymmetric variances is discussed in section 6.1.
1.4.1 Equilibrium decisions
At the decision-making stage, the information available to agent i consists of (i) the realization
of his local state O, (ii) message mj received from agent j, used by agent i to form beliefs over
0j (denoted Ei0j), and (iii) message mi sent to agent j, used by agent j to form beliefs over
the realization of 0i (Ej3 i). Given this information, agent i solves
minEi ((1 - ri) (i - di)2 +r (dj _ d)2).di
Taking the first-order conditions and rearranging gives the reaction functions for the two deci-
sions:
di = (1 - ri) Oi + riEidj and dj = (1 - rj) Oj + rjEjdi.
Solving the reaction functions for the equilibrium decisions yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Equilibrium decisions under decentralized authority:
d c = (1 - ri) Oi + E,0± +(1-ri)rr Ej0 .
Proof. Special case of proposition 9. j)
Proof. Special case of proposition 9. m
Note that the equilibrium decisions take the form d4e = ail9i + ai2EiOj + ai3EjOi (with
ail + ai2 ± ai3 = 1). Indeed, this structure of the solution is the same under all analyzed
governance structures, but with structure-specific coefficients agl, a 2, and a 3. Also, observe
that E2 0j and Ej9i will be based solely on the messages mj and mi exchanged at t = 3, and
as a result the quality of decisions will depend on the accuracy of communication. However,
before analyzing the accuracy of communication that the agents can sustain in equilibrium, let
us first consider briefly how the equilibrium responses of di and dj to information about Oi are
determined, to better understand the role of communication under decentralized authority.
Having observed Oi and absent any communication (so that Eid3 = Ejdi = 0), agent i's
decision would be given by di = (1 - ri) 6i. We will refer to the first coefficient of proposition
1, ail = (1 - ri), as the rate of direct adaptation. By communicating information about the
realization of Oi, agent i is able to improve both the coordination between the decisions and the
amount of adaptation he is able to achieve. Suppose agent i has sent a message mi to agent j,
inducing a belief EjOi. Because agent j puts weight rj on coordination, he will accommodate the
decision that he expects agent i to make. This accommodation, by improving the coordination
between the decisions, allows agent i to further increase the amount adaptation, and so forth.
Solving this iterative process gives then the coefficients aj2, which we will refer to as the rate
of accommodation, and ai3, which we will refer to as the rate of induced adaptation. The sum
ail + ai3 = ail+i3 will be called simply the rate of adaptation. An equivalent process over the
beliefs over Oj determines the weights aji, ai2 and aj3.
Because of the strategic interaction between the decisions, the decisions will in expectation
lie somewhere between agent i's preferred decisions di = dj = 0i and agent j's preferred
decisions di = dj = 0j. However, how far the equilibrium decisions are from each agent's ideal
point depends on how much weight each agent places on coordination and, as a result, on
the rates of accommodation. As ri increases, any adaptation achieved by agent i becomes
increasingly dependent on accommodation by agent j. As a result, agent j is able to decrease
his rate of accommodation aj2 and so move the equilibrium decisions in his favor. Similarly,
as rj increases, the increased dependency of agent j increases his rate of accommodation aj2,
allowing agent i to move the equilibrium decisions towards his ideal decisions. Finally, along
the diagonal ri = rj = r, each agent becomes increasingly dependent on the accommodation
granted by the other, but at the same time each agent becomes more accommodating: ai2 = aj2
is increasing in r.
Not only do ai2 and aj2 play a large role in the determination of the equilibrium decisions,
but as we will see below, as a measure of the incentive conflict between the two agents, these
coefficients are the sole determinants of the quality of communication by the two agents under
decentralized authority.
1.4.2 Equilibrium communication
As discussed above, agent i sends a message mi about the realization of Oi to achieve accom-
modation by dj, which in turn allows i to achieve more adaptation. The discussion also made
apparent the problem that the non-verifiability of information generates in the communication
stage. In the decision-making stage, agent i would like to have di = dj = Oi and so achieve both
perfect adaptation and perfect coordination. On the other hand, agent fj's expected response to
a message mi is given by aj2Ej (Oilmi), where the rate of accommodation aj2 is strictly below
one for all rj < 1. As a result, if agent j expects agent i to tell the truth, agent i will exaggerate
the realized Oi to induce a higher level of accommodation by agent j, making fully informative
communication impossible.
However, as shown by Crawford and Sobel (1982), partially informative communication
can still potentially be achieved. This partially informative communication is achieved by
partitioning the state-space so that any message mi reveals only that Oi belongs to some interval.
Intuitively, such partitioning discretizes the response of the recipient so that the sender can be
made to choose between an under-response from a lower message and an over-response from a
higher message.
From this logic it is clear that for a partition to be incentive-compatible, it needs to be that
when the realized state falls on the boundary between two elements (intervals) of the partition,
the agent is indifferent between saying that the state belongs to either one of the intervals.
That is, it needs to be that
E )Le Odj(.,EfOj), dj(., EfO0)) = E2 L O di (., EfO), d (., 7Ef0)
Solving this indifference condition gives us the difference equation that defines the family of
incentive-compatible partitions:
I0i,k - Oi,k-1I - I0i,k-1 - Oi,k-21 = 4ec 10i,k-1 - EiOjl,
where Oi,k are the cutoffs of the partition, with k increasing away from the expected preference
intersection Oi = E Oj, and
odec aj2 - r,(1-r 1 )
i = -aj2
which uniquely determines the rate at which the size of the intervals needs to grow to counter
the increasing incentives for i to exaggerate the realized Oi. In the case of simultaneous talk,
EiOj = 0 before the messages are sent, which we will maintain from now on.
While •pdec defines the relative size of two adjacent intervals, it does not yet define the
absolute size of the intervals. Solving for the most informative partition, which minimizes the
absolute size of the intervals given .pec, gives the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Equilibrium quality of communication:
The cutoffs of the finest incentive-compatible partition are characterized by
10i,nl = a ( ) with n E {-oo, ..., -1,1, ...oo}, where
(Wdec) Wider e j 
- 0 0dZc an 1Vpde- E (0, 1) a d Z _c")2 : (-oT .
--O, a0 0&... 0 o a20 aOi
0
Figure 1-3: Structure of the most informative partition
Proof. Special case of proposition 10. m
This solution is illustrated in figure 1-3. Note that truth-telling is possible at the point
of expected preference intersection: the expected response of the recipient matches the ideal
response of the sender. The rate at which the accuracy of messages decreases in [Oij is in turn
uniquely determined by 9o, which we will refer to as the quality of communication (by agent
i about Oi). As a (pec) --+ 1, communication becomes fully informative, while a (,qec) --+ 0
implies binomial communication, which is always possible in the present setting due to the
partial alignment of interests (i.e. the sender is always able to say whether his realized state is
above or below the expected preference intersection).
The quality of communication by agent i is in turn solely determined by the rate of accom-
modation by the recipient, aj2. This result should be no surprise since, as discussed in section
4.1, it is the rate of accommodation that measures under decentralized authority the degree of
conflict between the sender's preferred outcome and the recipient's equilibrium response. The
higher the rate of accommodation, the smaller the incentive conflict and the higher the quality
of communication that can be sustained. As the recipient becomes perfectly accommodating
(aj2 --+ 1), communication becomes perfect. Thus, in addition to influencing the equilibrium
decisions, the relative importance of coordination to the two agents (and the resulting rates of
accommodation) influence the ability of the agents to share their private information. Indeed,
it is exactly because the equilibrium decisions vary with the importance of coordination that
the quality of communication by each agent varies as well.
Figure 1-4 plots the quality of communication by agent i as a function ri and rj. Paralleling
the rate of accommodation by agent j, the quality of communication by agent i is increasing in
rj, decreasing in ri and increasing along the diagonal ri = rj. Thus, not only does an increase
in ri tilt the equilibrium decisions in favor of agent j, but it also compromises the ability of
agent i to share his private information. Communication by agent i is accurate only when he
expects the equilibrium decisions to be close to his ideal decisions di = dj = Oi.
1.4.3 Expected losses
Having derived the equilibrium decisions and the equilibrium quality of communication, we can
solve for the expected loss for each activity:
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Figure 1-4: Quality of communication by agent i under decentralized authority
Proposition 3 Expected Losses under Decentralized Authority:
EL e - A (c  + + -2 + r _ecV(ýO ec) , wher
Adec (1-r.)ri(1-r,)2  dec_ ri(1-ri) Adc fdec rj(1-r )2  dec
-) ' r- - 3 - A and
V(dec) -2 =-2 3E (Oi - EjOo) 2
Proof. Special case of proposition 11. m
We can thus write the expected loss to each activity as being composed of two components.
First, the expected loss under perfect information is given by Adec +( ý  . Note that Ad ec
is decreasing in rj. The more accommodating agent j is, the more the equilibrium decisions
favor activity i. Also, Aee _-- 0 both when ri -+ 0 and when ri -+ 1. When coordination is
unimportant, adaptation to local conditions is only mildly constrained. When coordination is
very important, most gains are realized simply by accommodating what agent j is going to do.
Second, the additional expected loss due to strategic communication is given by F ecV( +i ec)6
F ecV(ýjec) j. Note that the cost of strategic communication is composed of two components.
First, 4dec measures the quality of communication, as derived above. Second, fdec measures
the value of communication. This separation highlights the fact that accurate communica-
tion is valuable only if it translates into an improvement in decision-making. In the case of
decentralized authority, the value of communication is determined by the cost of strategic un-
certainty that the agents face over each other's actions. For example, when ri is very low,
agent i's decision is not constrained by accommodation by agent j and neither does he care
about coordination. Thus, value of accurate communication about either state is low to agent
i. Conversely, when ri is large and ri >> rj, then accurate mj is very valuable to agent i since
A
1
I
i
it allows him to predict what agent j is going to do, while the value of accurate mi is low since
while agent i is highly dependent on accommodation by agent j, at the same time agent j will
be very unaccommodating. 11
To better understand how the expected total loss E (Lec + L4ec varies with the environ-
ment, define the relative loss due to biased decisions by
E(Ldec+L ecaB(.)=1)-E(L B+LF)
E(L( +L+)
(i.e., the percentage increase in the expected total loss over the first-best outcome when de-
centralized decision-making is substituted for optimal decisions under perfect information).
Similarly, define the relative loss due to strategic communication by
dec+L ec dec)) 
-E(Lec+Lde
E(LFB+LFB)
(i.e., the percentage increase in the expected total loss over the first-best outcome when strate-
gic communication is substituted for perfect information under decentralized decision-making).
Note that because the expected loss under the first-best outcome is also bound away from
zero due to the technological trade-off between adaptation and coordination, any losses must
be measured in relation to this standard. The additional normalization by E (L FB + LF B)
is used to highlight differences in the limit behavior when the absolute loss converges to zero.
Thus, it is worth noting that while the discussion below is framed in terms of relative loss, the
absolute expected loss does converge to zero both when ri, rj --+ 0 and when ri and/or rj -- 1.
The results are summarized in figure 1-5 and we will discuss each panel separately.
Relative loss due to biased decisions
Panel (i) of figure 1-5 plots the relative loss due to biased decisions. First, observe that the
equilibrium decisions converge to first-best both when ri and rj --+ 0, and when ri and/or
rj -- 1. In the first case, each agent is able to make the individually optimal decision as
no interdependencies are present. In the second case, as long as at least one agent cares
only about coordination, it is optimal to coordinate around the activity that places a positive
value on adaptation. Thus, decision-making itself significantly compromises the performance of
decentralized authority only when at least one agent faces an intermediate value for coordination
and neither agent is extremely dependent on coordination.
The nature and cost of these biases, however, depend on the degree of asymmetry between
the agents. Because each agent undervalues coordination, the decisions are in expectation
too far apart. When the importance of coordination is relatively symmetric, this translates
"i-i + ±r > 0, so that more accurate communication is always beneficial in terms of the total expected
loss. However, it is possible that r, < 0. The complications that can arise in this case are discussed in section
7.1.
% %
30: : 3Y
20 j 2(
-,• U.5 rj
00 00
(i) Relative loss due to (ii) Relative loss due to
biased decisions strategic communication
Figure 1-5: Expected performance of decentralized authority
to a situation where each agent undertakes an excessive amount of adaptation. However, as
discussed in section 4.1, when the importance of coordination is asymmetric, the less dependent
agent is able to pull both decisions in his favor. While this outcome benefits the less dependent
agent, it is extremely damaging to the more dependent agent: not only are the decisions under-
coordinated, but they are now coordinated around agent i's preferred outcome. In essence,
a division that places only a little value on coordination will naturally make choices that are
closely tailored to match its local needs, independent of what the other division is doing. As
a result, the division that does benefit from coordination is forced to use as the basis for
coordination decisions that are highly unsuitable to its local needs, which in turn significantly
compromises any possibilities for valuable adaptation.
Relative loss due to strategic communication
Panel (ii) of figure 1-5 plots the relative loss due to biased decisions. Unlike the relative loss
due to biased decisions, the relative loss due to strategic communication is almost everywhere
increasing in the importance of coordination to either agent, in contrast with the quality of
communication discussed in section 4.2. This result follows from our earlier observation that
accurate communication is not valuable in itself. It is valuable only to the extent that it im-
proves decision-making. Thus, when both agents face a low importance of coordination, while
communication is very inaccurate, it is also unimportant because each agent has direct access
to their local information and adaptation is primarily direct (independent of accommodation).
Horizontal communication is needed only to improve coordination and to achieve the resulting
improvement in adaptation. It is only when coordination becomes more valuable that the inac-
curacies in communication start taking their toll. Indeed, while the quality of communication is
10
0
1
1
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also increasing in the importance of coordination, it is not increasing fast enough to compensate
for the increased relative cost of such coordination failures.
1.5 Alternative governance structures
As shown in Appendix A, the technical structure of the solution under the alternative gover-
nance structures is the same as under decentralized authority. In particular, the equilibrium
decisions under governance structure g take the form
di = g Emi + a 2EmEnOj + agi3EnEmOi,
where m and n are the agents controlling the decision right for activities i and j, respec-
tively, with ag + ai2 + a = 1. Similarly, the indifference condition defining the communication
equilibrium under governance structure g takes the form
|0 i,k - Oi,k-1 - I0i,k-1 - Oi,k-21 = Ok-1 ,
and thus the most informative partition is characterized by
a (ý)1i 16n , where ac(soq) =(1"-- -- T2 E (0,1).
As a result, we will present only the constants Wq. Finally, we can write the expected loss
to activity i under governance structure g as
gý + -2 ) -2
Since the algebraic expressions of the constants Aq, 1'? and g_ contain little additional eco-
nomic intuition, they are presented only in the appendix with proposition 11.
While the structure of the solution is similar across the governance structures, the solutions
themselves exhibit significant differences in their expected performance E (LY + Lq). These
differences arise for four interrelated reasons. First, the differences in the objective function(s)
of the decision-maker(s) across the governance structures translate into systematic differences
in the equilibrium decisions. Second, these differences in equilibrium decisions translate into
differences in the equilibrium quality of communication by the two local agents. Third, whether
agent i retains control of his activity or not directly impacts his qualitative motives for com-
munication and thus his equilibrium quality of communication. Fourth, the differences in
equilibrium decisions and the motives for communication translate into differences in the value
of communication.
Because each governance structure provides a qualitatively different combination of equi-
librium decisions and quality and value of communication, the relative performance of each
governance structure varies systematically with the underlying environment. In consequence,
each governance structure arises as the preferred (second-best) governance structure under spe-
cific environmental conditions. In the remainder of the section, we will analyze the equilibrium
outcomes under the alternative governance structures of centralized authority, partial central-
ization and directional authority, focusing on the reasons for and conditions under which each
of them can arise as the preferred governance structure. The results of sections 4 and 5 are
then brought together in section 6, where figure 1-10 presents the mapping from (ri, rj) to the
preferred governance structure.
1.5.1 Centralized authority
The outcome under centralized authority is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Equilibrium under centralized authority:
The equilibrium decisions under centralized authority are given by
deent (1-r2)EMOij+(ri+rj)(1-rj)EMOj% (1+ri)(1+rj)-(ri+rj)2
and the quality of communication is determined by
--nt= 1- il(a3] + 2ri1(a÷i3 a- 2 = (1-ri)(1lrj)+r-(1--r.)2
(1-r .)a\ 't 3(1-a .. t3)-r.(a...t aqent)2 (lrj)(rj_2rjrj+r?)i +- s •l i3• - ili -. kil~i3-- 7 2 Y
Proof. Special case of propositions 9 and 10. m
The decisions are, by assumption, optimal conditional on the information available to the
manager. The manager, however, has to rely solely on information communicated to her by the
local agents and as a result the coefficients of direct and induced accommodation are pooled
together in the equilibrium decisions. This difference in the information structure, in turn,
alters the incentives for communication.
Recall that under decentralized authority, agent i communicated to induce accommodation
by agent j, which both improved coordination and allowed agent i to achieve more adaptation.
As a result, the quality of communication was uniquely determined by the rate of accom-
modation abc. Under centralized authority, sending a message mi induces adaptation by thecent cent
manager (with di) at the rate ail+i3 and accommodation (with dj) at the rate aj2 t. This change
in the qualitative motives for communication generates two primary differences compared to
decentralized authority.
First, from the perspective of the adaptation component, it is the rate of adaptation acet•il~i3
instead of the rate of accommodation a2 n t that measures the degree of incentive conflict be-
tween the sender (agent i) and the receiver (manager). Intuitively, in the case of decentralized
authority, the ability of agent i to achieve adaptation was constrained by the amount of accom-
modation by agent j. In the case of centralized authority, it is constrained because the agent no
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Figure 1-6: Quality of communication by agent i under centralized authority
longer controls the decision and so has to persuade the manager to undertake any adaptation
to Oi.
Second, the coordination component further limits the incentives to exaggerate under cen-
tralized authority. This is because a -'3  acjt > 0, so that the decisions diverge in Imil. The
constraining influence of the coordination component on agent i's incentive to exaggerate is
strongest when ri is intermediate and rj is low to intermediate, so that the decisions do diverge
significantly with the messages sent and the sender cares about it. For low ri, agent i doesn't
care about coordination, while when either ri or rj is large, the two decisions remain quite close
together, independent of Imil.
These differences in the motives for communication are reflected in the quality of communi-
cation by agent i, summarized in figure 1-6. In particular, we can see that while the quality of
communication under centralized authority is always higher than under decentralized authority,
this difference is decreasing in the importance of coordination to either agent. In particular,
the quality of communication is decreasing in ri = rj under centralized authority while it is
increasing in ri - rj under decentralized authority. Under centralized authority, as the impor-
tance of coordination increases, the manager becomes less adaptive. This reduction in ale"
•i1÷i3
increases the incentive conflict between the manager and agent i and thus worsens the quality
of communication. In contrast, under decentralized authority, as the importance of coordina-
tion increases, the local agents become increasingly accommodating. This increase in cant in
turn leads to an increase the quality of communication. Indeed, the two solutions converge as
rj = ri ---+ 1.
Figure 1-7 decomposes the expected total loss E (Lent + Lqent into the relative loss due
to biased decisions and the relative loss due to strategic communication. By assumption, the
relative loss due to biased decisions is zero. Also, since the manager controls both decisions,
there is no strategic uncertainty in the decision-making stage. However, any inaccuracies in
communication now translate directly into fundamental uncertainty about the realized states
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Figure 1-7: Expected performance of centralized authority
of the world in the decision-making stage: E (Oi - EMOilmi)2 > 0 whenever a (, cent) < 1. As
a result, while the quality of communication by both local agents is higher under centralized
authority, the value of more accurate communication about either state is higher as well. In
terms of the expected losses, we can see this by noting that
(--eit + Fej-t) V (ý*) > i i + Fjec.) V (ýpi) Vri, rj < 1.
That is, the net cost of fundamental uncertainty under centralized authority is always higher
than the net cost of the same level of strategic uncertainty under decentralized authority. This
result is reflected in panel (ii), which shows that, despite the higher quality of communica-
tion, the relative loss due to strategic communication is almost everywhere higher than under
decentralized authority. Even if the quality of communication by both agents tends to per-
fect as ri, rj -- 0, it is not increasing fast enough to compensate for the increasing value of
communication.
As a result, decentralized authority dominates centralized authority whenever the impor-
tance of coordination is sufficiently low to both activities. Conversely, centralized authority
dominates decentralized authority whenever the importance of coordination is sufficiently high
to either activity. However, this advantage derives solely from the elimination of the bias in
the equilibrium decisions. As a consequence, the relative advantage of decentralized authority
is largest when at least one activity faces an intermediate value for coordination.
1.5.2 Partial centralization
Under partial centralization, only one of the decisions is centralized. Thus, we need to look
separately at the outcomes for the agent retaining control and for the agent losing control. We
°% .. " : %
1
will discuss the case where activity j is centralized.
Proposition 5 Equilibrium under partial centralization (of j):
The equilibrium decisions are given by
art(j) (1 r) 0 + ri(1-r )EiEMO+ri(ri+r )(1-ri)EMOa
i - (1 - r) + (1+ri)-ri(rj+ri) and
d part(j) (1-r 1 )EMO•+(r-+rj)(1-rj)EMO0
= (1+ri)-ri(rj+ri)
The quality of communication by the agent retaining control is given by
part(j)part(j) a02 = (r+ir)(1-ri)
pip 1a la.rt(j) 
- (1-rj) '
while the quality of communication by the agent losing control is given by
•(l-rj)/ (part(j) 2 [ part(j) part(j) 2
art(j) 31-j3 a a) + +/ 3 2 ) 1-2rirj+r rj(pipart(j) . -rj , (,part(j ) +r, j_ _a prt() j))2  1ri1-r])
3)-rj (ajpt() Pr()3k' j~ 3  31+ jlj3 1 3kj+j3 Q-i
Proof. Special case of propositions 9 and 10. *
Figure 1-8 decomposes the expected total loss E (L art(J) + L part(j )) into the relative loss
due to biased decisions and the relative loss due to strategic communication. Consider first the
relative loss due to biased decisions. Since agent i undervalues coordination, the equilibrium
decisions remain under-coordinated. Also, the equilibrium decisions are always biased in favor
of the agent retaining control. To see this result, note that agent i places a weight ri on
coordination while the manager places a weight ri + rj on coordination. In consequence, the
manager is relatively more accommodating, which in turn allows agent i to pull the equilibrium
decisions in his favor.
From the perspective of expected performance, the most important result is that as rj -+ 0,
the equilibrium decisions under partial centralization converge to optimal decisions. Because
the biases in decision-making arise from the local agents not internalizing the value of coor-
dination to the opponent, as rj --+ 0, di becomes optimal conditional on dj. Thus, to achieve
appropriate decision-making at the limit, it is sufficient to centralize dj. In general, centralizing
the less dependent activity can be used to improve decision-making relative to the decentralized
outcome, given a sufficient initial asymmetry.12 Equivalently, centralizing the more dependent
activity will bias the equilibrium decisions even further in favor of the less dependent activity,
leading to an even higher relative loss due to biased decisions than decentralized authority.
Describing the relative loss due to strategic communication in detail is somewhat harder
because of the asymmetric position of the agents. However, for our purposes, it is sufficient to
12Because centralization causes a discrete change in the valuation of coordination by the decision-maker and
so in the equilibrium rate of accommodation, the initial asymmetry needs to be sufficiently large as not to tilt
the bias in the opposite direction following centralization.
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Figure 1-8: Expected performance of partial centralization (of j)
understand when the loss is particularly low. Let us first consider the motives for communication
by the two agents. Note that the problem faced by agent i (retaining control) is analogous to the
problem he faces under decentralized authority, in that he sends mi to induce accommodation,
but now by the manager. Since the manager is more accommodating than agent j, the quality
of communication by agent i is always higher than under decentralized authority. Further, the
quality of communication can also be better than under centralized authority. This happens
when rj is large, so that the rate of accommodation is large and the constraining effect of the
coordination component under centralized authority would be small.
Similarly, the problem faced by agent j (losing control) is analogous to the problem he
faces under centralized authority, in that he sends mj to induce both adaptation by dj and
accommodation by di. The differences are two-fold. First, because of the constraining role
played by the agent retaining control, the manager is less responsive to j's messages, increasing
the incentive conflict between the manager and agent j. Second, because of the reduced co-
ordination between the decisions, the constraint on exaggeration provided by the coordination
component is stronger. As a consequence, the quality of communication by agent j under partial
centralization can either dominate his quality of communication under both decentralized and
centralized authority, or be dominated by both. It dominates both when rj is large, so that
the amount of adaptation or accommodation achieved by agent j would approach zero under
all governance structures and the stronger constraint provided by the coordination component
dominates the outcome. In consequence, centralizing a highly dependent activity can improve
the quality of communication by both agents.
In terms of the total expected loss, partial centralization dominates both symmetric gover-
nance structures under two different conditions. First, as mentioned above, centralizing activity
j when rj is low is sufficient to eliminate most of the bias in the equilibrium decisions under
decentralized authority. At the same time, not centralizing activity i prevents the introduction
of unnecessary fundamental uncertainty into the decision-making process. Because of this con-
tainment of the loss due to strategic communication, partial centralization performs better than
both centralized and decentralized authority when rj is small enough and ri is large enough.
Second, centralizing activity j when rj is large enough will also yield a lower expected total
loss than centralized or decentralized authority. Recall that when rj is large, the primary source
of loss under both decentralized and centralized authority is strategic communication. Under
decentralized authority, it is the strategic uncertainty faced by agent j in the decision-making
stage and, under centralized authority, it is the fundamental uncertainty faced by the manager
over Oi - both caused by inaccurate mi. Now, as discussed above, centralizing only activity j will
increase the bias in equilibrium decisions relative to decentralized authority. But it is exactly
this increase in the bias that improves the quality of communication by agent i, reducing the
loss due to strategic communication. Further, the quality of communication by agent j is also
better or only slightly compromised relative to centralized authority. When rj is large enough,
this improvement in communication dominates the loss caused by the increased bias in the
decisions.
1.5.3 Directional authority
Under directional authority, one of the local agents controls both decisions. Assuming that
both decisions are allocated to agent i, the following proposition summarizes the outcome:
Proposition 6 Equilibrium under directional authority (by i):
The equilibrium decisions are given by
dir(i) = dir(i) 
_0
di  =di = tOi
while the quality of communication is indeterminate, as all information sent by agent j is ignored
by agent i.
Proof. Special case of propositions 9 and 10. 0
Figure 1-9 decomposes the expected total loss E (L dir(i) + L dir (i ) into the relative loss due
to biased decisions and the relative loss due to strategic communication. Recall that agent i
aims at minimizing only Li. As a result, if given control of both decisions, he will set both
decisions as to optimize his local performance and ignores any messages sent to him by agent j.
Thus, the decisions are both highly biased and excessively coordinated unless r3 is very high.13
However, there is no loss due to strategic communication, as no adaptation to Oj is attempted.
In the region of very high rj, this avoidance of informational losses dominates losses caused
by biased decisions, and as a result directional authority arises as the preferred governance
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Figure 1-9: Expected performance of directional authority (by i)
structure. Indeed, as rj --+ 1, full efficiency is achieved under directional authority while all
other governance structures continue to suffer a first-order loss due to strategic communication.
It might be surprising that we are granting authority to the less dependent agent. How-
ever, the result is immediate when we recall that coordination in the model is achieved by
accommodating adaptation, and so the focal point of coordination should reflect the relative
importance of adaptation. As rj --+ 1, only adaptation to 0i matters, and as a result it is more
efficient to allow agent i to control both decisions than to rely on strategic communication as
the coordination device.
1.6 Relative performance
Figure 1-10 summarizes the mapping from the relative dependency of the two activities to the
second-best governance structure. Having already discussed the reasons for the performance
differentials through sections 4 and 5, we will now provide only a short summary of the results.
Decentralized authority is the preferred governance structure only when both activities face a
low importance of coordination. The equilibrium decisions are only mildly biased and com-
munication, while inaccurate, is also unimportant since each agent has direct access to local
information. Centralized authority is the preferred governance structure when the importance
of coordination is intermediate to high and not too asymmetric. The advantage of centralized
authority is in eliminating any biases in equilibrium decisions and thus performs best relative
to the other governance structures in the region of intermediate importance of coordination.
As ri and/or rj --+ 1, the solutions under centralized and decentralized authority converge.
13 We have capped the relative loss due to biased decisions at 30% to keep the figures comparable.
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Figure 1-10: Choice of governance structure
While centralized authority dominates decentralized authority in all regions but low im-
portance of coordination, centralized authority is in turn dominated by at least one of the
asymmetric governance structures when the activities face a sufficiently asymmetric impor-
tance of coordination. First, centralizing only the less dependent activity can be used to im-
prove decision-making relative to decentralized authority while limiting losses due to strategic
communication relative to centralized authority. Second, centralizing only the more dependent
activity can be used to worsen decision-making relative to decentralized authority to generate
a communication outcome that dominates both centralized and decentralized authority. Third,
directional authority by the less dependent agent can dominate all three alternatives when the
other activity is highly dependent as it fully avoids losses due to strategic communication.
1.6.1 Asymmetric variances
So far, we have discussed the results only in the setting of symmetric overall importance of
adaptation, as measured by the relative variance of the two states. The case of asymmetric
variances is straightforward: if Oi increases, the likelihood of control of any activity by agent i
increases, and the likelihood of control of dj by the manager increases. These results follow for
two reasons. First, as illustrated in the previous sections, the relative quality of communication
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is independent of 0i. As a consequence, the absolute quality of communication is decreasing in
0i, making any garbling of information more damaging. Second, any biases in decision-making
going against activity i become more damaging in expectation. As a consequence, the choice
of governance structure becomes skewed in agent i's favor when 3i > 9j.14
1.7 Some caveats and extensions
In this section, we will consider three extensions to the baseline model analyzed in sections 4-6.
First, we show that, contrary to most cheap talk models, the most informative communication
equilibrium is not always preferred by all the participants and discuss the implications of this
result for organizational performance. Second, we extend the results to account for imperfect
local information. Third, we extend the results to allow for the possibility of incentive alignment
through pay-for-performance.
Three significant assumptions, however, remain unexamined: the absence of interim con-
tracting on decisions, the absence of interim reallocation of decision rights and the absence of
potential problems of implementation when the decision-maker and the implementer are two
separate agents. 15 For interim contracting on decisions, while the informational asymmetries
in the interim stage are likely to prevent efficient bargaining over the decisions, the degree to
which bargaining could improve the performance of the different governance structures remains
unexamined. Similarly, the relative performance of the governance structures differs in 10i - 0j ,
which generates the possibility of both selective intervention and conditional delegation. En-
riching the analysis to account for these additional behavioral alternatives appears a promising
avenue for future research.
Problems of implementation, on the other hand, have been extensively discussed. Ensur-
ing compliance typically involves (i) costly monitoring by the decision-maker, (ii) an efficiency
wage based on compliance and/or (iii) an increase in global (with a corresponding decrease
in local) incentives faced by the implementer. However, two aspects of the present framework
make further analysis of the implementation problem of potential interest. First, the degree of
incentive conflict and so the gains from non-compliance depend on the importance of coordi-
nation, thus making the cost of ensuring compliance environment-specific. Second, centralized
authority can actually benefit from implementation problems. This result follows because the
fourth margin that the manager will use to ensure compliance is to bias the decisions in favor
of the implementer, thus decreasing the attractiveness of non-compliance. The initial bias will
have only a second-order impact on the quality of decisions but will have a first-order impact
on the quality of communication.
14 Detailed results are available from the author on request.
15Results extending the analysis to account for (i) sequential communication and decision-making, (ii) option
of costly but verifiable communication, (iii) noisy communication and (iv) pay-for-performance to motivate pro-
ductive effort are available from the author on request. Chapter 2 analyzes endogenous information acquisition.
1.7.1 Incentives to talk and listen
In the analysis we focused on the most informative incentive-compatible communication equi-
librium. From the perspective of the firm, this is the desired outcome. As a result, the manager
always wants to receive any incoming messages. Also, the sender prefers as accurate communi-
cation as possible. However, when the local agent retains control of his activity (decentralization
or partial centralization), he might prefer not to listen to incoming messages. This result is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Incentives to Listen:
Under decentralized authority, agent i would prefer not to listen to incoming messages when
rj > Tj ='_r
Under partial centralization (of j), agent i would prefer not to listen to incoming messages when
r3  Ž_--- _ (1+ri) _ ri.rj ri
Further, T < Tj.
Proof. See Appendix C. n
This results arises from the strategic interaction between the decisions. While listening to
informative messages helps to reduce coordination failures, this reduction is achieved through
the process of accommodation. Because accommodation induces additional adaptation, the
cost of accommodation can exceed the gains from improved coordination. By not listening, the
agent commits not to accommodate, which in turn limits the amount of adaptation undertaken
by the sender. As a result, communication can break down if coordination is sufficiently impor-
tant to the sender relative to the receiver, in which case the rate of induced adaptation (and
thus the cost of accommodation) is large relative to the rate of direct adaptation (and thus
the cost of coordination failure resulting from not listening). For the same reason, the agent
retaining control under partial centralization is more likely to prefer not to listen compared to
decentralized authority, as the manager puts more weight on coordination.
Note that the selection of the babbling equilibrium relies on the ability of the receiver to
commit to not listening. If the sender sends an informative message that he expects to be read,
then the induced component of adaptation will be present in his decision and it is better for the
receiver to read the message and accommodate. Similarly, if the sender sends an informative
message that he expects not to be read, then the receiver would prefer to read the message
because responding to the information helps to improve coordination without the added cost
of accommodation generated by the component of induced adaptation. However, if the agents
are able to take ex ante actions that will lead to inability to understand any messages, a
situation of strategic ignorance can arise where one or both directions of communication are
fully uninformative and the relative performance of the governance structure is significantly
compromised.16
1.7.2 Noisy information
The results presented in the analysis are robust to noisy information. In particular, if agent i
observes a signal si that is equal to Oi with probability Pi but is a random draw from U[-Oi, Oi]
with probability (1 - pi), the expected loss under governance structure g is given by the fol-
lowing proposition:
Proposition 8 Expected loss under noisy information:
( 2 -2 
2 
2
EL4 = A•' ((pi-Oi) 2 + (p3 ~j)2 ) + gji_*V (•Pi) (Pti)
2 +t P9 __V (•og) (p3 j)2
+ (1 pi2) -•2
Proof. See Appendix C m
The model is thus equivalent to a perfect-information model with the states distributed on
U[-9Oi, i], where Oi = piOi, plus a common additional loss reflecting the quality of primary
information. Intuitively, because all the participants are rational, they discount information
in the same way. Conflict exists only over how that information should translate into final
decisions. As a result, the relative incentive conflict between the actors is unchanged when the
primary information is noisy. This is no longer the case if the communication process itself is
noisy, as that does affect the degree of incentive conflict between the agents. Also, if pi are
endogenous, differences across the governance structures arise because of the differing incentives
to acquire information.
1.7.3 Incentive alignment
Even if interim recontracting were not possible, payoff sharing can potentially be used to improve
the outcome under any governance structure. We will outline here the case where the degree
of incentive alignment is exogenously limited. Endogenous degree of incentive alignment is
analyzed in Chapter 2.
Consider a situation where agent i retains a share si of the payoff to activity i and gains
a share 1 - sj of the payoff to activity j. That is, agent i's objective function becomes Ui =
siLi + (1 - sj) Lj. The role of incentive alignment in communication and decision-making is
immediate. As si --+ 1 - sj, the interests of the local agents become perfectly aligned both
16Note that, as in all cheap talk models, the babbling equilibrium always exists. What this result states is
that, unlike in most cheap talk models, the most informative partition need not be pareto-superior.
with each other and with the overall goal of profit-maximization and so the first-best solution
is achieved under all governance structures.
The rates of convergence, however, do differ across governance structures, leading to a sys-
tematic relationship between the degree of incentive alignment and the choice of governance
structure. The pattern that emerges is straightforward. As the degree of incentive alignment
increases, the relative attractiveness of both centralized authority and partial centralization of
the less dependent activity decreases, with both being eliminated as the preferred governance
structure strictly before perfect incentive alignment is achieved. Conversely, the relative attrac-
tiveness of decentralized and directional authority increases in the degree of incentive alignment.
Thus, managerial control to improve decision making and incentive alignment are substitutes.
Finally, the relative attractiveness of partial centralization of the more dependent activity is
non-monotone in the degree of incentive alignment, being initially increasing but eventually
decreasing in the degree of incentive alignment. In the limit of perfect alignment, the choice of
governance structure is made between decentralized and directional authority.17
These results are illustrated in figure 1-11 and they follow from two interrelated reasons.
First, as analyzed in sections 4-6, the governance structures differ systematically in the quality
of decision-making and the value and quality of communication. Second, incentive alignment
impacts decision-making and communication at different rates. In particular, the rate of im-
provement in decision-making is decreasing in the degree of incentive alignment, while the rate
of improvement in the accuracy of communication is increasing in the degree of incentive align-
ment. As a result, the returns to incentive alignment come initially in terms of improvements
in decision-making and later in terms of improvements in communication.
Consequently, both decentralized and directional authority, whose primary shortcoming is
biased decision-making, gain ground from centralized authority and partial centralization of
the less dependent activity when incentive alignment is increased. After a sufficient degree of
incentive alignment is achieved, most of the remaining relative loss is due to inaccurate com-
munication. Because both centralized authority and partial centralization of the less dependent
activity depend more heavily on accurate communication than decentralized or directional
authority, they are eliminated as the preferred governance structure strictly before perfect in-
centive alignment is achieved.
The logic for the non-monotone relationship between incentive alignment and the use of
partial centralization of the more dependent activity is similar. Recall that centralization of
the more dependent activity was used to improve communication by increasing the bias in the
equilibrium decisions relative to decentralized authority. Thus, the initial gains from incentive
alignment make partial centralization of the more dependent activity more attractive vis-a-
vis centralized and decentralized authority. However, as the degree of incentive alignment
increases further, the remaining inaccuracies in communication become the dominant concern.
In consequence, it becomes more attractive to leave both decisions at the local level, by using
either decentralized or directional authority - the two governance structures that rely the least
on accurate communication.1is
17This conclusion is thus highly analogous to Dessein (2002), who shows that in the CS framework, delegation
is always preferred over the cheap-talk solution when the bias between the agent and the principal is sufficiently
small.
lSNote that the logic behind these results was already implicitly present in two of our earlier results. First,
when ri, rj -- 0, the quality of decision-making under decentralized authority improved faster than the quality of
si=sj=0.550
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Figure 1-11: Exogenous degree of incentive alignment and the choice of governance structure
1.8 Conclusion
We have investigated how the allocation of decision rights inside an organization can be used
to influence decision-making and communication among strategic agents when decisions need
to balance coordination and adaptation and when information is both soft and distributed.
Decentralized authority, where each local agent retains control over his activity, is the pre-
ferred method of organization when coordination is sufficiently unimportant to both parties.
The equilibrium decisions are then only mildly biased and communication, while inaccurate, is
also unimportant because each local agent has direct access to his local information.
Centralized authority, where both decision rights are allocated to the central manager, is the
preferred method of organization when the importance of coordination is intermediate to high
and not too asymmetric. By making socially optimal decisions, the manager is able to eliminate
the biases in the equilibrium decisions under decentralized authority. However, because the
manager needs to rely solely on information communicated to him by the local agents, the
quality of adaptation remains limited. The advantage of centralized authority is largest in
the region of intermediate importance of coordination, where the under-coordination problem
under decentralized authority is particularly damaging. As the importance of coordination
grows further, the local agents become increasingly willing to coordinate their decisions under
communication under centralized authority, making decentralized authority the preferred governance structure
for the region of low importance of coordination. Second, when rj -- 1, it was better to choose directional
authority by agent i to avoid the limit losses due to inaccurate communication that were present under all the
other governance structures. The only difference is that in these cases, the incentive alignment arose through
the underlying environment, not explicit payoff-sharing.
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decentralized authority and as a result the decisional advantage of centralized authority is
eroded.
Partial centralization, where one of the decisions is centralized while the other is left under
local control, is the preferred governance structure under two very different asymmetric envi-
ronments. First, centralizing only the less dependent activity is sufficient to eliminate most of
the bias in the equilibrium decisions under decentralized authority, while not centralizing the
more dependent activity limits the total informational losses relative to centralized authority.
Second, centralizing only the more dependent activity helps to improve the information flows
between the agents by increasing the bias in the equilibrium decisions, a gain which outweighs
the cost of increased bias when the dependent activity is sufficiently dependent.
An alternative solution in the case of high dependency of one activity is to simply allocate
both decision rights to the less dependent agent (directional authority). Even if the agent gain-
ing control will make very biased decisions relative to the alternative governance structures, the
allocation does eliminate all strategic uncertainty from the decision-making process. When the
agent losing control cares primarily about coordination, the resulting gains from the full elimi-
nation of strategic uncertainty will outweigh the further increase in the bias of the equilibrium
decisions.
Finally, we illustrated how managerial control to improve decision-making and incentive
alignment and are substitutes. This result followed from two observations. First, the quality
of decision-making improved faster in the degree of incentive alignment than the quality of
communication. Second, the governance structures relying on managerial control (centralized
authority and partial centralization) were more dependent on accurate communication than the
governance structures relying on local control (decentralized and directional authority).
Taken together, these results suggest that the term "importance of coordination" is too
coarse for deriving clean organizational implications. First, coordination poses an organiza-
tional challenge only when it needs to balance conflicting needs for adaptation. Second, one
needs to account for asymmetric interdependencies between activities as they may warrant
asymmetric solutions. Finally, one needs to account for the distibution of the costs and benefits
of coordination among the organizational participants, since the degree of incentive alignment
impacts the relative performance of the different governance structures at differing rates. How-
ever, once these three qualifiers are accounted for, a consistent relationship emerges between
the underlying environment and the preferred governance structure.
1.9 Appendix A: The general solution
We will derive here the general solution to the framework analyzed. We will first derive the
equilibrium decisions, then the equilibrium quality of communication and finally the expected
losses.
1.9.1 Equilibrium decisions
In the final stage of the game, the actors holding the decision rights choose decisions that
maximize their payoffs conditional on their current information. Let m and n denote the
identity of the decision-maker for activities i and j, respectively, and let Wm denote the set of
information held by agent m when deciding. Also, let Em(.) denote E (. Wm) and (3f, /f3)
denote the weights that agent m places on activities i and j, respectively. Then, m solves:
• ((1 - rs) (04 - d,)2 + , (dj - d )2
minEm ((1ri)(Oi)
ndi +O ((1- r) (Oj - dy)2  r(d d)2)
and symmetrically for n. For example, under centralized authority, PT = Oj = 1, and un-
der decentralized authority, f = si,/ = (1 - sy), where si is the share of Li retained by
agent i and (1 - sy) the share of Lj gained by agent i. The first-order conditions are then
= O(1-r)EmO+(f38!ri+prj)Emdj = -(1rj)EnO~j+(pdrj+6'ri)Endi
Define for notational simplicity
,8!n(1--r) O•Tri+f•r O'ý(1 -rj) an 2--fln,ýr. ,'r
al = 6! 6•,r, a2 = Oj+'f8rir bl = and b2 =
which are simply the weights placed on adaptation and coordination by the decision-maker(s).
The first-order conditions simplify to
di = alEmOi + a2 Emdj and dj = bEn9Oj + b2 Endz,
and the equilibrium decisions are then given by the intersection of the two reaction functions
and summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 Equilibrium Decisions:
Let m and n be the identity of the decision-maker for activities i and j, respectively. Then,
d = al(1-b 2 a2 )EmOi+a 2 blEmEnOj+a2b2 aiEnEmOi aEm9  + a2EmEn + ag E n E  ii1-b 2 a2 i3
Proof. See Appendix C m
The logic behind the coefficients is the same as the one discussed in section 4. Absent any
coordination, adaptation by decision-maker m is limited to al. Coordination and the associated
improvement in adaptation is achieved by mutual accommodation. The more decision-maker
m cares about coordination and the more decision-maker n cares about adaptation, the more
m ends up accommodating: a2bj. Equivalently, the more accommodation m is able to get from
n, and the more he or she is dependent on it, the more adaptation is achieved through the
induced component: a2b2a1. The equilibrium biases are in turn determined by the underlying
importance of coordination for each of the two activities and the divisional biases (if any) of the
decision-maker(s). The less weight decision-maker m places on coordination, the more favorable
decisions he is able to induce. The equilibrium decisions converge to first-best when O• -T
and py -> p .
1.9.2 Equilibrium communication
In the communication stage, the agents send non-verifiable messages about their local conditions
to the decision-maker(s). Given the equilibrium decisions from above and letting 3i and Oj
denote the weights placed by agent i on Li and Lj, respectively, the indifference condition for
agent i is given by
Ej (63L (d,(., mL),dy(., L)) + fL (., di(., mL), d(. L)) L
= Ei (OiLi (di(.,mH),dj(.,mH)) + /iLj (.,di(.,mH),dj (.,mH)) 1ImH)
Rearranging the indifference condition and solving the difference equation yields the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 10 Equilibrium quality of communication: Under any governance struc-
ture, we can write the indifference condition defining the family of incentive-compatible parti-
tions as
Ii,k - Oi,k-11 - Ii,k-1 - Oi,k-21 = (rr ,g) Oi,k1 - E40j
with g indexing the governance structure and k increasing away from the expected preference
intersection (Oi = EiOj). The constant 9p (.) is given by
Wi (ri, rj, si, sj, g) ) 2 + ) 2 ,3 2 ]
a1[f,(1-ri)(1-Im=i(1-b2a2)) +(Ori+#jr)(bj-In=j(1-b2a2)) + (1-rj)b2]
= [oi(1-ri)a2bl(1--I,=i(l-b2a2))-(Tirig+rj)al(bi-Im=i(1-b2a2))bl-/j(1-rj)b 2ai]
where Im=i e {1, 0} is an indicator function for whether the sender (agent i) retains con-
trol over his own activity (di). The cutoffs of the finest incentive-compatible partition are then
given by
O,. - E10j = a (ý)fo ( - E9Oj) for Oi,, > EQOj (ne {1, ...,
Oi,n - EiOj = -a (j) Inl (0 + EiOj) for Oi,n < EiOj (n e {-coo, ...,-1}),
where a (p•o) = (e• (0, 1),
with Injl = 1 indexing the furthest interior cutoff and Inl --+ oo implying 01i --+ E2 Oj.
Proof. See Appendix C m
While the equation for 9p appears complex, the intuition behind the equation is straightfor-
ward. Note that both the numerator and the denominator are comprised of three components.
The first component captures how much weight agent i places on his own adaptation, coupled
with how much a marginal exaggeration would improve the outcome through the equilibrium
decisions. This component is always positive in the denominator so that the bigger the weight
on adaptation, the greater the incentive to exaggerate, other things constant.
The second component is the overall weight put on coordination by the agent. In the case of
Im=i = 1, the denominator is negative, while in the case of I,'m=i = 0, it is positive. Thus, in the
case of the agent retaining control, the accuracy of communication is decreasing in the weight
placed by the agent on coordination. This result follows because in this case, exaggeration
allows the agent both to improve coordination (because successful exaggeration would induce
a larger response by the other agent) and to achieve additional adaptation (because the agent
would trade some of the gains in coordination for additional adaptation). In contrast, in the
case where the agent doesn't control the decision, the two decisions are diverging in Imi and
thus damaging the coordination component.
Finally, the third component gives the weight placed by the agent on adaptation by the
other division. This component is always negative in the numerator and thus the quality of
communication is increasing in the weight placed on the other division's adaptation. Intuitively,
since any successful exaggeration worsens adaptation by the other division, this constrains the
incentives to exaggerate. As the incentives of the agent become perfectly aligned with the
equilibrium decisions, i j --+ oo and communication becomes perfectly informative.
1.9.3 Expected losses
Having derived the equilibrium decisions and the resulting quality of communication, the ex-
pected losses follow from a simple substitution of these solutions into the payoff functions.
However, to illustrate the impact of communication, let us look at the outcomes component-
wise. For the adaptation component, we have that
S -(A) (B) EE )E (Oi - d) 2 (1- a 2 (bi)2 E (EmOi) 2 + b2 a1 (b2al + 2b1) E (EmOi - EnEmi)2
(C) (D)
+ EVarmOi + (1-ba2)2 (a 2 b) 2 E (EmEnOj) 2
Here, (A) captures the baseline loss caused by the limit on adaptation imposed by the
need to coordinate decisions, as given by the equilibrium decisions. (C) captures the interim
uncertainty over the appropriate course of action faced by the decision-maker, constituting the
fundamental uncertainty over Oi remaining at this stage and is thus present only when agent i
is not allowed to decide di and communication is inaccurate. (B) captures the cost of the fact
that when communication is inaccurate, even if agent i would make the decision, the induced
component of adaptation is based on an inaccurate message. Finally, (D) gives the cost of
accommodating dj in terms of compromised adaptation. The size of these components follows
directly from the equilibrium decisions.
In a similar fashion, we can write the coordination component as
) (  (A)
E (d - di) 2  1-b2a2) (ba)2  E (EmEnOj)2 + E (EnEmOi) 2
(B) (C)
+ b2E (EnOj - EmEnOj)2 + a2E (EmOi - EnEmOi)2.
Here, (A) captures the baseline divergence in decisions, caused by the need for adaptation.
Parts (B) and (C) capture the strategic uncertainty remaining in the interim stage, caused by
the inaccurate communication and the associated incomplete ability to predict exactly what
the opponent is going to do.
To bring the two together in a simple form, we can rearrange (Oi - di) 2 based on the common
knowledge components, which gives
VarmOi + a2 (EmOi - EnEmOi)2 + (lb 2 a )2 (EnEmoi)2 + (EmEnj)2).
Then, adding up (1 - ri) (Oi - di)2 + ri (dj - di) 2 gives us
b1((1-ri)a +ria1) ((EnEmi)2 + (EmEnOj)2) + (1 - ri) Varm0i(1-b2 a2) 2
+ ((1 - ri) a2 + ria ) (Emoi - EnEmO,)2 + rjb2 (EnOj - EmEnOj)2 .
Now, whether any of the three last terms are present in any given situation depends on
the identity of the decision-maker(s) and the underlying accuracy of information. For example,
under perfect primary information and decentralized authority, VarmOi = 0, but the beliefs
of the two agents will be different, so that the last two coefficients will be positive. Similarly,
under centralized authority, VarmOi > 0, but the last two terms are not present because the
manager knows what he knows. What remains is to solve the expectations, which then gives
the following proposition:
Proposition 11 Expected Losses:
In the case of simultaneous communication, we can write the expected loss to activity i as
ELi = A (A(ýp i)9• + A (Wj)) + A_B (i)9 + A B(ý ),
where Ag is shorthand for Ak (ri, rj, si, sj,g), constants that depend only on the underlying
environment, the amount of payoff sharing present and the governance structure chosen, and
A (x) = (1-a(X))(+a(x))24(1-a(x)3 )
Proof. See Appendix C m
Corollary 12 An alternative way to write the expected loss to activity i is:
ELi = A( + + ±_+ V (Vq) + 2v_(V p ,
A? A g = -
where r_ = - Ai, F '= - Ai and V (pi) = 3B (a ) = 1
In the case of si = sj = 1, the coefficients are:
Adec (1-rj)rj(1-r )2
S 3(1-rir3 )2
Acent_ (1-ri)(1-rj)2 (ri+2rirj+r?)
i -- 3((l+ri) (1+rj) -(ri+rj)2)2
Apart(j) (1-ri)rti(1-r.)2
3(1-rrirj+ri(1-r))
Apart(j) (1-ri)2(1-rj)(rj+2rirj+r.?)3 3(1-rjr,+rj(1-r)) 2
A dir(i) 0Ai  =Aj-dir( i) (1-rL
A; 3rj
Adec ri(1-r)
Z-1 3
ceA t (1-ri)%-% 3
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i-i 3
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1.10 Appendix B: An alternative loss formulation
In the analysis we focused on a loss formulation
Li = (1 - ri) (Oi - di)2 +ri(dj -d_) 2 .
An alternative formulation has
Li = i (Oi - di) 2 + i (dj -d_) 2 = r [(1 - ri) (Oi - d4) 2 ri (d di)2]
where ri = c• + ,8. This loss formulation is analyzed for the general case in Chapter 2 and for
the symmetric case in Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006), so we will only outline the key
differences here. The solution itself follows Appendix A after substituting the weights /3 with
12(1-a(x).
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Figure 1-12: Choice of governance structure under alternative loss formulation
/Ziri in both the decision-making and communication stages and then scaling the final expected
loss with ri.
In the case of symmetric divisions, the two formulations are equivalent because the levels
cancel each other out in both the decision-making and communication stages. In the case
of asymmetric divisions, however, there is a significant difference. The reason for this that
when ri --+ 1, adaptation becomes fully unimportant in the formulation of the present model,
while if /i --+ c, adaptation to Oi remains valuable. Indeed, if cai and aj remain unchanged,
the focal point of coordination remains unchanged and an increase in /i only increases the
optimal amount of coordination. In other words, the focal point of coordination is driven by
the relative importance of adaptation (ai, caj) while the amount of coordination (and hence how
close together the decisions are around this focal point of coordination) is given by (0i ,j) . For
example, if cai = cj and /3i --+ cc, then the first-best decisions are simply dRB = dB = 10.+_10.
The equilibrium decision dynamics, however, remain the same. In particular, under decen-
tralization, as -- oo, d , ddec --+ 0 since the extra weight placed on coordination by agent i
weakens his strategic position in the decision-making stage and thus makes the outcome worse
for him. In consequence, the decisions keep on diverging away from the first-best. As a result,
when coordination becomes extremely important to one of the parties, communication never
becomes the primary issue. Instead, biased decision-making remains the overriding concern.
Consequently, directional authority never arises as the preferred governance structure under
this formulation unless we introduce asymmetries in ai or 0. Also, partial centralization of
the more dependent activity is no longer observed unless some incentive alignment is feasible.
Instead, partial centralization of the less dependent activity is used in the asymmetric settings
to balance decision-making while limiting the costs of inaccurate communication. Figure 1-
12 plots the outcome under two different levels of incentive conflict under the assumption of
ai = aj and k = -j.
The logic behind the impact of incentive alignment on the choice of governance structure
remains unchanged, even if the initial condition is changed. The use of centralized authority
DIHIj // H // //
! ..-•. -•, ,.
•--* IHi
--
and partial centralization of the less dependent activity is decreasing in the degree of incentive
alignment, while the use of decentralized authority is increasing. Partial centralization of the
more dependent activity is temporarily introduced to facilitate communication but is eventually
replaced by decentralized authority. In the limit, only decentralized authority survives. The
only difference to the original formulation is that directional authority is never observed for
reasons already discussed above.
1.11 Appendix C: Proofs and derivations
Proposition 7
Recall that
ELi = Aq 0-0 ) + Fy .V (ýOq) -0? + Fiyj .o O
Thus, increased accuracy of communication is damaging to activity i iff F_ < 0. For de-
centralized authority, we have
g ri(1-r 3 )2  (1-ri)ri(1-r,)
2
- 3 3(1-rirj)2
Rearranging gives
Z-_<7 iff r -= ri
The condition for partial centralization follows equivalently.
Proposition 8
Recall from A.2 that the expected loss under any governance structure simplifies to
b2 (1-r)a +ria2) ((EnEm9i)2 + (EmEn9j)2) + (1 - ri) VarmOi
(1-b2a2.)2
+ ((1 - ri) a2 + ria 2 ) (EmOi - EnEmOi)2 + rib2 (EnOj - EmEnOj)2
First, note that given the signal si, agent i's belief about the realized Oi is given by pisi.
In consequence, agent i's belief about the realization of Oi is distributed U [-Pi i,pi i], while
the receiver's belief upon receiving a message mi is given by piE (silmi). Because p~s cancel
each other out in the degree of incentive conflict, the communication solution presented goes
directly through and can be defined either in the space of signals or in the space of beliefs. The
only component that directly depends on the quality of primary information is Varm9i. When
m =i
E (Oi - EiOi)2 = piE (Oi - pi) 2 + (1 - pi) E (Oi - pxi)2 = (1 2
When m = i,
E (Oi - EmOi)2 = E (Oi - PiEmSi)2 = p2E (0, - piEmOi)2 + (1 - pi) E (Oi - piEmxi)2 .
Now, note first that E (Oi - piEmxi)2 = EO2 + p2E (Emxi)2 . Second, note that
E (Oi - piEmOi)2 = E (Oi - Em9i)2 + (1 - p) 2 E (Em9i) 2
Adding the two components together and adding and subtracting piE (Oi - Em9i)2 gives
Pi (E (Aj - Em9i) 2 + (1 _ P,) 2 E (Emoi)2) + (1 - pi) (EO? + pj2E (Emxi)2
+pE (0i - EmOi)2 - pE (Oi - EmOi)2
(1- p2) EO2 + (1 - pi) pE (Emxi)2 - p2 (1 - Pi) E (Em•i) 2 + p2E (Oi - EmOi)2
and noting that E (Emxi) 2 = E (Em0i) 2 , this simplifies to
E (pi0i pEmi)2 + (1 -) 9
First component is equivalent to the fundamental uncertainty that would be present if the
state was distributed on U [-Piki, p•i] and the second component gives the additional loss due
to inaccurate primary information. The equivalence is thus established.
Proposition 9
The first-order conditions are given by
di = ajEmOi + a2Emdj and dj = bEnOj + b2 Endj,
where
Emdj = biEmEnOj + b2 EmEndi and Endi = alEnEmOi + a2 EnEmdj.
Note that since Endi and Emd i are based solely on the messages mi, m sent, "what you
think that I know" and so all higher-order beliefs (which are equal) are common knowledge. 19
Thus, we can write by repeated substitution
di = aiEmOi + a2 (blEmEnOj + b2 (alEnEmgi + a2 (biEmEnij + b 2 (...)))),
which, after rearranging, simplifies to
=- a (1-b 2 a 2 )EmOi+a 2 biEmEnOG+a 2 b2 aiEnEmOi
1-b 2a 2
Proposition 10
"
9 The solution in the case of an exogenous probability of communication failure is available from the author
on request.
The linearity of the solution follows directly from the quadratic form of the payoffs and
the linearity of the equilibrium decisions in all information. In particular, we can write the
objective function of the sender (agent i) as:
minEi /3 ((1 - ri) (Oi - d, (., m,)) 2 + (3iri + 3jrj) (di (., mi) - dj (., mi))2
m, +[j (1 - rj) (Oj - dj (., mi))2
where mi stands for the message sent, and our task is to solve for an incentive-compatible
partition of the message space. Let Im=i e {0, 1} be an indicator function for whether the sender
retains control for his own activity. Then we can write the indifference condition component-
wise (dropping constant components): 20
A (Oi - d (.,mi))2  a2 (1 - Im=i (1 - b2a2 )) 2 (Ok + Ok-2 - 20 k-1)
-2ala 2 b1 (1 - Im=i (1 - b2 a 2)) (Ok-1 - EiOi)
A (Oj - d (., mi)) 2 = (b2al )2 (Ok + Ok-2 - 20k-1) + 2 (b2al) 2 (Ok-1 - EiOj)
A (di (., mi) - dj (., mi))2 = a2 (bi - Im=i (1 - b2 a2 )) 2 (Ok + Ok-2 - 20k-1)
+2a 2 (b1 - Im=i (1 - b2 a2 )) bi (Ok-1 - EiOj)
substituting back and rearranging gives then:
Ok = 2 0k-1 - Ok-2
+4 [0i(1-ri)a2b1 (1-Im=i(1-b2a2))-(firi+ojrj )al (bi-Im=i(1-b2 a2))bil-ij (1-rj)b2al (Oi - EiOj)a x[i,(_-ri)(1-Im=i(_-b2a2))2+(,6ir+,8jr)(bi 
-I=i(1-b2a2)) +Pj(1-_f)b2 2
or
On = 20n-1 - On-2 + 4 (On-1 - EiOj)
The general solution to the difference equation with the above structure is given by:
W W =•) (01 - EiOj)
let 1 and k be the two different cutoffs. Then,
(4 ~ (,+r+,)2k 1vT) (-i~
define k = n and I = n - x, where x is the distance between the two cutoffs, with x = 1
implying adjacent cutoffs. This substitution allows us to write the equation as
2 0We make the assumption that agent i doesn't have better information about Oj than the person deciding
dj. In the simultaneous one-round case, there is no prior information and as a result this condition is trivially
satisfied
On--Ei (1+ _2( n - = ) -(1-rr) 2 (n-x)
Wp
n
Now, to solve for the most informative partition (which minimizes the absolute size of the
intervals conditional on the relative size of the adjacent intervals being given by W), we let
n -+ oo00. Observe that:
(- )2 = (2-2 T+w
s = WY 1Y-*0oo -+ 0
as long as W > 0. Therefore, the above rearranges to:
0.- a-EiO 7)
On-EOj (1+ VT•) =
Letting On = gives the full characterization of the partition. The solution going backwards
(On < EiOj) follows similarly.
Proposition 11
To solve the expectations we need to use to communication equilibrium (we continue to let
a to stand for ai to simplify):
(a) probabilities
The probability of Oi E [k-1, Ok] is simply:
Sa'-1 (1 - a) Oi > EiOj
Ej a'-' (1 - a) Oi < Eily
where i = 1 indexes the furthest partition.
(b) cutoffs
The cutoffs are in turn given by:
04 = EiOJ . 'i - Ei@j)
where i = 0 --+ 0i = 9 and symmetrically downwards
(c) conditional expectations and variances
From the cutoffs it follows immediately that
EOi = EiOj + a i- 1 (1 + a) (_ - EiOj) i > EiOj
EOi = EiO - ½i-1 (1 + a) (_ + EiOj) Oi < EiO4
48
(d) ex ante expectations and variances
First, note that since learning is a random walk, EEOj = 0. The two components that do
matter are E (Ej 9) 2 and EVar(Oi)
Evaluating E (Ej Oi) 2
00
E (Eoi)2  i-1 (1 - a) (E1O + ai-1 (1 +) (0 - EiOj)) 2
i=1
+ E(Eo ) ai-1 (1 - a) (EiOj - ai-1 (1
_ _
--
Similarly for E (O -- )
Similarly for E (Oi - Ej 0,)2:
E (Oi - E3O0)2 =
+ a) ( + Eioj)) 2
3(-) (Eioj)2)
-- (l_oa3)
oE_ ( ia' (1- a)- ( i-1 (1- a)( - Eioj)) 2
- a) - (ai'- (1 + a) (± + EiO)) 200+ i=1 E (1i=1
i-((1- a))• /E_9 2)EVarjOi = 2 (1-P) (~2+ 3(EO3 )2
in the case of simultaneous one-round communication, EiOj = Ej3 i = 0, and we get the
functions A(x) and B(x) of the proposition. Finally, note that A(x) + B(x) = and that
(1-ax) 1- X2= ITf) +2 )
B (x) _o()) ((2++2vI,)) (2+12 1i_-(X) )3)1i, 12((2+x+2 )a-X)
S(2 + + 2 iv(T))
(2+2 X)3
12((2+2 )3 +3x2(2+2vr)+3x(2+2 -X)2)
4(1+ ,F:-) 2
124(1+ • ) +3x2+6x(1+ ,±-V ))
(1+ X) 2  1
3(4(2+x+2V,/TT)+3x(2+x+2 rV )) 3(4+3x)
Then, to simplify notation for the analysis, we define V (x) = 3B (x) = .4+3x"

Chapter 2
Motivating Information Acquisition
through Organization Design
Abstract
We investigate how monetary incentives and the allocation of decision rights inside an
organizational hierarchy can be used together to motivate information acquisition, support
accurate communication and guide decision-making. We analyze the differences between a
centralized decision-making structure, where local divisions acquire information and com-
municate it to the headquarters that makes the decisions, and a decentralized decision-
making structure, where the local divisions not only acquire information but also retain
decision-making authority. Under both governance structures, the basic tension of incentive
provision is between providing strong local incentives to motivate information acquisition
and balanced global incentives to motivate accurate communication and to guide decision-
making. However, because the value of information and the value of incentive alignment
depend on the allocation of decision rights, each governance structure arises as the preferred
choice under specific conditions. In particular, centralization is preferred only when coor-
dination is sufficiently important and motivating information acquisition is more valuable
than incentive alignment.
2.1 Introduction
One reason for the existence of organizations is their ability to coordinate interdependent activ-
ities. This idea has been embedded in organization science at least since Chester Barnard, who
defined formal organization as "a system of consciously coordinated activities or forces of two
or more persons" (1938 (1968:73), emphasis in the original). However, organizations exhibit
significant heterogeneity both in terms of the degree of interdependence between their activities
and in their organizational architecture.
Two key dimensions of organizational architecture are the degree of centralization of decision-
making and the monetary incentives provided to the organizational participants. This paper
analyses how these two dimensions are simultaneously determined by the degree of interdepen-
dence between the organization's activities. In particular, we examine how the allocation of
decision rights and the provision of monetary incentives can be simultaneously used to improve
the organization's ability to solve problems of coordinated adaptation.
The organization analyzed consists of two (symmetric) divisions, profitability of which de-
pends both on how well the activities of the divisions are aligned with local conditions and on
how well the divisions coordinate their activities with each other. The organization is oper-
ated by three self-interested agents, with two of the agents running the local divisions and the
third agent managing the headquarters. Information about the local conditions faced by each
division is only available at the divisional level and has to be actively acquired by the division
managers (local agents) at a personal cost. Information is thus local and distributed, and we
also assume that the information acquired is soft, in the sense that the agents can talk about
the information they (claim to) have acquired, but they cannot verifiably reveal any of this
information.
While information acquisition is localized, we assume that decision rights over how the di-
visions are operated can be reallocated inside the organization. We consider two alternative
governance structures. Under centralization, control of both divisions is allocated to the head-
quarters (manager), while under decentralization, control of the divisions is retained by their
respective local agents. After information acquisition, the local agents strategically communi-
cate this information (through cheap talk) to the decision-maker(s), and the decision-maker(s)
then choose decisions that maximize their individual payoffs given the information available to
them. Finally, while information cannot be acquired at the level of headquarters, the manager
is able to improve divisional profits by devoting costly attention to them. Thus, all three par-
ticipants need to be motivated through monetary incentives to perform their respective roles
appropriately.
The basic incentive provision problem under both governance structures is clear. While mo-
tivating the manager is relatively straightforward since balanced incentives lead to both good
decision-making and good choice of effort provision, the local agents face an inherent multitask-
ing problem. On the one hand, local incentives are needed to induce information acquisition.
On the other hand, balanced incentives are needed to induce accurate communication and, in
the case of decentralization, good decision-making. The question is then what factors determine
the optimal balance between the two and how this balance is influenced by the allocation of
decision rights.
The basic conclusion of our analysis is that centralization is preferred only when coordination
between the divisions is sufficiently important and aligning the interests of the local agents is
too costly in terms of compromised quality of primary information and managerial effort. In
particular, centralization is preferred only when the equilibrium strength of local incentives is
stronger than under decentralization. However, at the same time, the equilibrium strength
of incentives under both governance structures is typically decreasing in the importance of
coordination. In consequence, our results suggest that the common association of centralization
with weak incentives is not necessarily due to centralization requiring weak incentives as such,
but instead that both are needed when the organization needs to maintain a sufficient level
of coordination among its activities. While the link between the importance of coordination
and the level of decision-making was analyzed in Chapter 1 and in is also analyzed in Alonso,
Dessein and Matouschek (2006), the endogenization of the inter-divisional conflict and the
resulting co-movement of incentives and decision rights is novel.
To establish the intuition behind this result and to present some additional insights, we
will discuss the results in three steps. First, we discuss the basic links among information
acquisition, communication and decision-making to establish the logic behind the equilibrium
strength of incentives. Second, we consider how the value of information and the value of
incentive alignment depend on the importance of coordination. Third, we establish the key
differences between centralization and decentralization with respect to the value of information
and the value of incentive alignment.
The first set of results pertains to the basic links among information acquisition, communi-
cation and decision-making (conditional on the importance of coordination). First, the quality
of primary information, communication and decision-making are substitutes in terms of the
overall organizational performance. After all, it matters very little whether decisions are bad
because of bad incentive or bad information, and whether information is bad because it was
communicated inaccurately or because the primary information was poor. In consequence, one
driver of the choice of inter-divisional conflict is the sensitivity of the agent to incentives to ac-
quire information relative to the marginal benefit from transmitting and using that information
better. The more responsive the agent is to incentives to acquire information, the higher the
equilibrium inter-divisional conflict is under both governance structures. Second, the lower the
equilibrium quality of information, the higher the equilibrium degree of inter-divisional conflict.
This result follows from the inherent asymmetry between the value of information and the value
of incentive alignment. Information retains positive value even under maximal inter-divisional
conflict because some information still gets transmitted and enters the equilibrium decisions.
On the other hand, the value of incentive alignment goes to zero as the quality of primary in-
formation goes to zero since then there is no information to use. In consequence, the lower the
quality of information, the more valuable motivating further information acquisition is relative
to incentive alignment. Thus, conditional on the importance of coordination, the key drivers
behind the equilibrium degree of inter-divisional conflict are (i) the responsiveness of the agent
to incentives to acquire information and (ii) the quality of equilibrium information.
The second set of results pertains to the impact that the need for coordination has on the
equilibrium strength of incentives. First, whenever coordination carries positive value, there
are free incentives to motivate information acquisition: because the benefits of information
acquisition accrue to the division undertaking the acquisition while imposing a negative exter-
nality on the other division, full divisional ownership provides excessive incentives to acquire
information whenever coordination carries any value. Thus, both governance structures can
achieve some incentive alignment without compromising the quality of information and the size
of these free incentives is increasing in the importance of coordination. Second, the value of
information is typically decreasing in the importance of coordination: the need for coordination
limits the amount of adaptation that takes place in equilibrium and thus decreases the value of
information. Third, the value of incentive alignment is typically increasing in the importance of
coordination: under centralization, increased importance of coordination decreases the quality
of communication which needs to be compensated for, while under decentralization, incentive
alignment is used to improve both decision-making and communication. As a result of these
three forces, the strength of local incentives (and thus the degree of inter-divisional conflict) is
typically decreasing in the importance of coordination.
The third set of results pertains to how the value of information and the value of incentive
alignment differ across the governance structures and how these differences then translate to
differences in the equilibrium strength of incentives, quality of information and thus overall
performance. The basic result is that centralization arises as the equilibrium outcome only
when (i) coordination is sufficiently important and (ii) the equilibrium warrants a sufficient
degree of inter-divisional conflict (aligning incentives further is too costly, both in terms of
compromised quality of primary information and reduction in managerial effort). When inter-
divisional conflict is present, then communication is compromised in the case of centralization
while both communication and decision-making are compromised under decentralization. The
cost of each compromise depends on the importance of coordination. When coordination is
sufficiently unimportant, the cost of inaccurate vertical communication is higher than the cost
of biased decisions and inaccurate horizontal communication. Further, whenever centralization
is preferred, both the local incentives and the quality of information are higher than they
would be under decentralization. In contrast, when the equilibrium inter-divisional conflict is
sufficiently low, then decentralization dominates centralization independent of the degree of
incentive conflict.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related liter-
ature and section 3 describes the model. Section 4 derives the equilibrium outcome under
centralization and decentralization and section 5 analyzes the solutions. Section 6 concludes.
Appendix A outlines the general solution that accounts for asymmetries across the divisions
and Appendix B discusses how asymmetries between the divisions, in terms of importance of
adaptation, coordination and environmental volatility, impact both the incentive provision and
the allocation of decision rights.
2.2 Related literature
This paper contributes to and is related to the literatures on authority, strategic communi-
cation, coordination and incentive provision in organizations. The model builds directly on
the framework in Chapter 1 of this thesis and Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006), but
instead of considering the outcome conditional on an exogenous degree of incentive alignment
between the divisions and an exogenous quality of information, we endogenize both the degree
of incentive alignment and the quality of information acquired by the divisions.
In consequence, the paper is more closely related to Friebel and Raith (2006), Dessein,
Garicano and Gertner (2006) and Athey and Roberts (2001), each of which looks at the si-
multaneous determination of incentives and decision-making authority from alternative angles.
The paper most closely related to ours is Friebel and Raith (2006), who analyze a model where
the divisions need to exert effort to generate good-quality projects and the amount of resources
available for implementing the project can be determined either ex ante or interim. The basic
trade-off is thus between motivating effort to improve the likelihood of good-quality projects and
motivating truthful revelation of that quality to improve resource allocation. While interim re-
source allocation contains an element of coordination, the underlying problems are qualitatively
different. To illustrate, in their model, decentralization is always associated with zero incentive
alignment because if interim reallocation of resources is desired, the headquarters is always in
a better position to do so. In contrast, in our model, one of the key determinants of the choice
of governance structure is the relative degree of equilibrium incentive alignment achieved under
the two governance structures. Also, effort to acquire information is qualitatively different from
effort to improve the likelihood of good-quality projects.
As in Friebel and Raith (2006), the basic trade-off in Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2006)
(henceforth DGG) is between local incentives to induce effort provision and balanced incentives
to induce truthful communication. The organization needs to decide when to implement syner-
gies. A functional manager learns the returns to synergy implementation while two divisional
managers learn the cost of implementing those synergies in terms of compromised adapta-
tion. Again, incentive alignment is needed to induce truth-telling by the divisional managers
and appropriate synergy implementation decisions, while local incentives are needed to induce
productive effort. However, because the productive effort is orthogonal to the synergy imple-
mentation decision, the links among value of information, value of incentive alignment and the
allocation of decision rights are not analyzed in DGG.
Finally, Athey and Roberts (2001) consider a problem where two agents need to be motivated
to exert productive effort. In addition, somebody needs to decide which projects to implement,
which impacts the payoffs to both agents. If one of the agents is allowed to make decisions,
then he faces a multi-tasking problem analogous to the other papers: local incentives to induce
effort and global incentives to induce good project implementation decisions. Introducing a
third agent as the decision-maker helps to solve this multi-tasking problem. As in DGG, effort
provision and project choice are orthogonal. Further, information about the projects can be
made readily available to the manager, so that the use of a third agent is always beneficial unless
it carries an additional cost. In contrast, in our model, the problem of strategic communication
limits the use of an initially uninformed agent as the decision-maker even if she carries no extra
cost.
In addition to these papers, the present paper is more distantly related to number of other
papers.
Cheap talk: Communication, both between the local agents and to the headquarters, is
modeled as cheap talk. As a result, the model is related to the literature on cheap talk that has
followed the seminal article of Crawford and Sobel (1982). However, by considering multiple
senders, the setting is closer to Battaglini (2002), but since the agents obtain only partial and
independent information, inducing truth-telling is impossible in our setting absent monetary
transfers. Also, the possibility of preference alignment between the sender and the receiver
makes the payoff structure more related to Stein (1989) and Melumad and Shibano (1991).
Authority, delegation and incentives: The role of decision rights has also been analyzed
from other angles. Aghion and Tirole (1997) show how delegation of a project choice decision
can be used to motivate an agent to acquire information when the preferences of the principal
and the agent are misaligned. Their model, however, takes the degree of incentive alignment as
exogenous and the transmission of information is perfect. Chapter 3 examines how contracting
difficulties influence the allocation of decision rights and how such difficulties can be used to
endogenize the degree of incentive conflict in Aghion and Tirole while leaving a role for delega-
tion that is qualitatively different from monetary incentives. Still, Chapter 3 doesn't explicitly
consider the process of communication. Dessein (2002) illustrates how communication difficul-
ties encourage delegation by showing that the cost of biased decisions is typically lower than
the costs of garbled information following strategic communication in the setting of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). In a setting with multiple decisions, Alonso (2006) shows how sharing con-
trol of complementary decisions improves communication between an informed agent and an
uninformed principal. With the exception of Chapter 3, the models take the degree of incentive
alignment as exogenous. In contrast, the present paper examines how the degree of incentive
conflict is determined in equilibrium and how it depends on the current allocation of decision
rights.
Hierarchies: Organizational structures have also been analyzed from various other angles,
but with the exception of the papers already mentioned, primarily only from a team-theoretic
perspective. The paper closest to ours is Dessein and Santos (2006), who examine a team-
theoretic model that focuses on the limitations that the need for coordinated adaptation im-
poses on task specialization. Coordination in their model is, however, constrained only because
information transmission is exogenously imperfect. Other perspectives include information
processing (e.g. Marshak and Radner, 1972, Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994), problem-solving
(e.g. Garicano, 2000), screening for interdependencies (Harris and Raviv, 2002) and coordina-
tion and experimentation (Qian, Ronald and Xu, 2006).
2.3 The model
The basic structure of the model parallels closely the frameworks of Chapter 1 and Alonso,
Dessein and Matouschek (2006), with the addition of active information acquisition and the
resulting endogenization of incentive provision. The organization consists of two divisions, i
and j, that need to both respond to their local environments and coordinate with each other.
Each division is headed by a division manager (local agents i and j, respectively), who must
acquire information about their local conditions for decision-making purposes. In addition to the
local agents, there exists headquarters (manager, M), who invests in purely productive effort.
If decision-making is decentralized, after information acquisition, the local agents communicate
with each other through cheap talk after which they make decisions. If decision-making is
centralized, they communicate through cheap talk with the manager, who then makes the
decisions.
2.3.1 Payoff structure
Activities: The organization consists of two divisions, i and j. Given the decision di of how
to run the operations of division i, the ex post profit to activity i is given by:
7ri = Kgi - ci (Oi -di) 2 - i (dj - di )2 + yi In eM-i,
where Oi - U [-f, ýi] indexes the locally optimal decision, with 60 and Oj independently
distributed, and dj is the decision governing division j. We will refer to ai (Oi - d) 2 as the
adaptation component and to fi (dj - di) 2 as the coordination component of the profit func-
tion, together comprising the decision-dependent part of the divisional profit. In addition to
the decisions, the profitability of the division depends on the attention devoted to the division
by the headquarters, captured by the effort component, yi In eM-i.
We assume that Ki is large enough so that the organization is worth operating and to
simplify notation, since maximizing profit is the same as minimizing loss, we will focus on the
loss formulation of
Li = Xi ((1 - r) (O, - d,)2 + ri (dj - d,)2 -yj lneMM-i,
where we have simply normalized the decision-dependent part so that the relative importance
of coordination (dependency) of activity i is parameterized by ri e [0, 1] while the overall im-
portance of decision-making to the activity is captured by ai = (ai + /3). We assume that all
monetary costs and benefits of the organization are reflected in the profit and loss accounts
of the two divisions, so that the ex post performance of the organization is given simply by
Li + Lj.
Local agents: The local agents contribute to the performance of their division by acquiring
information about the local conditions to improve the quality of decision-making. In particular,
the local agent i acquires a signal ti of the realized state Oi that is correct with probability Pi
and a random draw from U [-0i, 0i] with probability 1 - pi at a personal cost of
C2'S (p) = -( i + Ivi) (p + In (1 - p2))
where i controls the marginal cost of information acquisition, I E {0, 1} is an indicator function
for whether the agent is also responsible for making decisions, and vi captures the opportunity
cost of decision-making.
The behavior of the local agents is managed through a profit-sharing plan. In particu-
lar, while we assume that (pi, Oj, di) are not contractible, the profitability of each division is
verifiable. In particular, agent i is offered a linear incentive contract
T' (Li, Lj) = Ai - si-iLi - si-iL,
which is used to guide information acquisition, communication and, if given control, decision-
making. The ex post utility of agent i is then given by Ui = Ti (Li, Lj) - C 'S (pi).
Manager: In contrast to the local agents, the manager is unable to acquire information
directly. However, he is able to contribute to the profitability of division i by exerting productive
effort at a personal cost
CM,9 (eM-i, eM-j) = (/M + IvM) (In (1 - eM-i) + In (1 - eM-j)),
where jiM parameterizes the marginal cost of effort, and paralleling the case of local agents,
I e {0, 1} is an indicator function for whether the manager is also responsible for making deci-
sions and vM parameterizes the opportunity cost of decision-making for the manager. As with
the local agents, the manager also needs to be motivated through a profit-sharing plan. The
contract offered to the manager is given by
TM (Li, Lj) = AM - SM-_Li - SM-JLj,
so that the ex post utility of the manager is given by UM = TM (Li, Lj) - C M ,g (eM-i, eM-j).
Assumptions regarding the payoff structure
Incentives: We assume that while the divisional pie can be divided arbitrarily between the
three participants and so used to grow the size of the pie, the pie itself cannot be leveraged
(that is, si-i + sj-i + 8 M-i <! 1). This assumption is crucial to the analysis and to the relevance
of the allocation of decision rights. With the help of a budget-breaker, the first-best could be
achieved and the organizational form would become irrelevant. We rationalize this assumption
by appealing to the possibility of sabotage, since the budget-breaker would always have an
incentive to make the organization fail to avoid making any payments.
We also assume that only the aggregate divisional profit can be measured, without the
ability to separately measure their components (adaptation, coordination and effort). While the
managerial effort provision problem could be fully solved by such a separation, the information
acquisition/decision-making problem would remain (even if attenuated) as long as the adding-
up constraint is present. Finally, we are restricting our attention to linear incentives. In general,
linear incentives are not optimal in the present setting, but the forces that are going to drive
the optimal division of the pie are largely orthogonal to forces that drive the shape of optimal
incentive contract.
Effort Structure: We have significantly restricted the roles of the agents to reduce the
number of dimensions that need to be analyzed, but these restrictions don't appear to play
a significant role in the qualitative nature of the results. For example, in practice we would
assume that the local agents can also engage in productive effort. Such productive effort would
simply increase the value of strong local incentives, leaving the general comparative statics un-
changed.' Similarly, the manager is also often in a position to directly acquire some information.
This, in turn, would significantly benefit the centralized solution.2 However, the localization of
information acquisition captures the idea that much information is location-specific and under-
standing that raw information requires specialization (even if codified information can later be
transmitted).
1'The results in the case of only local effort and no information acquisition are available from the author on
request.2Similarly, if agent i is able to acquire information about 0O, this will also typically improve the outcome
under decentralization. Sometimes, however, such cross-learning can lead to excessive information acquisition.
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Figure 2-1: Alternative governance structures
Local agents invest in information acquisition,
the manager exerts productive effort Decisions are made
I I I
Allocation of the decision rights and Local agents communicate with the decision-maker(s) Payoffs are realized
the incentive structure are chosen through one round of simultaneous cheap talk
Figure 2-2: Timing of events
2.3.2 Timing of events and the choice of governance structure
We will focus on analyzing two governance structures. Under centralization, both decisions are
controlled by the manager. Under decentralization, the decisions are controlled by the respective
local agents. These two governance structures are summarized in figure 2-1, depicting the flow
of information. The timing of events is further detailed in figure 2-2 and is the same under each
governance structure.
First, each local agent invests pi in information acquisition and the manager exerts pro-
ductive effort (eM-i, eMj)to maximize their respective payoffs. 3 Second, the local agents send
non-verifiable messages (mi, mj) about their local conditions to the decision-maker(s). In the
case of centralization, this communication is vertical (to the manager), while in the case of
decentralization it is horizontal (to the other local agent). Third, the decision-maker(s) use the
received messages and any additional information they have available to choose a decision that
again maximizes their respective payoffs. Fourth, payoffs are realized and shared according to
the contract.
The objective in the design stage is to choose an allocation of decision rights (a governance
structure g E {dec, cent}) and a profit-sharing rule {si, sj} that maximizes the expected surplus
generated by the game described. That is, letting u be the identity of the decision-maker
3The timing of managerial effort is irrelevant to the analysis.
controlling di and wA the information available to the decision-maker u in the decision-making
stage under governance structure g, we can write the program as:
mmin E (Li (dg, eM) + Lj (dg, eM)) + CM (eM) + Ci (pi) + Ci (pj)
g,{si,sjl}
s.t. dg E arg minE (su-i Li + su-jLj w, g), u e {i,j, M}
d
m e argminE (sk-iL + Sk-jLjIE (dI|mg) ,E (dlm) ,tk), k E {i,j}
{mf }
Pk e arg minE sk-iLj + Sk-jLj (di mg) , E dj m) , {mg (tk)} +Ck,g (p)
k E {i,j}
eM E arg minE (sM-iLi + sM-jLj) + CM,' (eM),
ei ej
where the constraints simply require incentive-compatibility in each stage of the game: (i)
decisions are individually optimal to the decision-maker(s) given the information available to
him or her, (ii) the messages sent are individually optimal to the local agents given the structure
of the communication equilibrium and the structure of the equilibrium decisions, (iii) informa-
tion acquisition by the local agents is individually optimal given its expected final impact on
the equilibrium outcome, as given by the communication and decision equilibria, and (iv) the
manager exerts an individually optimal level of productive effort. In addition, the beliefs held
by the agents at each stage of the game have to naturally be correct in equilibrium.
Assumptions regarding the timing of events
Renegotiation: The most restrictive assumption in the analysis is our assumption that no
renegotiation can take place between information acquisition and decision-making. First, rene-
gotiating the sharing rule down to 50/50 after information acquisition would clearly eliminate
all incentive conflicts and lead to first-best communication and decision-making. This, however,
would then also feed back into the information acquisition stage. In general, some conflict is
optimal in equilibrium and so commitment to the sharing rule is desired. Also, such renegotia-
tion, even if possible, is highly unlikely in more fluid problems where decision-making problems
overlap with information acquisition problems (so that there is limited fluctuation in the incen-
tive provision problem at hand). More troublesome is the lack of reallocation of the decision
rights or contracting on the decisions directly. While the presence of asymmetric and incom-
plete information is going to hinder efficient bargaining, the question of how much inefficiency
would remain remains unanswered. We appeal to the need for a speedy response to rule out
such intermediate bargaining.
Simultaneity: In this paper we focus only on the case where one round of simultaneous
cheap talk is followed by simultaneous decision-making. Results for the decision and com-
munication stages under the assumption of sequential actions are available from the author
on request. In short, sequential decision-making can be used to improve the outcome under
decentralization and is sustainable in equilibrium. The impact of sequential decisions on the
qualitative trade-off between centralization and decentralization is, however, minimal. 4 Sequen-
tial communication is typically worse than simultaneous communication. Under centralization,
this is always the case, while under decentralization, this is the case unless the variances are
highly asymmetric (in which case alternative governance structures will do better). Continued
communication, on the other hand, can benefit both governance structures. We focus on the
simple one-round case with the continued appeal to the need for a speedy response.
2.4 Preliminaries
Because of the relatively high dimensionality of the model, we will present the analysis in
a number of steps. First, sections 4.1 and 4.2 present the solution under centralization and
decentralization under the assumption of symmetric divisions (rj = rj, ri = rj and Oi = Oj)
and discusses the basic trade-offs that are present. The general solution is summarized in
Appendix A and was discussed in more detail in Chapter 1. In what follows, we will focus
on information acquisition and incentive alignment at the expense of a detailed repetition of
communication and decision-making stages.
Comparative analysis of these two solutions, maintaining the assumption of symmetry, is
then performed in section 5. Section 5.1 analyzes the true and perceived value of information
and the value of incentive alignment to detail the basic trade-offs. Section 5.2 analyzes the
equilibrium under no managerial effort. Section 5.3 adds the need for managerial effort and
section 5.4 adds the opportunity cost of decision-making. Appendix B extends the analysis
to asymmetric divisions and discusses how asymmetric governance structures can be used to
improve upon the symmetric structures analyzed in sections 4 and 5.
2.4.1 Solution under centralization
Decisions, communication and decision-dependent losses
Under centralization, the manager controls both decisions. When the divisions are symmetric,
the equilibrium sharing rule will be symmetric. Thus, to simplify notation, let sM = sM-i =
8 M-j be the share of each division allocated to the manager, s = si-i = sj-j the share of each
division retained by their respective local agents and 9 = si-j = sj-i the share of the other
division allocated to the local agents.
The solution follows by backward-induction. In the decision-making stage, the manager's
information consists of messages mi and mj received from agents i and j, regarding the observed
signals ti and tj, respectively. Thus, the manager solves
minsME (Li + Ljl mi, mj) .di,dj
Taking the first-order conditions and solving them yields a decision rule
4 Main differences arise when the divisions are asymmetric.
dcent EMOi+2rEMO,i 1+3r
where EMOi = piE (tilmi). When the divisions are symmetric (so that in equilibrium the
manager will place an equal weight on each division), the decisions are optimal from the per-
spective of profit-maximization. However, the manager needs to rely solely on information
communicated to her by the local agents. Thus, while the decisions themselves are appropriate
given the information reaching the manager, the information itself is endogenous and dependent
on the degree of incentive alignment between the manager and the local agents.
In the communication stage, agent i sends a non-verifiable message mi regarding the real-
ization of ti to the manager in an attempt to influence her decisions. As long as s > 9, the
local agent places excessive weight on the profitability of his division and the resulting incentive
conflict between the agent and the manager leads to some garbling of information. In the case of
centralization, the quality of communication (as determined by the most informative partition
equilibrium of the cheap talk game) is parameterized by
ent- [0,
which becomes perfect when r - 0 or s --+ and is monotone decreasing in r and Is - 3
for all s > 9. When the decisions face no need for coordination, no incentive conflict is present
between the manager and the local agents: the manager simply implements the individually
optimal decision for each division. However, when the value of coordination becomes posi-
tive, the manager becomes less responsive to local information than the local agents would
prefer. In consequence, the quality of communication is decreasing in the dependency of the
divisions. The bigger the own-division bias, the bigger the conflict and as a result, the quality
of communication is monotone decreasing in the size of the incentive conflict.
Given the equilibrium decisions (dent, dent) , the equilibrium quality of communication by
the local agents ( c(3en t) and the quality of primary information (pi, pj) , we can then solve
for the expected decision-dependent component of the expected loss, which is given by
Proposition 13 The decision-dependent component of the expected loss under centralization
can be written as
ELyent = Aent ((pii)2 + ( 2 + retV (ent) (Pii)2 + retV (cent) (p )2
-2
where A "nt ,rjr 1 cent - A ent Fr~en#t _ Acent = and V (.cent) _ 1
Z -%i- =- 7ri -- All -•-3- -A%' 3 )r an V 4q-3,p e n t "
Thus, division i naturally benefits from more accurate communication by agent i since it
allows for more accurate adaptation by the manager. Similarly, division i benefits from the
increased quality of primary information acquired by agent i since it also improves decision-
making. Intuitively, it matters very little from the perspective of the final outcome whether the
manager holds poor information because it got transmitted inaccurately or because the initial
information was inaccurate. Only the final accuracy matters. The accuracy of information
transmission is in turn measured by V (cent) and the payoff consequences of communication
imperfections are given by Fýnt
However, division i suffers both from more accurate primary information and from more
accurate communication regarding Oj. This is the key characteristic of the model and results
from the fact that coordination in the model is achieved by accommodating the needs of the
other division, which is costly because it compromises local adaptation. Intuitively, if division
j doesn't know what it should do, division i doesn't need to undertake any accommodation and
is thus better off. The presence of this cost of accommodation can provide significant help in
motivating information acquisition, as we will see below.
Information acquisition and effort provision
Consider first the managerial problem of effort provision. Since the choice of effort is indepen-
dent of the decision-dependent part of the loss and there is no cross-substitution of effort, the
per-division effort choice problem can be written simply as
maxsM),i ln eMi + (PM + VM) ln (1 - eM-i) -+ eM-i - SM'Yi
e M-i S M"[ i'+•M"+V M•
The local agents, on the other hand, will invest in information acquisition to
minE (sLi + ULj) + C' (Pi),
Pi
the first-order condition to which is given by
(7ri - (Acent +FeýtV (ý~en t ))) - S ( +ent Fre (cent ))]-2 p?
(1) (2)
where the left-hand side gives the perceived marginal value of information. Part (1) of LHS
gives the impact of information acquisition on the loss to activity i. First, the perceived value
of information is decreasing in r, since the more important coordination is, the less the deci-
sions will make use of any information about local conditions and thus the less valuable any
information is (even when, as stated earlier, a is constant). Second, the perceived value of
information is increasing in Weent. The more accurately the information acquired is transmitted
to the manager, the more accurately the decisions match local conditions. Thus, while the
quality of information and the quality of communication are substitutes from the perspective
of overall performance, quality of communication also complements formal incentives in mo-
tivating information acquisition. Part (2) gives the cost of improved information imposed on
division j through the increased cost of accommodation. Note that as long as s > 9, this cost
is undervalued relative to improvement in division i's profitability. Thus, misaligned incentives
provide free incentives to acquire information. We can see this explicitly by noting that, keeping
the quality of communication constant, the profit-maximizing level of effort would be given by
- ( d + tV ~nt))) - (Ajgent + ~eýtV ((Pýent))] 0i.
Thus, holding the quality of communication constant, (i) setting s = 1 and 9 = 0 provides
too strong incentives to acquire information, (ii) setting s = 9 < 1 provides too weak in-
centives to acquire information and (iii) the incentives to acquire information are monotone
increasing in s and monotone decreasing in 9. Thus, there exists an interior incentive strength
Owith 0 (ent) < (ent) < 1 such that, other things constant, the incentives to acquire
information are profit-maximizing.
To complete the characterization of the incentive provision problem, note that SM =
(1 - s - ) , since there is no point in wasting any incentives. Thus, because the problem
faced by the two divisions is symmetric, we can characterize the incentive provision problem as:
Proposition 14 The optimal choice of (s, -) under centralization solves
min [ri - (7ri - [(AMent + Ajent) + (---2 + -r-n)
p (p? + In (1 -p?)) - [yi Inem_ +(pm+vm)In(1 - eM-i)]
Corolary1 T eotilchcent os ( {ent ,}ender centl o 2[s ("ri-- (~t~ rýei V(" i i en) ) -- 7~
• 
"rx -i•k i )J
s.t. p2  - [s(,,,-. --ri-(Aqent+rntv("ent) ) "Z( e +- ce V("cent))]O2
eM-i (1-s-s Y
eM =1-s-s )-Yi+A~M+L'M
,cent s+gr
% r(s--s)
(2) (3)
For both s and 7, each component has a simple interpretation. The first component is simply
the direct impact of incentives on the value and cost of information acquisition, with a.> 0
and < 0. The solution to this part would give the optimal amount of information acqui-If we take the first-ordernt), conditionsal on the soquality of communication, as discussed corollary:bove.
However, the incentives provided have two additional effects. First, the second componentCorollarygives the impact the opincentimalves provided have os, s under centr quality of communication and its payofflves(cent) a p
consequences, with as(iple >i0 at < as long as s > f. Second, any incentivesprovided to the local agents decrease the incentives of the manager to exert productive effort,
captured by the third component.Fowvr, bthe sind ,cntivespronient hase aw sdimpeitrrttion.l efeThe firsttescn componentisimlthgirescth impact the incentivesprvddhe on thvalealicoty of inormmuiation acqiiin, with payoff>citon se(quenes, -gt v(ýOq ) v(ntcoseuecswih > 0 and to I < 0 as long as s > i. Second, any incentivesprovided to the local agents decrease the incentives of the manager to exert productive effort,
captured by the third component.
2.4.2 Solution under decentralization
Decisions, communication and decision-dependent losses
The solution under decentralization, where each local agent controls their respective decisions,
parallels that of under centralization, with two differences. First, in the decision-making stage,
agent i knows his signal ti and his information thus consists of (i) the signal ti obtained regarding
the realization of Oi, (ii) message mi sent to agent j regarding the realization of ti, used by agent
j to form beliefs about i's beliefs about Oi, denoted EjEiOi (= piE (Oilmi))and (iii) message mj
received from agent j regarding the realization of tj and used by agent i to form beliefs about j's
beliefs about Oj, denoted by EiEj Oj. Second, if s > W, decision-making will be biased relative to
centralization because of the excessive weight placed by agent i on the profitability of division
i. Thus, agent i solves
minE (sLi + Lj Iti, mi, mj)
di
and similarly for agent j. Solving the first-order conditions yields a decision rule of
ddec - l-r)E.0. + (s+s)r E'E, ± ( 2-7)2r2Z s+sr E ((s+r)+r(s+s))zE30J + (s+7r)((s+r)+r(s+s))EEii.
As discussed in Chapter 1, conditional on the information available to the agent and inde-
pendent of the degree of incentive alignment, the equilibrium decisions converge to first-best
decisions both when r -+ 0 and when r --+ 1. In the first case, no coordination is needed. In the
second case, since the payoffs are fully dependent on coordination, the agents become willing to
coordinate even absent any explicit incentive alignment. However, whenever s > W and r is in-
terior, the decisions exhibit too little coordination (and correspondingly, excessive adaptation)
from the perspective of profit maximization.
The role of incentive alignment in the decision-making stage is immediate: as s -- 9, the
quality of decision-making is monotonically improving and converges to profit-maximizing when
a balanced sharing rule of s = is achieved. Since the initial bias in the decisions is largest in
the region of intermediate r, the value of improved incentive alignment (from a decision-making
perspective) is correspondingly highest in that region.
In the communication stage, agent i attempts to persuade agent j to accommodate his
adaptive needs and thus an incentive conflict leading to garbled communication is again present
whenever s > 9. In particular, the quality of communication under decentralization is given by
dec r(s-) 2+'s(1+3r)
Thus, as in the case of centralization, when s -* s, communication becomes perfect as
the interests of the two local agents become perfectly aligned. However, in contrast to the
case of centralization, the quality of communication is now increasing in r. The reason for this
is that while in the case of centralization, the agent is communicating to achieve adaptation
by the manager, in the case of decentralization, the agent agent is communicating to achieve
accommodation by the other agent. As the importance of coordination increases, the amount
of adaptation decreases, thus increasing the incentive conflict between the local agent and the
manager, while the amount of accommodation increases, thus decreasing the incentive conflict
between the two local agents. Further, it is immediate that (fec (s,~, r) < rent (s,~, r) Vs >
and r < 1, since the rate of accommodation is always lower than the amount of accommodation,
and that Iec (s, 9, r) -+ cent (s, 9, r) as r -- 1, since when the problem becomes one of pure
coordination, the rates of adaptation and accommodation converge. However, f (s, 9, r -* 1) <
oo since conflict remains over the focal point of coordination.
Having the equilibrium decisions and the quality of communication, we can then solve for
the decision-dependent component of the expected loss, which is given by
Proposition 16 The decision-dependent component of the expected loss under decentralization
can be written as
ELdec = Aqec ((Pi i) 2 - 2 + Fc eV (dec) (Pi i) 2 + pdecV (dec) 2
+ 1 p 2) ,
where Aec r(rj(s++s(s+r-) pdec rr(s(s+r-)+r•(s+) - Adec
e (s(1+r)+2r)2  i-i (s+er)c>
Fdec - 7ris 2 (1-r)r - Adec - r and V deci - (s+r) ,i 3 1 - 4+3±3 "ec
The basic features of the loss are the same as under centralization in terms of the impact
of pi, Pj and d1ec. There are two primary differences. First, the coefficient A9, which reflects
the equilibrium decisions, was independent of (s, s) under centralization, while under decen-
tralization it naturally dependent on the degree of incentive alignment. Second, the costs of
inaccurate communication are naturally different, with inaccurate communication being always
less damaging under decentralization than under centralization. This result reflects the dif-
fering purposes of communication. Under centralization, decisions are naturally coordinated
but information needs to be transmitted to achieve any adaptation. Under decentralization,
the decisions are going to be somewhat adaptive even absent any communication since the
local agents have direct access to information, but communication is needed to coordinate the
decisions and to improve the amount of adaptation.
Information acquisition and effort provision
The solution to the effort provision problem by the manager is exactly the same as in the case
of centralization, with the exception that the opportunity cost of time is now (weakly) lower
since the manager no longer needs to make decisions. Similarly, the local agents will invest in
information acquisition to satisfy the first-order condition
[s ( - (Anec cr ( 9de ) - ( dec • rdec) io p (o l+ a i
Thus,
Thus, we can characterize the incentive provision problem as
Proposition 17 The optimal choice of (s, is) under decentralization solves
min [-i - (i - [(At + Alec + (P) + ) V (Wfec) p2] 42
- (p + v) (pi + In (1 - p )) - [yi In em-i + (IM) In (1 - eM_)]
[s., (^ +r,_ (Vs, ) )- d3 d7-2 do -2(,e))-) A rv• )0[( , -(qe+rý ,_ )-g(Ajd +r•_, V(Wq,))]0,2+(jA+V)
(-s-s•y
dec r(s-92+gs(1+3r)% = (s+Tr)(8-
Taking the first-order conditions, the optimal choice is characterized by the following corol-
lary
Corollary 18 The optimal choice of s' e {s, si under decentralization solves
-(,,i - [(Aqec + Mee)+ (_de, + Z v ec) OR,
+ [-_z+ pdec.)eV (ces t ) ' O(Adec+Adec) +a(r dec- )V(dec (pii)2
-yi.... ipm 
___ 0eM-i (1-eM-i) -
The first-order condition is thus very similar to the one under centralization. However, while
the solutions are structurally similar, they differ in a variety of places. First, A ec A cent
implying that the equilibrium decisions are different under the two governance structures,
which in turn impacts the value of information. Second, the value and accuracy of informa-
tion transmission generally differs across the governance structures: (oe_ + Frec) V ((dec)
(Fct + Fet) V (•~ent) . Again, this difference translates into differences in motivation for in-
formation acquisition. Third, the first-order condition under decentralization contains a fourth
term, which captures how decision-making is impacted by changes in the degree of incentive
alignment under decentralization.
2.5 Equilibrium outcomes and relative performance
We will perform the analysis of the equilibrium in several steps. In section 5.1 we will first
examine how the two governance structures differ in their perceived and true value of infor-
mation acquisition, which determines the value and need for providing incentives to motivate
information acquisition, and how they differ in their value of incentive alignment, as measured
by gains in the quality of communication and, in the case of decentralization, decision-making.
Having discussed the trade-off between local incentives to motivate information acquisition
and balanced incentives to motivate communication and decision-making, section 5.2 presents
the equilibrium outcome under the assumption of no managerial effort and no opportunity
cost of decision-making. We see that the primary benefit of centralization is in alleviating
the inherent tension between local and balanced incentives and thus arises as the equilibrium
outcome when (i) equilibrium warrants sufficient inter-divisional conflict and (ii) centralization
can provide a sufficient improvement in the quality of decision-making. Managerial effort is
added in section 5.3. The need to motivate the manager makes providing both local and
balanced incentives more costly. In consequence, as managerial effort becomes more important,
the equilibrium conflict between the two divisions increases and centralization becomes more
likely to be the preferred governance structure.
Finally, section 5.4 adds the opportunity cost of decision-making. Adding to the trade-offs
in sections 5.2 and 5.3, we see that when the managerial opportunity cost increases, decentral-
ization becomes the preferred solution also when the importance of coordination is sufficiently
high. Conversely, when the local agents' opportunity cost of decision-making increases, central-
ization becomes the preferred method of organization also when the importance of coordination
is sufficiently low.
2.5.1 Value of information and value of incentive alignment
Value of information and local incentives
To isolate the basic trade-offs, we will begin by analyzing the case where effort by the manager
carries no value and decision-making involves no opportunity cost. The first set of results
pertains to the perceived value of information, conditional on the degree of incentive alignment.
Recall from above that we can write the difference in the perceived marginal value of more
accurate signals as
- idec cent s ((A'ent + FqentV (rent)) - (AMec + FqeV (Wqec))) 2dec cent %dZc
MVp, -MVdec = + (1- s) Acent + pcentV (ent)) - (Acec +Fe L V (pe) i+ 1- S) (( .j -r _Zvw Z - T_ ic)
Similarly, we can write the difference in the true value of information as
MVdec MVcet ((Aent + centV (cent)) - (Aec + decV (dec
pd- dec - + A ent + eV (qenti) - Aec + Fdec V (pec))
Analysis of the differences yields the following proposition:
Proposition 19 Perceived and true value of information:
cent dec vcent(i) If communication were non-strategic and perfect, then MV > MV, and MVent
MV de c Vre (0,1) and s > 1 - s.Ai
Scent - dec(ii) If communication were impossible, then MVP, < MVp, and MV Ant < MVdec V
rE(0,1) and s> 1 - s.
(iii) MVp and MV9, are decreasing in r, MVp is decreasing in s and M1V, is increasing
9in s. Further, MV;, > MV9 when s = 1 and re (0, 1). Thus, conditional on the quality of in-
formation and decision-making, the first-best incentives to acquire information would be given by
< Wg (r) = ( r1 v(A )+r v( _v)) <1
2(r-(A+f V ))+(A+r_-V(p))
(iv) MVcent > MVdec if r > f (s) and s > 7 = . If < MVent < MV7e c . Also, .s) < 0.
dec ~ cent(v) MVP, Ž MVP, for all r if s < 1 (1 + v') 0.911 and for r < F(s) otherwise. Also,
< 0.
V dec - cent
(vi) MVent -•P MVd c and MV, --+ MVP, when r -+ 1,r - 0 or s -- 1/2.
This proposition illustrates the multifaceted nature of the forces that actually go into de-
termining the value of information. Parts (i) and (ii) establish the hypothetical bounds on
the value of information. If information transmission was perfect, then centralization would
actually provide stronger incentives to acquire information than decentralization. In the case
of perfect information, the manager would achieve the profit-maximizing outcome while if the
agents make decisions, each agent will be worse off unless their incentives are perfectly aligned
with those of the firm, thus leading to a lower value of information.5 Conversely, if information
transmission is impossible, then the value of information is always higher under decentraliza-
tion. In the case of centralization, information that cannot be transmitted carries zero value.
In the case of decentralization, the agents are still able to achieve some adaptation and the need
to coordinate constrains the decisions enough so that such adaptation carries a positive value
relative to no response.
Part (iii) summarizes the overall behavior of the value of information. Both the true and
the perceived value of information are decreasing in the importance of coordination. The more
important coordination is, the less adaptive the decisions are and thus the lower the value of
information (given the absolute value of adaptation). Similarly, the true value of information
is increasing in 1 - s because it is communicated more accurately and, under decentralization,
used better, while the perceived value is decreasing because of the increasing internalization of
the cost of accommodation imposed on the other division.
Because the gains to information are disproportionately accruing to the division that ac-
quires the relevant information, there are free incentives to acquire information and there exists
an interior 9 (r) such that the first-best level of incentives to acquire incentives is provided:
5This result highlights the idea that in a broader organizational context, delegation need not improve moti-
vation because other constraints on decision-making might change at the same time. However, it continues to be
the case that if agent i gained control of di while the manager retained control of dj, then the incentives of agent
i would be unambiguously improved (while the overall firm value would be unambiguously decreased) because
the local agent would then be able to induce more favorable decisions without worrying the constraining role of
agent j controlling dj.
some incentive alignment can be achieved without any loss in the efficiency of information ac-
quisition and this alignment is typically increasing in the importance of coordination under
both governance structures. 6
Parts (iv)-(vi) of the proposition summarize the differences in the perceived and true value
of information, which are illustrated in figure 2-3. Because these play a key role in the deter-
mination of incentives, we will go through them in some more detail. Part (iv) (and panel (i))
state that the true value of information is higher under centralization whenever coordination
is sufficiently important and the incentive conflict sufficiently large. Consider first the case of
a large incentive conflict. When r is small, then the equilibrium decisions under decentraliza-
tion are mildly biased while the communication under centralization is mildly garbled. For a
sufficiently low r, the cost of garbled communication under centralization is larger than the
cost of biased decision-making under decentralization. However, as r increases, the equilibrium
decisions under decentralization become increasingly biased, while the value of accurate com-
munication under centralization decreases, making centralization the more efficient means of
using information. Even if the decisions under decentralization eventually start improving, the
value of information remains higher under centralization until the two converge as r - 1.
On the other hand, as incentive alignment is increased, the value of information under de-
centralization comes to dominate centralization for all levels of coordination. To understand
this result, recall that incentive alignment improves communication under centralization while
improving both communication and decision-making under decentralization. Now, communi-
cation is always less valuable under decentralization because some adaptation can be achieved
even without communication. Second, as shown below in section 5.2, the return to increased
incentive alignment is convex in the dimension of communication while being concave in the
dimension of decision-making. Thus, as s --+ 1/2, (i) value of information comes to be driven
by the quality of communication and (ii) inaccurate communication is more damaging under
centralization. In consequence, information is always more valuable under decentralization. 7
Finally, as we reach the limit, both decision-making and communication become perfect under
both governance structures, thus equating the outcomes.
Part (v) (and panel (ii)) in turn states that contrary to the true value of information,
the perceived value of information is almost always higher under decentralization. However,
as pointed out by part (i), this result is not related to gaining the decision-right itself. In-
stead, it is driven by the fact that the distribution of costs and benefits, when accounting for
the equilibrium quality of communication, is different across the governance structures. In
particular, the negative externality imposed by better information is typically higher under
decentralization. This result follows for two reasons. First, the equilibrium decisions un-
der decentralization exhibit excessive adaptation. Excessive adaptation, in turn, increases
the perceived value of information while increasing the costs of accommodation and coor-
dination failure on the other division. Second, in the case of centralization, the perceived
value of information is inherently attenuated by the garbling that occurs in the communication
6 In particular, 8sc9 '•t (r) /Or < 0 Vr and 
~
dec (r) /Or < 0 for r < F '< 1. For sufficiently high r, 83-d (r) /Or >
0 because of the improving quality of decision-making under decentralization. Finally, cent (r) --+ - dec (r) as
r --+* 1.
7 Indeed, because of the structure of the problem, the boundary f (s) is exactly the boundary between central-
ization and decentralization given a fixed quality of information and an exogenous degree of incentive alignment.
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Figure 2-3: Differences in the perceived and true value of information
stage, which is absent in the case of decentralization. 8 In terms of the underlying coefficients,de dc(A-tcent
-Vdec > • V cent because ri - (Afec + FdecV (pdec)) > 7ri - (Aent Fe tV (gcent)) while
(Adec + rdqecV ((p/ec)) > (Acent + fcentV (cent)). However, because the equilibrium decisions
converge as r -- 1, r -+ 0 or s -+ 1/2, so do the perceived values of information.
Value of incentive alignment
The value of incentive alignment, conditional on the quality of information, is roughly the
converse of the value of information, conditional on the degree of incentive alignment. To
understand this result, note that the value of information is constrained by two effects: (i) biased
equilibrium decisions and (ii) garbled communication. High value of information (conditional
on the importance of coordination) implies that the bias is low and communication is accurate.
Conversely, low value of information implies that the bias is high and/or communication is
valuable and inaccurate. Incentive alignment, in turn, generates an improvement in these
dimensions. Thus, in broad terms, high value of information implies a low value of incentive
alignment and vice versa. The qualifiers are that the quality of primary information naturally
affects the overall value of incentive alignment and, on a more nuanced level, the differences in
the perceived value of information translate to differences in inherent motivation.
To look at the value of incentive alignment in a little more detail, recall that in the case of
centralization, this benefit is measured by
My ~-n [(i.ert ± ijcet) 19V(son) (Pi~i) 2 ,MZce t  -- -i +1 F-i ) 4s
while in the case of decentralization this benefit is measured by
8Exactly the converse holds true under costly communication where, once the information is generated, the
agent typically has stronger incentives to communicate that information under centralization than under decen-
tralization. Results available from the author on request.
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Comparing the two components yields the following proposition:
Proposition 20 Value of incentive alignment:
(i) The value of incentive alignment is increasing in the accuracy of primary information.
Holding the accuracy of primary information constant, increasing the alignment of interests
is always valuable and:
(ii) MVcent > 0 and MVdec >0.37 ~~ , >0 and d MV 0
(iii) MVfcent <0 and MVec >0.s ~< 0 and d M O
(iv) MVdec -, MVcent when r - 0 and when r --+ 1.
(v) MVdec > MVcent whenever r > T (s), with < 0
Part (i) makes the obvious statement that the value of incentive alignment is increasing
in the accuracy of information: the more information there is, the more valuable its accurate
transmission is. The remainder of the proposition examines the behavior of the value of incentive
alignment under the assumption of constant pi to better highlight the differences. These results
are illustrated in figure 2-4.
Part (ii) notes that the value of incentive alignment is increasing in the importance of
coordination under centralization but not necessarily under decentralization. The case of cen-
tralization results from two forces. First, the incentive conflict between the agents and the
manager is increasing in the importance of coordination, thus worsening the quality of com-
munication. Second, the value of accurate communication goes down since the decisions are
inherently coordinated and they become less responsive to local conditions as the importance
of coordination increases. The first effect, however, dominates, leading to the increasing value
of incentive alignment. This result holds for all degrees of incentive alignment.
The same conclusion doesn't, however, follow under decentralization because incentive align-
ment now affects both equilibrium decisions and equilibrium communication. Panel (ii) in figure
2-4 illustrates the net effect. To get intuition for the shape the relationship, recall from sections
4.2 and 5.1 that the equilibrium decisions under decentralization are worst at the range of in-
termediate importance of coordination. In consequence, when s is high, the value of incentive
alignment is highest in the region of intermediate r, where the equilibrium decisions experience
the largest relative improvement. In contrast, when s is sufficiently low so that the accuracy of
communication is the dominating concern, then the monotonicity result holds also under decen-
tralization. In the case of decentralization, the reason why accurate communication becomes
more important is somewhat different from the case of centralization. Under decentralization,
the value increases because coordination, value of which is increasing, is dependent on commu-
nication, and any adaptation is becoming increasingly dependent on accommodation. While
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Figure 2-4: Differences in the value of incentive alignment, given pi
the quality of communication is increasing, the value of accurate communication is increasing
even faster.
Part (iii) makes explicit the role of incentive alignment alluded to in section 5.1. Under
centralization, incentive alignment improves only communication, and the quality of commu-
nication enjoys increasing returns to scale under both governance structures. Under decen-
tralization, communication improves both decision-making and communication. In contrast to
the quality of communication, the returns to incentive alignment in terms of decision-making
(conditional on the quality of information) are decreasing in the degree of alignment. In con-
sequence, when s is small, the additional returns from increased alignment of interests are in
terms of communication, while the gains in decision-making dominate under decentralization
when r is intermediate and s is large.
Finally, part (v) (panel (iii)) states that the value of incentive alignment is higher under
decentralization than under centralization whenever r and s are sufficiently large. This result
is the converse of part (iv) of proposition 19 and the result of the logic to part (iii) of this
proposition: as the degree of alignment becomes sufficiently large, additional gains come pri-
marily in terms of improvements in communication. Since communication is more valuable
under centralization, so is incentive alignment.
2.5.2 Equilibrium incentives and relative performance
Before presenting the equilibrium outcome, it is worth briefly summarizing the basic trade-
off between local incentives to motivate information acquisition and balanced incentives to
encourage accurate communication and improve decision-making. First, the two are comple-
ments in the following sense: the value of primary information is increasing in the quality of
decision-making and communication and the value of accurate communication and appropriate
decision-making is increasing in the quality of information. Second, the two are substitutes in
terms of the final outcome: only the final quality of information held by the decision-maker
matters in terms of the overall performance. Given these inherent trade-offs between the two,
we can, without any further analysis, identify three rough regions in the parameters space as
to the relationship between the degree of equilibrium incentive alignment, importance of coor-
dination and the preferred governance structure:
High conflict/low importance of coordination: Decentralization dominates centraliza-
tion. Given a fixed level of incentives, (i) information is more valuable under decentralization
and (ii) more information is acquired under decentralization. Free incentives allow for an in-
creased degree of incentive alignment under decentralization while the higher value of incentive
alignment necessitates weaker incentives under centralization. Note that the former is a positive
effect (more of both) while the latter is a negative effect (substituting one for the other).
Medium conflict conflict/high importance of coordination: Centralization dominates
decentralization. Given a fixed level of incentives, (i) information is more valuable under cen-
tralization while (ii) more information is acquired under decentralization. Because of the higher
free incentives and higher value of incentive alignment, incentives are weaker under decentral-
ization. In equilibrium, more information is acquired under centralization.
Low conflict/any importance of coordination: Decentralization dominates centraliza-
tion. Given a fixed level of incentives, (i) information is more valuable under decentralization
and (ii) more information is acquired under decentralization. The value of incentive alignment
is dominated by improvements in communication and is thus higher for centralization, leading
to relatively weaker incentives.
Because of the nuanced variation in the true and perceived value of information, the resulting
free incentives and the value of incentive alignment, this categorization is by necessity quite
rough. However, it contains the basic logic that carries through the rest of the analysis. The
only thing that remains to be determined is how the equilibrium degree of conflict between the
divisions is determined. The following proposition makes these trade-offs exact:
Proposition 21 The equilibrium choice of incentive strength and governance struc-
ture:
(i) Incentive strength is decreasing in (6, -p) under both governance structures, decreasing
in r under centralization and decreasing in r under decentralization as long as 0 is sufficiently
high (I is sufficiently low)
(ii) Centralization dominates decentralization whenever r > r (0) as long as 0 < 0 (p), where
> 0. If 0 > 0 (p) , then decentralization is always preferred. Equivalently, centralization dom-
inates decentralization whenever r > r (p) , as long as p > (0) , where > O. If • < i (0),
then decentralization is always preferred.
(iii) sce n t (r) > sdec (r) whenever ELcent (r) < ELdec (r)
(iv) pcent (r) > pdec (r) whenever ELcent (r) < ELdec (r)
These results are summarized in figure 2-5. Let us begin with the equilibrium strength of
incentives. To understand this result, we need to recall that while the level and the alignment of
incentives are complements in terms of increasing each other's value, they are also substitutes
in terms of generating final value. Thus, at the margin, the trade-off between the level and the
alignment of incentives is determined by which avenue brings about a bigger bang for a buck.
The fact that typically as/ar < 0 follows from the observation in sections 5.1-2 that the
value of information is decreasing in the importance of coordination while the value of im-
proving communication is increasing in the importance of coordination. The only exception
is decentralization when s is high, in which case the gains to alignment are largest when r is
intermediate due to the additional improvement in decision-making, so that as/ar > 0 for r
high enough.
While the results with respect to r are related to value of information and alignment, the
results with respect to (0, -A) are primarily related to the cost of information acquisition. To
see this result, note that
7 < 0 and > 0.
Thus, the agent becomes less responsive to incentives when 0 increases or A decreases (while
deciding to acquire more information). In consequence, it becomes more efficient to transmit
information more accurately instead of motivating information acquisition. In the present set-
ting, this result is further complemented by the fact that the value of incentive alignment is
increased by the increased accuracy of primary information. As a result, the level of incen-
tives is decreasing in the variance of the environment and increasing in the cost of information
acquisition.
The mapping from the environment to equilibrium incentives then leads to the choice of
governance structure, which is illustrated in panel (iii) and gives the behavior of boundaries
for the three regions discussed above. When there is significant equilibrium conflict between
the divisions, decentralization dominates centralization when coordination is sufficiently unim-
portant and vice versa. As 0 increases or L decreases sufficiently, the equilibrium degree of
incentive alignment becomes sufficiently high that decentralization dominates centralization for
all r. Finally, the costs of inaccurate communication (and so the value of increased incentive
alignment) becomes sufficiently high that motivating any additional information acquisition
becomes too costly and s = 1/2.
To illustrate the differences in equilibrium strength of incentives and equilibrium qual-
ity of primary information, panel (iii) also plots the boundaries for scent (r) > sdec (r) and
pcent (r) > pdec (r). We can see that centralization is preferred only when scent (r) > sdec (r)
and pcent (r) > pdec (r) - both equilibrium incentives and the quality of information are higher
under centralization. This result reflects the higher value of information (and correspondingly
lower value of incentive alignment) under centralization. While motivating information acqui-
sition under decentralization is easier, its value is lower and thus is substituted for incentive
alignment. On the other hand, better quality of information under centralization doesn't im-
ply that centralization is preferred. This is the joint result of (i) the higher value of incentive
alignment under decentralization and (ii) the presence of stronger free incentives under decen-
tralization. Together these allow decentralization to acquire less information but make better
use of that information, thus dominating centralization. The presence of free incentives is also
(i) incentive strength
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reflected by the fact that pcent (r) > pdec (r) + scent (r) > sdec (r) but not vice versa - more
information can be acquired under decentralization even if the strength of formal incentives is
lower.
Finally, panel (ii) reflects the corresponding quality of information. Because of the structure
of information acquisition, the strength of incentives and the quality of communication are
inversely related, since the sensitivity to incentives is inversely related to the current level
of information and because of the complementarity between the level and the alignment of
incentives. The results would be highly analogous if we allowed for a baseline quality of free
information p2, upon which the local agents could improve at cost of
C (ps) = -1 ( e + In (1 - e?) .
To summarize, under each governance structure, the level and alignment of incentives is
determined by their relative value and the sensitivity of the agent to incentives to acquire infor-
mation. The key advantage of centralization is relaxing the multitasking problem of acquiring
information and making good decisions present under decentralization. Thus, the advantage of
centralization is largest when (i) the inherent multitasking problem under decentralization is
largest (intermediate r) and (ii) solving it through incentive alignment is too costly in terms of
sacrificed quality of primary information (high sensitivity of pi to incentives). In consequence,
whenever centralization arises in equilibrium, the equilibrium strength of incentives is stronger
than under decentralization and more accurate information is generated.
The final observation of centralization having stronger incentives than decentralization might
appear counterintuitive in the face of the common association of centralization with weak incen-
tives. However, looking at the strength of incentives under the different governance structures
conditional on the structure being the preferred choice tells a different story. Indeed, three re-
gions can be identified. First, we have the region of strong local incentives coupled with low
importance of coordination. In this region we do indeed observe decentralization. Second, we
have a region of weak local incentives coupled with intermediate to high importance of coordi-
nation, under which we do observe centralization. Thus, moderate incentives and centralization
do indeed go hand in hand. However, this result is not because one would cause the other, but
because both are caused by an environment that needs coordination without sacrificing incen-
tives to acquire information. Finally, we have a region of weak incentives where decentralization
is preferred for all levels of coordination. In this region the incentives are generally very weak
and the relationship carries a flavor of a partnership. This outcome arises when doing more
with what is available is more valuable than acquiring more information.
2.5.3 Managerial effort
So far we have only analyzed the trade-off between incentive strength and incentive alignment
between the local divisions. We will now add the need to induce also managerial effort. The
impact of this addition is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 22 Importance of managerial effort and the choice of incentives and
governance structure:
(i) < 0, < 0.
(ii) (/+)> 0
(iii) The likelihood of centralization is non-monotone in the importance of managerial effort
and depends on (0, p). In particular, the boundary T (0, p, 7) above which centralization is pre-
ferred is characterized by
,,-) < 0 for 'y < ;7 (, p) and > 0 for 7 > (9, p) . Further, > 0 and
< 0.
Part (i) of the proposition is self-evident. To motivate the manager, decreases in s and 9 are
perfect substitutes. In consequence, both margins are naturally used to motivate the manager
when the importance of managerial effort increases. Part (ii) states that as managerial effort
becomes more important, the equilibrium incentive conflict between the two divisional agents
increases and follows from the following thought experiment. Consider decreasing s and 9
proportionately, so that the relative incentive conflict and thus the quality of communication
and decision-making remain unchanged. However, a proportional decrease leads to (i) a decrease
in the accuracy of primary information, supporting a direct increase in s, (ii) move to a more
sensitive part of the cost function, supporting a further increase in s and (iii) a decrease in
the value of incentive alignment, supporting a decrease in s. In addition, there is an increasing
response to incentive alignment (since the absolute distance Is - Is is decreased because of
the proportional reduction). However, the first three effects dominate and thus the degree of
incentive conflict between the divisions is increasing in the need to induce managerial effort.
In other words, as incentivizing the agents becomes increasingly costly, the benefits of aligning
incentives decrease faster than the benefits of local incentives.
With this result at hand, we can then understand how the choice between centralization
and decentralization is impacted by the need to induce managerial effort, which is illustrated in
figure 2-6. Let us begin with the case of -y --+ 0. This setting gives simply the initial condition
of no managerial effort analyzed in the previous section. The figure gives the contours (and
the resulting choice between centralization and decentralization) for varying initial conditions
as given by (0, i). Now, as we increase the importance of managerial effort, the likelihood
of centralization is initially increasing because the incentive conflict between the divisions is
increasing and, as argued above, the advantage of centralization is in managing these incentive
conflicts. Indeed, sj-i = 0 is achieved well before SM-i -- 1, restoring a full degree of incentive
conflict (recall that from the perspective of alignment, incentive conflict is maximal if no weight
is placed on the other division, independent of the weight placed on own division). Eventually,
however, the advantage of centralization is being eroded. Note that this result has little to do
with incentive alignment. Instead, it is the result of the free incentives to acquire information
under decentralization, which come to dominate the picture as SM-i -- 1. Finally, the position
of the point of inflection on the boundary depends also on the initial conditions but reflects
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Figure 2-6: Choice of governance structure when managerial effort is valuable
more the value of managerial effort relative to information and thus how quickly the extreme
incentive conflict is achieved. 9
Letting r' denote the boundary between centralization and decentralization when maxi-
mal incentive conflict is present and no information acquisition is needed (Chapter 1), r" =
lim r (0, ýPY), )the boundary when managerial effort is the overriding concern (which is inde-)-Y--Oco
pendent of the initial conditions), and r'" = min lim r (,, [, y), which is equivalent to 0 - 0
"),---+co
or t -~ o0, we have that
r• > r" >r'.
When no managerial effort is needed, the equilibrium will always exhibit some incentive align-
ment at the boundary because of the presence of free incentives and the value of incentive
alignment. In contrast, when managerial effort becomes the overriding concern, the divisions
exhibit maximal conflict and in consequence, centralization becomes more attractive - r". > r".
Finally, one could naively assume that the maximal incentive conflict setting would be analo-
gous to the case of exogenous quality of information. This, however, is not the case because
of the differing perceived value of information under the two different governance structures.
In particular, because the free incentives to acquire information are higher under decentraliza-
tion when the inter-divisional conflict is large, more information is acquired (which is preferred
because the overall incentives are too weak from profit-maximizing perspective) and thus the
boundary between centralization and decentralization is strictly higher than the boundary in
the case of maximal incentive conflict and free information - r" > r'.
9 As 0 " or p 1, either information becomes less valuable or its acquisition becomes more costly. In consequence,
managerial effort is relatively more valuable for a given 7 and thus the rate at which managerial incentives are
increasing is higher, leading to a shift in the point of inflection leftward.
2.5.4 Opportunity cost of decision-making
Finally, let us add opportunity cost of decision-making. The consequences of this addition are
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 23 Opportunity cost of decision-making:
When decision-making carries an opportunity cost, the dimension of importance of coordination
is divided into maximum of four intervals, where
(i) centralization is preferred on r e [0, r 1 (v, vM)] and on r E [r2 (V, vM) , r 3 (v, vM)] and
(ii) decentralization is preferred on r E [r' (v, vM) , r 2 (, vM)] and on r [r3 (V, VM) , 1] .
This result is summarized in figure 2-7. Two observations are worth making. First, when
managerial time becomes valuable, decentralization becomes the preferred solution both when
coordination is sufficiently unimportant and when it is sufficiently important. To understand
this result, recall that as r -- 1, the solutions under the two governance structures converged.
In consequence, if managerial time is costly, it is more efficient to use decentralized decision-
making, which is equally efficient in terms of the final outcome while carrying a lower oppor-
tunity cost. While centralization is eventually fully eliminated as the managerial time becomes
extremely expensive, it retains its advantage longest in the region of intermediate importance of
coordination where the managerial contribution to the decision-making process adds the most
value.
Second, centralization becomes preferred for low importance of coordination when the local
agents' time becomes valuable. Recall that when coordination is unimportant, information
acquisition by the agents is most valuable. At the same time, communication is near-perfect
under centralization and thus allows for specialization by the agents on information acquisition.
Thus, this result is simply the converse of our first observation.
Opportunity cost of decision-making simply provides an additional dimension that needs to
be considered when choosing the optimal governance structure: how much does the governance
structure improve decision-making relative to its cost in terms of compromised activities. Log-
ically, the manager should not be bothered with trivial questions that distract him from taking
care of other aspects of the business and conversely, sometimes separating the decision-making
function from the local level allows for more efficient specialization in information acquisition.
2.6 Conclusion
We have analyzed how monetary incentives and the allocation of decision rights can be simul-
taneously used to manage information acquisition, communication and decision-making when
coordinated adaptation is needed and access to information is localized. Under both centraliza-
tion and decentralization, the inherent conflict in incentive provision is providing strong local
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Figure 2-7: Choice of governance structure when decision-making is costly.
incentives to motivate information acquisition and balanced incentives to
communication and appropriate decision-making.
motivate accurate
In terms of the overall organizational performance, motivating information acquisition and
aligning incentives are substitutes. After all, it matters very little whether the organizational
performance is poor because of poor decisions or inaccurate information, and whether infor-
mation is inaccurate because it was communicated poorly or because primary information was
inaccurate. In consequence, under each governance structure, the choice of incentive strength
is determined by how responsive the agent is to incentives to acquire information relative to the
gains in communication and decision-making achieved through incentive alignment. Because
the value of information is decreasing in the importance of coordination, value of incentive
alignment is increasing in the importance of coordination and the amount of free incentives
available is increasing in the importance of coordination, the incentive strength is typically
decreasing in the importance of coordination under both governance structures.
However, while the quality of primary information and incentive alignment are substitutes
in terms of overall performance, they also complement each other. After all, accurate commu-
nication is only valuable if there is information to transmit and conversely, information is more
valuable the more accurately it gets transmitted. Because these values are dependent on the
allocation of decision rights, so does the equilibrium incentive strength. In consequence, each
governance structure arises as the equilibrium outcome under specific environmental conditions.
First, whenever the inter-divisional conflict is low, decentralization dominates centralization
for all levels of coordination. This result follows because while the returns to incentive align-
ment are decreasing in terms of improvements in decision-making, they are increasing in terms
of improvements in communication. In consequence, when the equilibrium incentive alignment
is high, the value of information is driven by the accuracy of communication under both gov-
ernance structures and accurate communication is more valuable under centralization. As a
result, decentralization outperforms centralization.
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Second, whenever the equilibrium inter-divisional conflict is high, then the optimal allo-
cation of decision rights depends on the importance of coordination. When coordination is
sufficiently important, then centralization outperforms decentralization because it is able to
improve upon decision-making without sacrificing the quality of information transmission too
much. In essence, centralization is helping with the multi-tasking problem of both acquiring
and using information appropriately. In contrast, when coordination is sufficiently unimportant,
then decentralization continues to outperform centralization because the mildly biased decisions
under decentralization lead to a smaller loss in profitability than the garbling of information
following strategic communication under centralization. However, the two solutions converge
both when coordination becomes unimportant or extremely important. When there is no need
to coordinate, communication becomes perfect under centralization even under maximal inter-
divisional conflict while the equilibrium decisions converge to profit-maximizing decisions under
decentralization when coordination becomes the overriding concern.
The equilibrium incentive conflict is in turn determined by the relative responsiveness of the
agent to incentives to acquire information, with increasing sensitivity supporting stronger inter-
divisional conflict, and the importance of managerial effort, with the inter-divisional conflict
increasing in the importance of managerial effort. This last result follows because the value
of motivating information acquisition decreases slower than the value of incentive alignment
when the provision of incentives becomes more costly. Finally, if decision-making involves an
opportunity cost, then if the cost of managerial time increases, decentralization becomes the
preferred governance structure also when coordination is extremely important, while if the cost
of local agents' time increases, then centralization becomes the preferred governance structure
also when coordination is sufficiently unimportant.
2.7 Appendix A: Structure of the general solution
In this Appendix, we give the key equations behind the general solution and used in the analysis.
The proofs are contained in Chapter and thus omitted.
2.7.1 Structure of the solution
Equilibrium decisions: In the model, coordination is achieved through mutual accommoda-
tion of adaptation to local conditions: di accommodates dj's response to Oj and vice versa. In
particular, letting m denote the agent controlling di and n denote the agent controlling dj, the
equilibrium decisions can be written as
dm = aEmOi + a2EmEnOj + agEnEmOi.
We will refer to af, as the rate of direct adaptation, as it measures the degree to which agent m,
given his beliefs about Oi, adapts to local conditions absent any response by the other decision.g
Similarly, we will refer to ai2 as the rate of accommodation, as it measures how much agent m,
given his knowledge about Oi, will accommodate dj in an attempt to improve the coordination
between the decisions, and to a3 as the rate of induced adaptation, as it measures how much
agent m is able to increase the amount of adaptation, given the accommodation by dj. The sum
agl + ag3 = ag+i3 will be called simply the rate of adaptation. How closely these coefficients are
aligned with the first-best coefficients then depends on how much the objective functions of the
decision-maker(s) deviate from the firm's objective. We will refer to this aspect of the alignment
as the quality of decision-making. The coefficients in turn arise from the weight placed by the
decision-maker(s) on adaptation and accommodation and the resulting decision-making game.
In particular, the equilibrium decisions are given by:
al (1-b 2 a 2 )EmOs+a 2biEmEnOj+a2 b2 alEnEmOi
di 1-b2a2
where the coefficients (al, a2, bi, b2) follow from the first-order conditions of the two agents,
with
FOCm : di = alEmOi + a2Emdj
FOCn : d = blEnOj + b2Endi
Equilibrium communication: Communication is modeled as one round of simultaneous
cheap-talk between the informed local agents and the decision-maker(s). If the equilibrium
decisions differ from agent i's ideal decisions, perfectly informative communication cannot be
achieved because in such a setting agent i has incentives to misrepresent information. However,
partially informative communication can still be achieved, where the accuracy of communica-
tion will be driven by the degree of misalignment between the sender's preferred response to
information and the receiver's equilibrium response. Defining the communication to take place
in the space of observed signals, the cutoffs of the most informative partition equilibrium are
characterized by
Iti,aI = a (ýo() i with nE {-oo,...,-1,1,...co},
where a (Wq) = g e (0, 1).
We will refer to ýo as the quality of communication and it is uniquely determined by the
requirement of incentive-compatibility of the partition, which in turn depends on the degree
of incentive conflict between the sender and the receiver, as driven by the monetary incentives
and the underlying environment.
Equilibrium expected losses: Having the equilibrium decisions and the equilibrium
quality of communication, deriving the decision-dependent component of the expected loss is a
simple matter of substituting in the decisions and taking expectations. This decision-component
part of the expected loss can be written as
EL = A ((Pi4i) )2 + (P )2) + piB (p) (pi6) 2 + 2p__B ) (pA-)2
+ ri %1 oil)
where (pi, pj) is the quality of primary information and (AN, _, Lg_ ) are governance-structure
specific coefficients. These coefficients are determined solely by the equilibrium decisions and
thus the weight placed on adaptation and coordination by the decision-maker(s). The cost
of inaccurate information shows up in two places. First, Pi < 1 implies that primary infor-
mation is inaccurate. Second, the cost of inaccurate communication about ti is captured by
FqB ((p) . The particular solutions under centralization and decentralization, together with
the asymmetric governance structures discussed in Appendix B are given in the following for
subsections.
2.7.2 Centralization
Define
al -= sm-iri( --rj) a2 sm --~ iri -sm -?r,a1=SM-iri+8M-jK-jr' a2  -SiD-i+8M-jD-jrj= 8M~i r-BMj( rj) b2 s8MiKj •-SM_jKljr
sM_jl-sminiri ,8M_jrsj+sM_iriri
Then, the equilibrium decisions follow from above, while the quality of communication is given
by
cent = a l[s-i-i(1--ri)+(8ii•iri+si-jnjrj)b2+si-•(1-rj)b ]
ssi-iri(1-ri)a2bl-(si-iKiri+si - r )alb si2 - (1-r bba '
leading to coefficients in the expected decision-dependent part of the loss of
Acent_ K1ib (1-ri)a +ra) pcent_ (1-ri) Agc ent and pcent Acent
% 3(1-b 2 a 2) - -- 3 - Z-3 -
2.7.3 Decentralization
Define
si-jIS(1-rj)
a si-=i+si-j-jrj I
b= s- j (1-r3 )
_ j-jr,,jr+sj-jsjrj
.2 = Si-irq+8i-jKjrj
b2 
-
Then, the equilibrium decisions follow from above, while the quality of communication is given
by
dec b2al [si-in(1-ri)a2+(siaiiri+si Ijrjr)a?+si jj(1-rj)]
s [i-i.i(1-ri)a2bi+(si-iir±+si-jjrj)a2 bi-si-j~ j(1-rj)b2al]'
leading to coefficients in the expected decision-dependent part of the loss of
-dec ib• (1-rj)a +r2a?) dec ((1-ri)a±+ria2) _ dec and fdec _ ~r i _dec
I 3(1-b 2 a 2 ) ' - 3 -i - 3 i
2.7.4 Partial centralization (of j)
Define
a1 = Si-isi+8i-jrjrj
b = 8M-jIJ(1-rj)8M1 j-.-SMi+ ijir'
a i-iriri+Si-ijr-jra2 = si-i i+s-sijjrj
b2 = SM-j jrj+SM-iniri8M-jr~jnU8M-jri ,j
Then, the equilibrium decisions follow from above, while the quality of communication by
agent i (retaining control) is given by
Sart(j ) bgal[i-(1-ri)a2+(si-i •;iri+si-j rjrj)a +S, ijj(1-rj
vpart(j) =~a [S-r1 2 1 a)
[,i-iri(1-ri)a22bl+(as-isiri+si-j03rj)ajbi-as_-4m(1-rj)b2ai'
which is equivalent to the case of decentralization with the exception of differing constants
bl, b2, and the quality of communication by agent j (losing control) is given by
art(j) blsi-i1 j(1-rj)+(sj-jjrj+sj-iriri)ai sjyIi(1-ri)a]
9ar(p)ip - [ s-j_ (l-r)b2al-(Sj-jr-jry+si-iri)bla-sjy•ini(l-ri)a2bl]
which is equivalent to the case of centralization with the exception of differing constants bl, b2.
These lead to coefficients in the expected decision-dependent part of the loss of
Aart(j) _Kib2 ((1-r)a2+ria2a) FPart(j) _ ((1-ri)a2+ria2) Aart(j) and part(i) = -A7rt(j)3(1-b2a2)2 - -
part(j) _Ka2 (1-rj)b +r1bi part(j) part(i) and Evert(i) - - APart(i)
3 3(1-b 2a2) ' 3- 3i i 3-i 3 j
2.7.5 Directional authority (by i)
Define
a, = 122 si~siirirsi a =
a "- = 9i-i~j (1-rA) b2 -'= s -jrr+si - iri8i_jrffj .•si_i liri , i_jrlj-•si_i liri
Then, the equilibrium decisions follow from above, while the quality of communication by
agent j is given by
dir(i) bi s- (1-rj)+(.s- _jrj+ssj-i iri)a +j-in,(1-ri)a21S[8j _jKj (1-rj )b2 al_-(sj _j Kj rj +sj i i ri)bl a2_ 2•~r)~b]1 sypy(-ryb~at(sypyr~sy-str~b1 -si-iui (1-ri)a bi '
which is equivalent to the case of centralization with the exception of differing constants bi, b2,
and communication by agent i is irrelevant since he controls both decisions. These lead to
coefficients in the expected decision-dependent part of the loss of
dir(i) ~ib1((1-ri)a2+ria7 ) dir(i) _ dir(i) and ir(i) -Adir(i)
i  3(1-b 2 a2)2 i i  d i  -J  - i
dir(i) ~ja ((1-rj)b2 +rjb3 ) pdir(i) (1-) dir(i) and ir(i) dir(i)
A 3(1-b2a2) ' 3- 3 j a -i  -
2.8 Appendix B: Asymmetric divisions and alternative gover-
nance structures
Having analyzed the setting with symmetric divisions, we will now extend the analysis to ac-
count for asymmetries in the importance of coordination, adaptation and the volatility of the
environment faced by the two divisions. We will perform the analysis in three steps. In sec-
tion B.1 we outline the basic impact that asymmetries in the importance of coordination have
on decision-making under centralization and decentralization. Since asymmetric environments
sometimes warrant asymmetric governance structures, section B.2 introduces two alternative
governance structures and presents the equilibrium outcome when the importance of adapta-
tion and environmental volatility remain constant across the divisions but the importance of
coordination is asymmetric. Section B.3 discusses the impact of asymmetries in the importance
of adaptation and the volatility of the environment. Finally, section B.4. considers an alterna-
tive payoff structure where the importance of adaptation for each division is decreasing in the
importance of coordination.
To further simplify the analysis, we will limit the role of the manager to one of a decision-
maker that simply makes profit-maximizing decisions conditional on the information available
to her. That is, her objective function is given by min Li + Lj. In consequence, the whole pie
will again be divided between the two local agents to minimize the expected loss, conditional on
the governance structure. In a more detailed analysis, the weights placed on the two divisions
can, in asymmetric settings, be used to manipulate the decisions made by the manager and thus
the relative quality of communication by the two agents to improve the equilibrium outcome.
However, a detailed analysis of this setting would take us too far afield here.
2.8.1 Equilibrium decisions when importance of coordination is asymmetric.
To understand the impact of the importance of coordination on the equilibrium decisions, it is
sufficient to analyze the case of si-i = 1. As discussed in sections 4 and 5, incentive alignment
will simply provide a monotone improvement in the quality of decisions, with the decisions
converging to first-best as si-i - si-j. To keep the intuition clear, we will temporarily revert
to notation in terms of absolute importance of coordination and adaptation, (Ai, ai).
Under centralization, the equilibrium decisions are profit-maximizing by assumption and
given by
d&ent (a-+(f,+8j))a, EMOi + (,++p )a EMO
Z Qck(ja)(ifj ja1+(aj~eaj)(t3i+P33
which in the case of symmetric overall importance of adaptation simplifies to
(a+2(Pj,+l¾)) M j EMOJ.
(1) (2)
Thus, the amount of accommodation (2) that should take place in equilibrium depends simply
on the overall importance of coordination (Pi + '¾) , while the focal point of coordination will
depend on the relative importance of adaptation for the two activities. On the other hand,
under decentralization the equilibrium decisions are given by
ddec = E 2 +a EjE+9d +  ' ) i fli÷ ai ,E-E-0.
which, in the case of symmetric importance of adaptation, simplifies to
ddec_ =aU Eili + ( + EjEjOj + E3 E 0j.
(1) (2) (lb)
Thus, the amount of accommodation (2) granted by agent i depends primarily on his im-
portance of coordination, P~i. Indeed, the amount of accommodation is decreasing in 3j. As
division j becomes increasingly dependent on coordination, the less accommodation agent i
grants to the division and so pulls the equilibrium decisions in his favor, worsening the equi-
librium outcome. Thus, as we move away from the diagonal, the worse the decision-making
becomes under decentralization. While the less-dependent division is going to be better off
because of more favorable decisions, this gain is more than outweighed by the loss experienced
by the more dependent division. Indeed, in the limit as j -- co, the decisions under decen-
tralization converge to ddec -ddec -= Oi, while the profit-maximizing decisions are given by
-3
det - djnt = ½EMOi + ½EMOj. This convergence was achieved on the diagonal because of the
symmetric weight placed on coordination by the two divisions but not off the diagonal because
of the advantageous position of the less dependent division in the decision-making stage unless
si-i - Si-j-
M M
A
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(C) Partial Centralization (D) Directional Authority
Figure 2-8: Alternative governance structures (2)
2.8.2 Equilibrium under asymmetric importance of coordination
Because of the increasing bias in decision-making when ri $ rj, the conclusion that centraliza-
tion dominates decentralization whenever (i) the equilibrium warrants sufficient conflict between
the divisions, (ii) coordination is sufficiently important to at least one of the divisions and (iii)
managerial time is not too costly continues to hold. However, because asymmetries in the
importance of coordination translate to asymmetries in the equilibrium decisions, partial in-
terference can do even better than centralization. In consequence, we introduce two additional
governance structures, summarized in figure 2-8.
Under partial centralization, only one of the decisions is controlled by the manager, while
under directional authority, both decision rights are allocated to one of the divisions. Otherwise,
the governance structures are identical to centralization and decentralization analyzed so far:
agents acquire information, communicate strategically and then make decisions.
The equilibrium outcome, with the equilibrium strength of incentives and the choice of
governance structure is summarized in figure 2-9.
The diagonal of the figures replicates the instances of the analysis in sections 4 and 5.
As the agent becomes increasingly insensitive to incentives to acquire information, the higher
the degree of incentive alignment and the further along the diagonal the boundary between
centralization and decentralization shifts. Similarly, the more important coordination is to
either activity, the weaker the equilibrium incentives because of the lower value of information.
Also, the equilibrium incentives under decentralization continue to be weaker than the incentives
provided by alternative governance structures for the same environment.
What is new is that when we move sufficiently far off the diagonal, both centralization and
decentralization are now dominated by partial centralization, where the manager takes control
only of the less dependent division. To understand the logic behind this result, recall from
the previous subsection that when the importance of coordination is asymmetric, the primary
source of bias is the lack of accommodation by the less dependent division. By centralizing
only this division, the manager is able to achieve an improvement in decision-making. While
the equilibrium decisions won't become first-best (unless the centralized division is fully in-
dependent), at the same time not centralizing the other division limits the value of accurate
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Figure 2-9: Equilibrium strength of incentives and the choice of governance structure
communication. In consequence, such partial interference can also dominate full centralization.
Again, the manager is used to solve a multi-tasking problem which is too costly to solve through
incentive alignment alone.
2.8.3 Equilibrium under asymmetric importance of adaptation
The final step in the analysis is to consider the situation where the importance of adaptation
ai and environmental volatility 6i can differ across the divisions. The exact avenues through
which they translate into payoffs are slightly different. For example, differences in environmental
volatility k don't directly impact equilibrium decisions or communication. However, it does
change the equilibrium quality of information and the value of incentive alignment and thus
the equilibrium incentives. On the other hand, differences in the importance of adaptation ai
do impact the equilibrium decisions and thus the quality of communication directly, which in
turn changes the equilibrium incentives and the overall expected performance of the different
governance structures.
However, while the exact avenue of these changes is different, the qualitative role of the
parameters is identical. In essence, both ai and Oi measure the overall importance of division
i relative to division j: how important it is to get di "right," consisting of both correct use
of information and the accuracy of that information. In consequence, as ai or 0i increases, it
becomes increasingly attractive to adapt a governance structure that is favorable to division i :
either partial centralization of division j, which can be used to make division j more responsive
to division i's needs and thus facilitating decision-making and communication by division i,
or simply directional authority by agent i, in which case both decisions are controlled by him.
Both structures both limit the need to transmit information about 0i, garbling of which becomes
increasingly costly when the importance of that information increases, and generate decisions
that are biased in favor of that division. Further, as the importance of division i increases, both
si-i and si-j are increasing: relatively more valuable information implies need for stronger
incentives together with increased discretion, which in turn implies increased value of incentive
alignment.
Since the qualitative impact of both variables is the same, we will only detail the impact
of an increase in 0i, a progression which is summarized in figure 2-10. Panel (A) begins with
a mild increase in volatility. The initial impact is simply to skew figure 2-9 clockwise from
the top-left corner (where coordination is most constraining to the behavior of division i),
increasing the region over which j is centralized (increasing i's flexibility) and decreasing the
region over which i is centralized (since the inaccuracies in communication become increasingly
damaging). Panel (B) continues the progression. The clockwise rotation continues, with the
marginalization of centralization and partial centralization of i. Further, there is a significant
expansion in the region over which decentralization becomes the preferred outcome. This
result reflects the fact that the increasing asymmetry between the divisions is alleviating the
inherent multi-tasking problem: the whole pie is increasingly held by the manager of division
i.10 Finally, panel (C) reaches the final stage of the progression. Now the divisional asymmetry
is so large that directional authority by agent i starts to dominate the landscape, with the
initial marginalization of decentralization and later the marginalization of partial centralization
of j. This result follows because (i) getting di right becomes the dominant concern and because
the asymmetry is now so large that agent i can be provided with incentives guiding him to
make good decisions even when allowed to control both of them. Indeed, the final contour has
-2 -240 = 0i, which is still far from extreme and thus highlighting the complementary role of the
increasing degree of incentive alignment that occurs in equilibrium.
To highlight this role of incentive alignment under asymmetry, figure 2-11 plots the share
of each activity retained by their respective local agents. While perfect alignment is not yet
achieved, we can see clearly how when agent i is granted control, he holds a large share of
both activities in equilibrium. Conversely, we see that partial centralization of j remains the
equilibrium outcome when rj is small, and allows for stronger incentive conflict. The reason for
this outcome is that when rj is small, adaptation to Oj remains relatively more valuable, which
can better be achieved by using the manager instead of agent i as the decision-maker for dj,
as this allows for motivating information acquisition through stronger local incentives for agent
j. Again, the manager remains a player breaking the multi-tasking problem when solving it
through incentive alignment is too expensive.
2.8.4 An alternative loss formulation
In the analysis, we focused on the loss formulation of
Li = ai (Oi - di) 2 + i (dj - di) 2 .
10 Indeed, if the degree of incentive alignment were exogenously controlled (and sufficiently large that governance
structures matter), then this would not occur.
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Figure 2-10: Impact of increasing Oi on the choice of governance structure.
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Figure 2-11: Equilibrium incentives under 403 = Oi.
The key feature of this version was that even as 8i -+ oc, the absolute importance of adaptation
remained constant. While the comparative statics of section B.3 can be interpreted in terms of
changing ai, there is also an alternative formulation that naturally embeds such considerations.
Let the loss be now given by
Li = i [(1 - ri) (Oi - di)2 + ri(dj di)2
but, instead of ri = (ai + fli), let ri be constant. Now, increasing the importance of coor-
dination translates into a corresponding decrease in the importance of adaptation and allows
us to directly consider asymmetries in the need for adaptation. The key difference is that now
as ri --+ 1, first-best can be achieved, unlike the case of ai > 0. The difference of this formu-
lation comes in terms of decision-making in asymmetric environments. The decisions under
centralization are given by
dcent _ (1-r )EMOi+(ri+rj)(1-rj)EMOj
(1+rj)(1+rj)-(rj+rj)'
while under decentralization (and full incentive conflict) the decisions are given by
d ec = (1 - ri)8 i + (1- )rEi + (1 -rir EjS1r~, % 3 (1-riri) ji
Now, while decision-making initially worsens under decentralization when the importance
of coordination increases for either division, the decisions eventually converge to first-best when
ri and/or rj -+. 1. The reason for this is that while die , d ec -+ Oi as rj --+ 1 (as above), now
this outcome is indeed optimal since adaptation becomes fully irrelevant to division j.
Figure 2-12 presents the equilibrium outcome under this formulation. As we can see, the
behavior along the diagonal is very similar to the case analyzed in the main body because the
absolute levels drop out in the symmetric case. The only difference is in the behavior of the
incentive strength. Now, in addition to having s -+ 1 as r --+ 0, we also have that s --+ 1 as r --+ 1.
The reason for this is as follows. As coordination becomes increasingly important, two things
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Figure 2-12: Equillibrium incentives and choice of governance structure under varying impor-
tance of adaptation.
happen. First, the value of information is decreasing even faster than under the earlier analysis.
Indeed, the value of information converges to zero as r -+ 1. Second, also communication
becomes less important. This result follows because since adaptation becomes unimportant,
the information content of the messages becomes irrelevant. The existence of messages is
sufficient to achieve perfect coordination since the focal point of coordination doesn't matter.
In this setting, since the decreasing value of information moves the agent to the flatter part of
the cost curve, it turns out that the value of accurate communication decreases faster than the
value of accurate information (since motivating information acquisition becomes increasingly
cheap), thus leading to a situation where incentive strength is increasing in the importance of
coordination.
The big difference in comparative statics occurs when we move off the diagonal. Recall that
in the case of fixed importance of adaptation, moving off the diagonal increasingly worsened
equilibrium decisions and this was managed by centralizing the more dependent activity. In the
present setting, the decisions eventually converge to first-best and instead the primary problem
becomes one of communication. Further, the value of information becomes asymmetric. In
consequence, instead of centralizing the less dependent activity to balance decision-making, now
we observe first partial centralization of the more dependent activity to facilitate communication
and finally directional authority by the less dependent activity to fully eliminate any residual
coordination failures. The logic is thus exactly the opposite of the case where the value of
adaptation remains constant. The fact that partial centralization of the less dependent activity
is not observed at all is caused by the fact that now achieving incentive alignment off the
diagonal is easier because of the stronger change in the relative value of information. Indeed,
now first-best is achieved in the limit when coordination becomes extremely important to either
activity by simply allocating all payoffs to the agent who still cares about adaptation.
For the same reason, the impacts of ri and 0i on the choice of governance structure are
slightly different from that of the main analysis. The outcome is illustrated in figure 2-13. We
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Figure 2-13: Impact of asymmetric environmental volatility on the choice of governance struc-
ture.
see that instead of skewing the governance structures clockwise from the top-left corner, now
an increase in k generates an expansion from the bottom-right corner. The reason for this is
that adaptation by division i is most important when rj is large so that directional authority is
preferred. However, what continues to hold is that as coordination becomes increasingly impor-
tant, centralization and decentralization are compressed away and the parameter space comes
to be dominated by partial centralization of j and eventually only by directional authority by i
(as in the main analysis), while the rate at which the impact occurs and the exact comparative
statics are clearly different because of the differences in the incentive provision problem and
the scaling of the parameters. In particular, the increased smoothness of the transition in the
figure is provided by the fact that when ri is large, an increase in 9j has an increasingly small
impact.
Chapter 3
Uncertainty, Delegation and
Incentives
Abstract
How does imperfect contractibility influence the governance of a contractual relation-
ship? We analyze a two-party decision-making problem where the optimal decision is un-
known at the time of contracting. In consequence, instead of contracting on the decision
directly, the parties need to design a contract that will induce good decision-making in the
future. We examine how environmental uncertainty, quality of available performance mea-
sures and interim access to information influence the joint determination of the allocation
of authority, use of performance pay and direct controls. We use the results from the model
to cast light on (i) the conflicting empirical evidence on the risk-incentives tradeoff found in
work on executive compensation and franchising, (ii) complementarities in organizational
design and (iii) the determinants of the choice to delegate.
3.1 Introduction
Many contractual relationship have two features in common. First, at the time of contracting,
the parties face uncertainty over the future decisions that will maximize the value of the rela-
tionship. Second, additional information about the consequences of potential actions is learned
during the execution of the contract. As a result, instead of attempting to specify the complete
plan ex ante or relying on constant renegotiation, many contracts simply allocate authority
over different decisions among the participants and then use contractual controls to guide the
exercising of that authority. The canonical example of such contracts is the employment rela-
tionship, but most contracts exhibit some degree of open-endedness with respect to the exact
actions that will be taken during the execution of the contract.
This paper examines what factors determine the allocation of authority in such settings
and how the contract can be used to induce appropriate use of that authority. We construct a
model where a single decision that influences the payoffs of two parties needs to be made, but
the optimal decision is unknown at the time of contracting. While additional information is
learned by both parties before the decision needs to be made, the opportunities for renegotiation
are limited. As a result, the parties need to design a contract, consisting of (i) an allocation
of the decision right and (ii) a compensation package (incentive contract), that maximizes the
expected value of the relationship.
We assume that the preferences of the two parties are not directly contractible. However,
there exist performance measures that (imperfectly) track the preferences of the parties. Thus,
while pay-for-performance is possible, the contract needs to account for "The Folly of Rewarding
for A While Hoping for B" (Steven Kerr, 1975). For example, linking compensation to short-run
monetary profits can yield decisions that are very different from those that maximize the net
present value of a project, and linking compensation to the cost of materials can yield decisions
that are very different from those that minimize the true opportunity cost of a project. In
addition to using the available performance measures, we assume that the contract can specify
a default decision and any penalties that the decision-maker needs to pay to (or receive from)
the other party when deviating from this default decision. This component of the contract can
be interpreted either narrowly (as a formal adjustment clause) or broadly (as the degree of job
flexibility granted to the decision-maker).
We first derive the optimal contract, consisting of (i) the identity of the decision-maker,
(ii) the weights placed on available performance measures, (iii) the default decision and (iv)
the penalty scheme, under the assumption of perfect interim information and risk-neutrality.
Second, we examine how the results change when we introduce asymmetric information (specific
knowledge), information acquisition and risk-aversion into the model.
The analysis contributes to the literature on two different levels. First, on the level of
application, the results help to explain the conflicting empirical evidence regarding the risk-
incentives trade-off found in the literatures on executive compensation and franchising. The
results are also found to be consistent with a number of additional regularities found in the
empirical literature on organizational design and franchising. Second, on the level of theory,
the model combines the logic of traditional moral hazard models with the newer literature on
authority and delegation. This approach provides a simple, unified framework for analyzing
the co-determination of authority, job flexibility and pay-for-performance. We hope that this
explicit focus on co-determination will help in providing a more consistent framework for future
empirical and theoretical work analyzing incentive contracts and organizational design.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 reviews the results and
discusses how they fit with the related empirical literature. Section 1.2 discusses how the model
relates to the existing theoretical literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents
the solution under full information and risk-neutrality and outlines the impact of asymmetric
information, active information acquisition and risk-aversion (with detailed analysis presented
in Appendix A). Section 4 reviews the related empirical evidence in more detail and section 5
concludes.
3.1.1 Outline of the results and their relationship to empirical literature
The logic of our model highlights the observation that as the environment changes, various
control instruments are adjusted simultaneously. The predictions of the model regarding the
co-movements of incentive strength, job flexibility and delegation with the volatility of the envi-
ronment, quality of information and quality of performance measures are found to be consistent
with a number of empirical regularities found in different literatures.
Let us discuss first the empirical relationship between risk and incentives. The empirical
literature has been hard-pressed to find a negative relationship between risk and incentives as
predicted by classical moral hazard models (e.g. HolmstrOm and Milgrom, 1991). The work on
executive compensation has found ambiguous results, with some studies finding positive, some
negative and still others an insignificant relationship between risk and incentives (summarized
in Prendergast, 2002). Further, the literature on franchising has found a consistently positive
relationship between risk and the choice to franchise (summarized in Lafontaine and Slade,
1997). While neither the literature on executive compensation nor the literature on franchising
has found consistent evidence of a negative trade-off between risk and incentives, they are also
in some conflict with each other. By making the distinction between determination of incentives
conditional on delegation and the choice to delegate, our model not only provides an explanation
for the lack of evidence for the negative trade-off between risk and incentives but also for the
apparent conflict in the results found in the two literatures, as follows.
The empirical evidence on CEO compensation is best understood in terms of our results
conditional on delegation, since the task structure of CEOs exhibits relatively little heterogene-
ity in the amount of decision rights controlled.1 Conditional on the identity of the (risk-neutral)
decision-maker, the characteristics of the optimal contract are as follows. First, the incentive
strength is increasing in the volatility of the environment and decreasing in the noisiness of
the performance measures. Second, incentive strength and job flexibility are complements.
Third, the default decision is biased in favor of the non-deciding party. Further, if the decision-
maker is risk-averse, then the relationship between volatility and incentive strength can also be
non-monotone.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward. The decision-maker can be controlled
either through performance pay (incentives) or direct controls. The value of incentives derives
from their ability to induce the agent to respond to new information that he otherwise would
not respond to. This value depends directly on how uncertain the environment is, leading to
a positive relationship between incentive strength and volatility. Further, this value depends
on how much flexibility the agent has in responding to such information in the first place. As
a result, incentive strength and job flexibility are complements. Conversely, when the risk of
misaligned performance measures increases, the incentive strength needs to be decreased to
limit the gaming of the incentive contract by the decision-maker. In consequence, the incentive
strength is decreasing in the noisiness of the performance measure and direct controls will be
used instead. Further, because the risk of misaligned performance measures limits the degree
of incentive alignment, the equilibrium decisions, absent other controls, will always favor the
decision-maker. To counter this bias favoring the decision-maker, the default decision is always
biased against him. Finally, risk-aversion simply provides an additional cost of uncertainty,
'Moving beyond CEOs, the confounding effect of endogenous delegation becomes a more prominent issue.
which counters the increasing productive value of incentives as the volatility of the environment
goes up.
Our results thus suggest two potential explanations for the conflicting evidence found on
the relationship between risk and incentives in the literature on executive compensation. First,
much of the empirical work has not made the distinction between the volatility of the environ-
ment and the noisiness of the performance measures, instead relying on the variance of stock
returns as the catch-all for risk. Our model predicts that the signs of these two types of uncer-
tainty should be in opposite directions. Second, even if this distinction is accounted for (as in
the empirical work of Shi, 2006), risk-aversion can lead to a non-monotone relationship between
volatility and incentives and the sign will depend on the amount of noise in the performance
measures. To our knowledge, neither the potential non-monotonicity nor the potential interac-
tion between volatility and noise in the determination of incentive strength has been analyzed
in the empirical literature.
In contrast to the case of executive compensation, where the ambiguity concerning the risk-
incentives tradeoff is present conditional on delegation, our results explain the observed positive
relationship between the choice to franchise via the increased authority granted to the agent
(franchisee) relative to a basic employment contract. When the agent is granted more authority,
more incentive pay is needed to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal. The
remaining question is when should we observe more delegation.
Having derived the optimal contract conditional on the identity of the decision-maker, the
remaining problem is simply one of choosing the party that can be induced to make the better
decision. Our results show that the decision-maker should be the party (i) whose payoff is more
sensitive to the decision, (ii) who faces a more volatile environment, (iii) whose preferences are
hardest to contract on and (iv) who has the best information about the realized states of the
world. These results thus qualify the common intuition that increased uncertainty about the
environment yields greater delegation. In particular, increased volatility faced by the principal
will lead to less delegation unless, first, the increased volatility is accompanied by an increas-
ing informational advantage held by the agent and, second, sufficiently accurate performance
measures exist that can be used to guide the behavior of the agent.
While in many situations, such as franchising, we would expect environmental volatility and
the amount of specific knowledge to be highly correlated, moving the focus from volatility to
specific knowledge (as emphasized by Jensen and Meckling, 1992) also helps to explain why in
some cases increased uncertainty leads the principal to retain more control, such as the case of
offshore drilling analyzed in Corts and Singh (2004). Further, the analysis of active information
acquisition suggests why high-powered incentives to the agent are rarely observed when the
principal retains authority, and thus provides a specific role for the delegation choice observed
with franchising as opposed to simply providing high-powered monetary incentives.
Finally, while we are unaware of any empirical studies that have analyzed simultaneously
all the links predicted by our model, a few recent studies have examined subsets of these
relationships. Consistent with our results, Nagar (2002) finds that in retail banking, branch
managers in more volatile banks are delegated more decision rights and receive more incentive
pay. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) classify executives according to their job classification and
show that the strength of incentives is related to their job classification, evidence which is
generally complemented by Barron and Waddell (2003) and Wulf (2006). With the exception
of Nagar (2002), the impact of the environment on the choice to delegate is not examined.
Finally, Moyer (2006) finds evidence that the likelihood of delegation is increasing in the quality
of performance measures, another aspect that has received only limited attention. To our
knowledge, the distinction between job flexibility and delegation has received no empirical
attention. 2
3.1.2 Relationship of the model to theoretical literature
The present model combines and extends many of the results present in two different literatures:
moral hazard and authority and delegation. We will discuss each in turn.
Moral hazard: While the discussion of the model is framed in terms of decision-making, if
we fix the identity of the decision-maker, then the setting parallels closely models of hidden
action, with the exception of introducing uncertainty over the marginal cost and productivity
of effort. In consequence, the results of the model are related to a number of papers analyzing
the typical effort-provision problem. 3
First, random productivity of effort has been forwarded as an explanation for the ambiguous
relationship between risk and incentives by a number of authors. The key distinction between
volatility and noise has been made in the case of risk-aversion by Zabojnik (1996) and Baker
and Jorgensen (2003), and in the case of risk-neutrality but limited liability by Raith (2004).
While in our model the noise is related to misaligned performance measures, and in doing so,
bears a resemblance to Baker (1992), the results are analogous. 4 We also extend these results
by recognizing the possibility of external controls imposed on the decision-maker through job
design. 5 Further, in contrast to much of the work on random productivity, the solution derived
in section 3 is indeed the optimal contract and doesn't exogenously assume linear incentives.
Second, active information acquisition, which we discuss in Appendix A, has also been
analyzed by Shi (2006). Third, the positive relationship between job flexibility and incentive
strength, and their negative relationship with noise, is present in Holmstr6m and Milgrom
(1991). However, the role of volatility is not analyzed in their model. Finally, since action is by
assumption hidden in all these models, the question of allocation of authority does not arise.
Authority and delegation: Our main contribution to the literature on authority and dele-
gation is in endogenizing the degree of interim incentive conflict through the use of incentive
contracts and thereby identifying contractual complications as additional determinant of the
allocation of authority.
2A related question is the impact of IT on the degree of decentralization. On the one hand, it can facilitate
the flow of payoff-relevant information to the principal (supporting centralization). On the other hand, it can
improve the quality of monitoring and performance measures (supporting decentralization). Further, note that
while improvements in either monitoring or performance measures can lead to decentralization, their implications
for job flexibility are very different.
3The link is clear once one recognizes that even providing literal "effort" is a decision to provide that level of
effort.
4 Rantakari (2007) discusses in more detail the impact of different types of uncertainty on the choice of incentive
strength.
5While some attention has been given to action-contingent transfers, to our knowledge nobody has considered
the role that the "default decision" can play in the solution.
In our analysis of the choice to delegate, the model resembles most closely Prendergast
(2002). The direct overlap of the underlying forces, however, is limited to the role of specific
knowledge. In our model, the relative sensitivity of the payoffs to the decision, the volatility
of the environment and the level of noise in the performance measures provide independent
reasons for delegation, even absent any informational advantage by one of the parties. Also, we
do not need to make the assumption of exogenous cost of measuring inputs and outputs (where
measuring inputs is cheaper than measuring outputs) that is made in Prendergast (2002).
Further, as discussed above, the optimal contract can exhibit significant heterogeneity even
conditional on the identity of the decision-maker, a feature not present in Prendergast (2002).
Three other models are related. First, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show how delegation
improves the incentives of the agent to acquire information. The model, however, is silent
on monetary compensation and assumes an asymmetric and exogenous degree of congruence
between the preferences of the agent and the principal. Our model shows how the accuracy
of available performance measures can provide microfoundations for such asymmetric degree
of congruence. Further, the incentive effect is somewhat more nuanced in our setting and is
discussed in the end of section 3 and in Appendix A. In particular, the model suggests why
monetary incentives cannot be used as a substitute for the motivating role of delegation, even
if their provision would be feasible.
Second, Dessein (2002) contrasts delegation and communication solutions in the setting of
Crawford and Sobel (1982). He shows that, given a fixed bias, increased uncertainty leads to
worse average quality of communication while leaving delegation unaffected, making delega-
tion more likely in more uncertain environments. His model can thus be seen as providing
microfoundations for the relationship between volatility and informational asymmetry, even if
the model remains silent on incentives. Third, Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006) and
Chapter 1 of this thesis analyze an alternative model where the relative quality of the commu-
nication and delegation solutions is unaffected by the overall level of volatility and the choice
to delegate is driven by the importance of coordination between decisions. 6 Taken together,
these results suggest that the link between volatility and informational asymmetries is likely to
be context-specific and something that needs to be accounted for. In contrast to the last three
papers, we take the amount of informational asymmetry remaining in the decision-making stage
as an exogenous parameter.78
3.2 The model
We consider a contracting problem where two parties come together and need to sign a contract
to make a decision, d, optimal choice of which is uncertain at the time of contracting. Both
6 0n the role of coordination in organizational design, see also Dessein, Garicano and Gertner (2005), Friebel
and Raith (2006) and Hart and Holmstrom (2002).
7 On problems of communication, see also Crawford and Sobel (1982), Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) and
Alonso (2006).
8There also exists a large descriptive literature on organizational and contractual design. See, for example,
Simon (1947) on authority, Williamson (1975) on adaptation, Jensen and Meckling (1992) on specific knowledge
and Klein (1995) on franchising.
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parties are risk-neutral. Our goal is to study the joint determination of the allocation of the
decision right, the degree of incentive provision and any potential constraints put on the decision
itself, given the underlying environment. While the model is fully symmetric, in our discussion
we will frame it as a principal-agent relationship. The relationship of the model to models of
hidden action is discussed in Appendix A.5.
3.2.1 Preferences
The utilities of the principal and the agent are given by
Up = Kp - y(Op - d)2  and UA = KA (OA - d) 2,
where p ) N(( " )( p A
OA A UPA A
The relative importance of the decision to the principal is measured by y, with -y E (0, co). Kp
and KA measure the maximum private returns to the principal and the agent, and Op and OA
index the decision that would realize these maximum private returns to the principal and the
agent, respectively. We will refer to Op and OA as the states of the principal and the agent. At
the time of contracting, the distributions of the states are common knowledge, but their exact
realizations are not.9 While it is only the realized incentive conflict lOp - AJA that matters for
the payoffs, as we will see, the information contained in 1 P - A/AI and UPA will be used by the
optimal contract to manage the realized incentive conflict.
As an example, consider the problem of managing an R&D project. While there is naturally
a need to induce literal effort, there are also likely to be a number of decisions that need to be
made during the project: what avenues of research to explore, what components to develop,
what equipment to purchase and so forth. Let the principal be the firm and the agent the R&D
lab. Then, Op will index the decision that will maximize the firm value while OA will index the
decision that will maximize the utility of the R&D lab absent any outcome-dependent transfers
and includes aspects such as knowledge generation and professional satisfaction.
3.2.2 Performance measures
We assume that there are two performance measures available, given by
.Xp(sp,d) = -(sp - d)2 + EXp and XA(SA,d) = -(sA - d) 2 + EXA,
where si = Oi + e~i, with ei - N(0, a,). Under our assumption of risk-neutrality through-
out the main analysis, exi play no role in the optimal incentive contract. 10 The key behind the
9The model is silent on the existence of assets and asset ownership. In a more microfoundational model,
(OA, Op) can potentially be directly manipulated through reallocation of asset ownership, as in Holmstrom (1999).10Risk-aversion is discussed in Appendix A.3.
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analysis is the presence of ei, which implies that the available performance measures are never
perfectly aligned ex post with what the principal or the agent would have wanted to measure,
and it is this ex post misalignment that causes the decision-maker always to choose subopti-
mally. This logic parallels the basic idea of Baker (1992) regarding misaligned performance
measures.
In our R&D example, depending on the basic structure of compensation, sp might index
the project that will generate the largest revenue stream while SA might be the project with
the smallest monetary cost. Thus, sp will be missing the non-monetary value-added of the
project realized by the principal, while SA will be missing the private development costs and
professional prestige realized by the agent. Note also the distinction between si and Xi. If si
is the project that maximizes the revenue stream, Xi is the revenue stream that is actually
realized. Thus, Xi is always verifiable, while si might not be.
In addition to the output-based measures, we assume that decision-contingent transfers can
be made based on
Xd(l, d) = - d)
where d is a default decision to be determined by the contract. While the direct interpretation
of this component is formal decision-contingent transfers, we prefer the broader interpretation
of general job flexibility granted to the agent. The basic idea is that job design can be used to
make some actions more costly than others.
Given the contractible variables, the decision-maker is then offered a linear contract of the
form
T (d) a= iX + B.
As we will show in section 3, given the structure of si and the possibility of making trans-
fers based on Id - dl , this linear contract is optimal, which makes the question of whether si
are verifiable irrelevant for this analysis. When decision-contingent transfers are not available,
unconditional linear incentives will no longer in general be optimal, an aspect which is discussed
in Appendix A.4. Similarly, if such transfers involve any waste (as one could expect if the cost
of different choices is managed through various bureaucratic measures), the optimality of the
linear contract is lost."
3.2.3 Timing and information
The timing of events is summarized in figure 3-1. At t = 0, the principal offers a contract
that consists of a default decision d, weights placed on the performance measures and decision-
"lHowever, the forces controlling the shape of the performance contract are very different from the variables
determining the overall strength of incentives and the identity of the decision-maker. Thus, the logic of the model
generalizes and the comparative statics remain almost identical. The only notable difference is in the impact
of the correlation p between the preferences of the agent and the principal. When decision-contingent transfers
are available, p is used with the help of decision-contingent transfers to translate information contained in Oi
about Oj directly into the final decision, while when such transfers are not available, p is used only to predict the
expected size of the incentive conflict.
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I I I
t=0 t=l t=2
Principal offers a contract Private information The decision is made, as
(a,B,g,d) is realized induced by the contract
Agent accepts or rejects Payoffs are realized
Figure 3-1: Timing of Events
contingent transfers a, a fixed transfer B and the identity of the decision-maker g E {P, A}.
We assume that both parties have deep pockets and so the optimization problem becomes one
of maximizing the ex ante total surplus, which in turn is equivalent to minimizing the total
expected loss. Substituting out B, we can write this optimization problem as
minE ((Op - d*)2 + (OA - d*)2)g,oa,d
s.t. d* E arg maxE (UA (.) + Tg (.) Iwg),
d
where w indexes the information held by the decision-maker in the decision-making stage.
At t = 1, information about (OA, SA, OP, sp) is realized. In our main analysis we will focus on
the case where both parties learn all information. As we will see, there is some redundancy,
as the solution is equivalent to the case where the agent learns OA and sp, while the principal
learns 0p and SA. We assume that renegotiation at this stage is not possible.12 Finally, at
t = 2, the decision is made by the agent controlling the decision right, as induced by incentive
contract and the realization of (OA, 8 A, Op, Sp). The purpose of the incentive contract (a,-) is
to induce as good decision-making as possible, given the available performance measures. Given
the optimal contract for both agents, we will then choose as the decision-maker the party g
who, in expectation, will make better decisions.
12While our assumption of prohibitively costly renegotiation is extreme, the assumption of costless renegotiation
is also for many purposes a theoretical abstraction. First, even if each party had full information, costless Nash
bargaining is unlikely to take place. In practice, renegotiation costs both time and money as the parties are trying
to capture a larger share of the available surplus (e.g. Williamson, 1985 and Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978).
Second, the presence of asymmetric information (introduced in section 3.4.1) would complicate the renegotiation
process further. As long as there are some costs of renegotiation, there is a region over which decisions are
not renegotiated ex post, even if total surplus could be increased absent such costs. The higher the costs are,
the larger this region is and within this region, we still need a contract that will control the behavior of the
decision-maker. Further, the better the contract is, the less often it needs to be renegotiated and the greater the
resource savings.
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3.3 Analysis
We begin our analysis by discussing the optimal contract and show how it can be implemented
in the present environment with the simple linear contract discussed above. We then present
the solution to the optimal contract under the assumption of zero correlation of preferences, as
this is sufficient to understanding the key determinants in the relationship between volatility of
the environment and the strength of incentives. Finally, we discuss what additional insights can
be gained from the general solution and from extensions to imperfect information, information
acquisition and risk-aversion by the agent. A more detailed exposition of these extensions and
other observations is presented in Appendix A.
3.3.1 Optimal contracts
The key to understanding the structure of the optimal incentive contract is to recognize that
the purpose of the contract is to control the responsiveness of the decision-maker to information
about (OA, SA, OP, Sp). If the preferences of the two parties were directly contractible, then the
first-best decision would be given by
min'y (Op - d)2 + (A - d) 2 -- dF B  OP+OA
d 1+7
The agency problem in the model is generated by the fact that OA and Op are not con-
tractible. Instead, while the decision-maker i will fully internalize his own state Oi, he can be
induced to care only about the realization of sj, which, because of the presence of ej, will never
exactly match the preferences of the non-deciding party Oj. Consider the case where the agent
controls the decision right. Now, SA is clearly redundant as a performance measure since the
agent already knows and fully internalizes OA. Similarly, since 0Op is non-contractible and the
agent has perfect information about sp, Op is redundant as well. Thus, the only information
that can be brought to bear on the agent's decision is (OA, Sp).
Consider now the following problem: given information about (OA, SP), what decision will
maximize the expected total surplus? That is, given the information that can be used to bear
on the decision, what is the optimal way to use that information. This second-best decision is
given by
dsB = -yE(Oplsp,0A)+OA1+•/
By Bayesian updating, E (OpISp, OA) = /30 P + - 1 SP 2+ 0 A, where the coefficients are de-
termined by the overall and relative informativeness of (sp, OA). Thus, the second-best decision
will be linear in the information of the agent:
dsB - 6o0p + 6 ISP + 6 20A •
We next show that an appropriate contract can induce this second-best decision. Given the
linear contract
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T (.) = B- ap (sp - d)2 - aA (SA - d)2 - aD d)2
and individual utility
U (.) = KA - (A - d)2 ,
the agent's first-order condition can be written as
dA -. %0 + 7 1 SP + 772SA + 773OA.
Thus, it is immediate that 472 = 0 since, as mentioned above, SA contains no additional in-
formation (over OA) about Op. The solution of (ap, aD, ) then follows from a direct matching
of the coefficients to induce the agent to respond to incoming information as a decision-maker
who makes optimal decisions conditional on information only about (sp, OA). Such a solution
exists and thus the linear form of the contract is optimal. A corollary of this result is that the
linear delegation contract based on (sp, OA) always dominates an ex ante contract based on
(sp, SA), even if such a contingent ex ante contract was feasible.
3.3.2 Solution under zero correlation
Delegation
Consider first the case where the correlation p between OA and Op is zero to highlight how the
optimal incentive strength varies with o2 and a2 .Since A contains no information aboutp,
22
E (Op Isp, OA) = 2 p +P - 2 8Psp,Up±-}O'• p Upbr
which implies that the second-best decision will solve
d = (7E (Op Isp, O) A) + OA) = 7 2 +sp + OA
At the same time, the agent's decision for any (ap, aD, ) is given by
dA aCPsp+aD'd+0A
1+aP+aD
A straightforward matching of coefficients yields the following proposition:
Proposition 24 The optimal incentive contract under delegation and p = 0 is given by
2=,2 2
ap = , ad = 02 +02 and d = l~p.Cr~~~ pbp p 'ep
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Proof. Special case of proposition 4 m
The strength of incentives is given by ap. We can see that the higher the volatility of the
principal's state, the more important it is that the agent's decisions track closely the principal's
preferences. Similarly, the noisier the performance measure, the less closely the principal's state
can be tracked and to avoid the 'get-what-you-pay-for' (GWYPF) problem, the less weight is
placed on the performance measure. In consequence, the overall incentive strength is driven
simply by the volatility-to-noise ratio ap/ap
, 
with an adjustment for the difference in the
relative importance of the decision, 7.
In addition to considering linear incentives, we have also included job flexibility in the
solution. The cost of deviating from the default decision d (and so the inverse of job flexibility) is
given by ad- It is also driven by the volatility-to-noise ratio but exactly in the opposite direction,
with constraints increasing in aE, and decreasing in u,. The intuition is straightforward. The
agent can be controlled either through incentives or direct controls. Other things constant,
when the volatility of the environment increases, incentive alignment becomes more valuable as
it induces the agent to make more use of his information, which is then complemented through
reduced direct controls. In consequence, incentive strength and job flexibility are complements,
as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Similarly, they both decrease in the noisiness of the
performance measure. However, unlike Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) which is silent on the
matter, they also co-move positively with the volatility of the environment.
We can also see that the default decision d is biased in favor of the principal. The intuition
for this result is that since ap < 1, the decision made by the agent will in expectation always
favor the agent, unless other constraints are introduced. To compensate for this decisional bias
favoring the agent, the default decision is biased in favor of the principal. Finally, note that the
optimal incentive strength and degree of job flexibility are independent of a , the variance of
the agent's individually optimal decision. This result follows simply because the agent already
fully internalizes any variance in his own needs. It is only the preferences of the principal that
the agent needs to be induced to internalize.
Employment
The employment solution follows symmetrically and is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 25 The optimal incentive contract under employment and p = 0 is given by
-2
OA = 2T, OAd = 2 CA2 and d-- AaP--•PPaA01A+Ga2 aA+ ~ OP-PO'A
Proof. Special case of proposition 4 m
In a symmetric two-agent model, the symmetry of the solution is immediate. On the other
hand, the considerations of how the principal himself is controlled rarely arise in the basic
principal-agent framework since the principal is usually just a passive party hiring the agent to
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perform a task. The present framework, however, highlights the fact that (absent repeated-game
considerations), when granted authority, the employer is need not be any more benevolent than
the employee. Just like the employee, given his wage, would like to work as little as possible and
choose projects requiring minimal input by him, the employer, if given the decision right over
some aspect of the employee's behavior, needs to be controlled against abusing the employee.
Choice of contract
Substituting the equilibrium decision in the total expected loss and comparing the solutions
under employment and delegation yields the following proposition:
Proposition 26 The equilibrium expected losses under (D)elegation and (E)mployment are
given by
2 2
ELD - ELFB + +and
2 2IrA+eA
ELE - ELFB + T1 (OAr •)O "
Thus, delegation is preferred if
,20,2 2 +o2
- O2 A U2 +2"
That is, the likelihood of delegation is increasing in a 2 a 2 and decreasing in o P, 2 and
7.
Proof. Special case of proposition 4 m
As discussed in section 3.1, the purpose of the incentive contract is to induce decisions
that are as close to first-best as possible, conditional on the information that the decision-
maker can be induced to use. The quality of these decisions, in turn, depends simply on the
volatility-to-noise ratio oa/o 2 of the state that the decision-maker is not directly internalizing,
with an adjustment for the relative sensitivity of the payoff of each party to the decision. In
consequence, delegation becomes more likely whenever the agent's preferences become harder to
contract on (02A T) or the volatility his state increases (U2 T), while the converse happens when
either the principal's preferences become harder to contract on or the principal's state becomes
more volatile. Further, delegation becomes less likely when the principal's payoff becomes more
sensitive to the decision (7y).
To summarize, increased uncertainty faced by the principal increases the incentive strength
and job flexibility granted to the agent conditional on delegation, but it also makes delegation
less likely. In consequence, the results so far would appear to go partially against the accumu-
lating empirical evidence that delegation is associated with greater uncertainty. However, what
the results really highlight is that uncertainty alone is not sufficient in supporting delegation.
What is needed is the development of an informational asymmetry between the agent and the
principal during the execution of the contract.
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An example The basic logic of the analysis so far is well illustrated with offshore drilling
contracts, discussed in Corts and Singh (2004). Having acquired a lease on an offshore tract,
oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) companies contract with independent drilling
companies to drill wells on the tract. The wells come in two forms: exploratory and development
wells. Exploratory wells are used to gauge the type and value of fuels present within a tract.
Development wells are used to extract efficiently these reserves. The contracts governing the
relationship also come primarily in two forms: day-rate and turnkey contracts, corresponding
roughly with cost-plus and fixed-price contracts, respectively. The regularities of interest for
the present analysis are that (i) day-rate contracts are more prominent in governing the drilling
of development wells, (ii) day-rate contract is associated with an E&P representative being
present on the rig during the drilling and retaining a number of decision rights, while (iii) no
representative is present under turnkey contracts and control of the project is retained by the
drilling company.
The key to understanding this pattern of contracts is to recognize that while exploratory
wells exhibit greater financial uncertainty as to the profitability of the tract, the drilling itself
is fairly standard. In contrast, development wells exhibit significant uncertainty over the best
way of extracting the resources at the time of contracting. In terms of the coefficients of the
model, a2 (development) > U2 (exploratory) even if a 2x (development) > 2X P (exploratory).
As discussed above, it is exactly high up that leads to the retainment of control by the principal.
Also, to control the demands for adjustments made by the E&P representative, cost-plus terms
are used in the financial management of the project. Further, the presence of the E&P repre-
sentative on the rig is used to improve the access to information by the principal, thus limiting
the rise of informational asymmetries. Conversely, when a2 is low, a fixed-price contract is
used to incentivize the drilling company to manage costs better, together with discretion over
such decisions. 13
Imperfect monitoring So far we have framed the problem in a way that assumes that deci-
sions are verifiable. The imperfections in contracting have risen from the inability to renegotiate
the contract coupled with the imperfect measurability of the inputs and outputs that are de-
manded by different decisions. If the actions become hidden, then costly monitoring can simply
force delegation: if the agent cannot be directly induced to perform actions demanded by the
principal, then the only available avenue is de facto delegation which in turn necessitates the
use of performance measures to indirectly guide the behavior of the agent. In between, we have
different degrees of costly monitoring.
1 The advantage of cost-plus contracts is typically considered to arise from their ability to facilitate renego-
tation/recontracting (e.g. Bajari and Tadelis (2001)), but another way of viewing the situation is to note that
asking for adjustments under cost-plus terms does not typically require any renegotiation. Thus, instead of
facilitating, we are really avoiding renegotiation.
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3.3.3 General solution
The solution for p $ 0 follows the same steps outlined above and is given by the following
proposition:
Proposition 27 The parameters of the optimal incentive contract under delegation are given by
aplp202r 0= , -f =2 yQ-PO'Aip) 
- IPOA-ILAPUP
-p = (1-p 2 )Aa p+A (a+pAP d - (1p2)a22 +p(A+pAap)' CA-PaP '
while the parameters of the optimal incentive contract under employment are given by
2A-- 1 02 - 2
a ~ -t4- ) A____________ P C( -P~AP /1AArP-1APP0UAy(1-p 2 )a2 02+± A (,_y2 +P-Aap)' Od = y(1-p 2 ), a2A2-laA (y2 +P-Ap)' aP-PaA
The resulting expected losses are then given by
EL E = ELFB + 1-t (1-p2)+aA
ELD = ELB + 2 (e (1-p 2 )
Thus, delegation is preferred if
0r,2 A 0r2('- 2)+0,2
That is, the likelihood of delegation is increasing in u2A, a and decreasing in a, a02 and
y. The role of p depends on the variance/noise ratio. In particular, if uA/eA2 > p/O.6p
, 
then
the likelihood of delegation is increasing in plj.
Proof. See Appendix B m
Let us first consider the strength of incentives, ap and aA. We can see that the qualitative
impact of the volatility of the environment and the noise in the performance measure remain
the same. The only difference is that incentives will be non-monotone in p. To understand this
result, note that as p = 0, Oi becomes informative of 9j. In consequence, it is possible to use
the decision-contingent transfers to induce the decision-maker to use the information contained
in his own state, instead of relying on the noisy performance measure. When IpI is large, it is
possible to rely heavily on direct controls in guiding the agent's behavior. Indeed, as Jp| -+ 1,
0i becomes perfectly informative about 9j. As a result, incentive strength will converge to
zero and first-best decisions are achieved purely through job design. Conversely, the need for
pay-for-performance tends to be highest when Jp| is small, since in this case direct controls
are highly inefficient in guiding the behavior of the agent. Thus, the incentive strength can be
decreasing in the expected size of the incentive conflict in the decision-making stage.14
14 0Of course, if decision-contingent transfers were not available, this is no longer the case. Further, the fact
that this non-mionotonicity is related to decision-contingent transfers resonates well with the idea of learning
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Similarly, since the correlation between preferences improves contracting in both directions,
its impact on the choice between delegation and employment is relatively limited. From the
results we see that the role of correlation is only to reduce the decisional advantage held by either
party. This result follows because an increase in the correlation between the states allows us
to substitute away from the noisy performance measure towards decision-contingent transfers,
which improves the overall 'quality' of both delegation and employment contracts. However, it
improves more the contract that induces statistically worse decisions. Intuitively, the marginal
value of increased Ipl is higher when a?/a2 is low, since the ability to use direct controls is more
valuable when the initial decisions are poor, and the ability to use direct controls is increasing
in |pl.
3.3.4 Extensions
The analysis so far has assumed that both the principal and the agent become fully informed
before the decision needs to be made. However, in many situations an informational asymmetry
develops between the agent and the principal during the execution of the relationship. Store
managers have often better direct access to local information than the headquarters. The R&D
lab becomes better informed about the viability of various research alternatives when the project
is on its way. The opimal way to extract oil is learned during the drilling. Similarly, while some
information can become readily available over time, it is often also actively acquired. In this
subsection, we will review some of the results that arise when we relax the assumptions of
perfect and free information and risk-neutrality. A more detailed exposition of these extensions
can be found in Appendix A.
Incomplete and asymmetric information
In Appendix A.1, we show how the development of an informational asymmetry between the
principal and the agent can lead to more delegation. This result should come as no surprise
when we recall that the ultimate purpose of the contract is to induce good decision-making.
Whether decision-making is compromised because of imperfect information or imperfect per-
formance measures makes very little difference in terms of the expected total loss. However,
while the worsening of the quality of information held by the principal increases the likelihood
of delegation, keeping the informational asymmetry constant, an increase in the volatility faced
by the principal still decreases the likelihood of delegation. Thus, for an increase in uncertainty
faced by the principal to lead to delegation, the informational asymmetry needs to be increasing
in the volatility of the environment. To summarize, what matters is not uncertainty per se but
the amount of informational asymmetry between the principal and the agent. In consequence,
to contract (e.g. Mayer and Argyres, 2004). As the parties learn their environment better, direct controls can
be used to substitute for pay-for-performance, independent of whether learning leads to E (p) I or E (p) T •
Even if the expected conflict increases, knowledge of the regularities involved in the conflict help to design the
initial contract better. On the other hand, the parties might also learn to construct more accurate performance
measures, which would imply that a'i 1, in turn implying heavier use of better-constructed performance measures.
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increased uncertainty can sometimes lead to more delegation (e.g. choice to franchise) and
sometimes to less delegation (e.g. choice of offshore drilling contracts).
While imperfect information impacts the allocation of authority, it has only limited impact
on the contractual terms conditional on delegation. This result follows because the parties
naturally discount information that is imperfect. It is only the relative sensitivity that needs to
be controlled. Thus, while imperfect information gets reflected in the level of incentives (where
the impact depends on the exact information structure - in particular, worse information does
not imply weaker incentives), the comparative statics with respect to the exogenous variables
remain unchanged.
Information acquisition
While some information can become readily available over time, information is often also ac-
tively acquired. Appendix A.2 examines a setting where information about the agent's pref-
erences remains free but the parties need to undertake privately costly effort to learn about
the principal's preferences. This setting provides an alternative explanation for the correlation
between uncertainty and delegation: if the agent is in a better position to acquire information,
then increased uncertainty can increase the probability of delegation even if all information
learned by the agent can be perfectly transmitted to the principal before decision-making. As
uncertainty increases, the importance of utilizing the superior ability of the agent to acquire
information becomes more valuable. Delegation of the decision right motivates the agent to
acquire information as he can then use the information in a way that is beneficial to him.
Further, the results suggest why the motivational role of delegation can be hard to replicate
with purely monetary incentives. Note that absent any contractual difficulties, the motivational
impact of delegation could be simply replicated with monetary incentives. For example, in the
model of Aghion and Tirole (1997), pay-for-performance based on the principal's preferences
could be used as a substitute for delegation. There are two interrelated reasons why such
a solution is unlikely to hold in our setting. First, absent any pay-for-performance, the agent
places a negative value on any information about the principal's preferences. This result follows
because any additional information will in expectation restrict the agent's ability to have his
way. In consequence, to induce information acquisition by the agent, not only does pay-for-
performance need to be positive, it needs to be sufficiently strong as to overcome this inherent
negative value. Second, even if the agent can be motivated to acquire information through
sufficiently strong monetary incentives, such compensation in turn generates poor decision-
making. The reason for this is that the principal now has strong incentives to make decisions
that will limit the amount he has to pay to the agent. In short, providing the agent with
incentives to acquire information simultaneously generates incentives for the principal to make
poor use of that information. In consequence, delegation arises as a motivational tool that is
qualitatively different from (and in the present setting superior to) monetary compensation.
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Risk aversion
Appendix A.3 analyzes the determination of incentive strength when the agent is risk-averse.
The results show that while an increase in the noise in the performance measure leads to the
familiar negative trade-off between noise and incentives (as in the case of risk-neutral agent
analyzed above), the relationship between volatility and incentives is now non-monotone and
dependent on the amount of noise. In particular, the noisier the performance measure, the
lower the incentive strength and the higher the likelihood that an increase in the volatility
of the environment will lead to an increase in incentives. The intuition behind this result is
straightforward. When the volatility of the environment increases, there are now two opposing
forces. First, the value of responsiveness increases, as above, supporting stronger incentives.
Second, risk-aversion makes incentives more costly to provide, supporting weaker incentives.
In consequence, the relationship is ambiguous. Further, if the performance measure is very
noisy (and in consequence the level of incentives low), then the 'value' aspect of incentives can
dominate the 'risk' aspect of incentives at the margin and the predicted relationship between
volatility and incentives is positive.
We have not examined the impact of risk aversion on the actual choice to delegate, but
the results appear ex ante ambiguous because of two opposing forces. First, given an incentive
structure, then delegation can be used to allow the agent to have more control over his environ-
ment, thus supporting a positive relationship between risk-aversion and delegation. Second, not
delegating can limit the need for performance pay in the first place, thus limiting the amount
of risk faced by the agent and so supporting a negative relationship between risk-aversion and
delegation. Casual empiricism would suggest that the latter effect often dominates.
3.4 Empirical applications
The logic and the results of the model shed light on a number of empirical findings. We will
first discuss empirical work on managerial incentives, visiting the "tenuous trade-off between
risk and incentives" and discussing some of the recent advances that have made the distinction
between volatility and noise or examined the co-determination of different variables. Second,
we will discuss how a number of empirical regularities found in the literature on franchising fit
with our model. In the case of franchising, while the discussed regularities (with the exception
of the positive relationship between risk and incentives) can be explained also within a tradi-
tional moral hazard framework, the advantage of our model is in providing an explicit role for
delegation.
The lessons from this review are two-fold. First, a number of empirical regularities can be
fruitfully viewed under the common lense of managing (mal)adaptation problems. Second, the
behavior of agents is managed through multiple control instruments. Failure to recognize and
control for the simultaneous determination of these instruments runs the risk of false associations
and conclusions. While data limitations are always a challenge, we hope that our explicit
categorization of various control instruments (delegation, job flexibility and incentives) and
environmental features (volatility of the environment, informational asymmetries, the quality
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of performance measures and the level of non-controllable risk) will help to guide and further
our understanding of the determination of different incentive systems.
3.4.1 Inside firms - managerial incentives and delegation
As reviewed in Prendergast (2002), the empirical evidence on the trade-off between risk and
incentives in managerial compensation is mixed, with some studies finding a significantly posi-
tive, some studies finding a significantly negative, and still some studies finding an insignificant
relationship between risk and incentives, where risk is typically measured by some version of
variance of stock returns. Given that the allocation of decision rights is relatively homogeneous
among CEOs (whose incentive compensation has traditionally been used as the basis for exam-
ining the relationship between risk and incentives), this setting is most appropriately analyzed
as the determination of incentives conditional on delegation having already taken place.
If we consider risk-neutrality to be the appropriate representation of the problem, then
the model suggests that the conflicting results are a result of the empirical studies failing to
distinguish between the two types of uncertainty (volatility and noise), leading to a potential
misspecification problem in the existing empirical work. Recall that the optimal strength of
incentives conditional on delegation was given by
ap = 20' p
We see that the optimal strength of incentives is increasing in the volatility of the state it-
self and decreasing in the noise contained in the performance measure. Further, if the agent is
risk-averse, ap can be non-monotone in A2, and ao2 and A2 will interact in the determination
of the equilibrium strength of incentives, with high a2p increasing the likelihood that ap is
increasing in A2 . Thus, not only should empirical work account for the distinction between
volatility and noise, but also account for the possibility that the relationship between volatility
and incentive strength can be inherently non-monotone.
Recent advances
(i) Volatility and noise Shi (2006), motivated by an information-acquisition perspective,
is to our knowledge the only empirical paper that makes the distinction between volatility
and noise. He decomposes the variance of a firm's stock return to its market-, industry- and
firm-specific components and finds that the strength of incentives is decreasing in market-
level risk while increasing in industry- and firm-specific risk. Further, he finds that when
the definition of the industry is broadened, the positive relationship is weakened and becomes
eventually negative. While this decomposition is clearly an imperfect proxy for the theoretical
constructs themselves, the evidence is highly suggestive that forces beyond risk-aversion and
noisy performance measures are at play in the determination of managerial incentives. 15
15These results stand in some contrast to Jin (2002) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) who also decompose the
return risk to idiosyncratic and market components, but from a relative performance evaluation perspective, and
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To our knowledge, no paper has attempted to examine the potential non-linearity in the re-
lationship between volatility and incentives or the interaction between the impacts of volatility
and noise. Further, a common feature in much of the literature on executive compensation is
the use of various firm-level characteristics such as book-to-market ratio, R&D and advertising
intensities and industry classifications simply as additive control instruments. In contrast, our
analysis suggests that such variables can contain valuable information regarding the environ-
ment and the importance of managerial control. In consequence they can influence not only the
overall sensitivity of compensation but also potentially how the return uncertainty translates
to incentive compensation.
Finding variables that are better associated with the theoretical constructs of both volatility
and managerial control than firm- and industry-level stock return volatility should prove valu-
able in furthering our understanding of the link between the environment faced by a firm and
its chosen managerial compensation policy. For example, Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) provide
evidence that the level of managerial compensation is tied to the degree to which the manager
is able to influence the performance of the firm, as measured by various variables along the
lines mentioned above, and Shi (2006) explicitly discusses how pay-for-performance sensitivity
is lower in capital-intensive industries. To our knowledge, the question of whether these vari-
ables further translate into differences in the link between incentive strength and volatility or
noise has not been examined.
(ii) Delegation and beyond managers While the set of tasks that a CEO performs is
relatively homogenous, with the above qualifier that the environment and, relatedly, the extent
to which the CEO is able to control it, can vary across industries, the task set of other managers
and workers can exhibit significant variation. A number of recent papers have examined how
the incentive compensation varies by executive rank and how the degree of delegation within a
group is influenced by uncertainty. While these studies do in general identify the importance
of delegation, they in turn tend to pool all risk under one heading.
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) provide empirical evidence on how the top management
incentives vary by responsibility. Grouping executives in four categories according to their
responsibilities, they show that the pay-for-performance sensitivity is significantly higher for
CEOs than for divisional managers, with the strength of incentives decreasing in all categories
with return volatility. These results are complemented by Barron and Waddell (2003), who rank
executives within a firm according to their pay level, and provide evidence that the highest-
paid executives also face the strongest incentives. While these results clearly illustrate that the
incentives provided depend on the responsibilities of the agent, they do not shed light on how
the division of responsibilities is in turn influenced by the environment.
Better evidence of the determinants of delegation is provided by analyzing a single category
of managers. Nagar (2002) analyzes the degree of authority and incentive compensation of
retail branch managers. He finds that, consistent with our results, the degree of delegation of
find that compensation is not related to the systematic (market) part while decreasing in the firm (idiosyncratic)
risk. The decompositions used, however, are different, and Shi (2006) places more weight on industry-level risk
and recognizes the potential endogeneity of the level of volatility.
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responsibilities to branch level is higher in high-growth, volatile and innovative banks, and that
branch managers with more authority receive more incentive-based pay. Wulf (2006), using data
from a proprietary compensation survey of Hewitt Associates on the compensation of division
managers, also finds that the compensation of division managers with broader authority is more
sensitive to global performance measures, while conditional on the degree of authority, the trade-
off between risk and incentives is negative. Finally, Moers (2006) provides evidence that the
likelihood of delegation is increasing in the quality of contractible performance measures, as
also predicted by our model.
Some recent studies have also examined how firm-level compensation policies and other
parameters vary with various environmental variables. Foss and Laursen (2005) use survey data
from Danish firms on the firm-level use of performance pay, delegation and relate it to measures
of uncertainty such as the innovativeness of the firm and profit variance. They find that the use
of performance pay is increasing in uncertainty and that this relationship is increasingly strong
as the knowledge intensity of the industry increases (suggesting that environmental variables
can indeed impact the strength of different links, as discussed above). They also find some
evidence of increased use of delegation in more uncertain environments. Using similar data but
from the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey of 1998, DeVaro and Kurtulus (2006)
find that there is a negative relationship between risk and incentives (a relationship which is
amplified when controlling for delegation), a positive relationship between risk and delegation
and a positive relationship between performance pay and delegation, thus providing the most
consistent piece of evidence in accordance with our model. Finally, Demers, Shackell and
Widener (2002) examine the joint determination of performance pay, performance measurement
and the allocation of decision rights in B2C Internet companies. Combining survey and archival
data, they find that all three are complementary. However, potentially because of the low cross-
sectional variation and the relatively small sample size, they find only little evidence on their
relationship with various environmental variables, such as knowledge intensity and customer
orientation.
3.4.2 Franchising and other contracts
The joint analysis of allocation of authority and choice of compensation policies inside firms
(and beyond top executives) is significantly constrained because of lack of detailed data. In
contrast, a wealth of data exists on contracts between firms. In this subsection, we will first
review how some of the determinants of the choice to franchise fit with our model and then
make some observations on work on other contracts.
The decision to franchise
Lafontaine and Slade (1997,1998) review the existing empirical work on the decision to franchise.
They document a number of empirical regularities, of which the ones of most interest to us are
(i) risk is positively related to the choice to franchise, (ii) the importance of the agent's effort
is positively related to the choice to franchise, (iii) high cost of monitoring output or sales
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is positively related to company operation, and (iv) high cost of monitoring effort directly is
negatively related to company operation. With the exception of (i), variants of the traditional
hidden action model are able to explain all the regularities when viewing franchising as a choice
to provide high-powered incentives. The additional contribution of our model is that it provides
an explicit role for the delegation of responsibilities to the agent, thus identifying franchising
as an arrangement that is qualitatively different from simply providing high-powered monetary
incentives.
(i) Risk is positively related to the use of high-powered incentives/decision to fran-
chise: As discussed above, much of apparent risk is uncertainty that a well-informed party
is able to react to, captured in our model by the variance of states. We showed that while
increased uncertainty faced by the principal doesn't necessarily lead to delegation, if an infor-
mational asymmetry develops between the principal and the agent and/or information needs to
be actively collected, then delegation of decision-making will be used to motivate information
acquisition and/or encourage responsiveness to that information. Thus, to the extent that the
various measures, such as variation in detrended sales per outlet and fraction of outlets dis-
continued within a given period of time, used to capture risk (noise) actually capture volatility
that the agent is in a better position to respond to, then increased uncertainty should indeed
lead to franchising instead of company-ownership. 16
(ii) The importance of the agent's effort is positively related to the decision to
franchise: While it is an old prediction of models of moral hazard that the incentives of the
agent are increasing in the importance of his effort, this explanation still leaves unanswered the
question of why franchising instead of higher bonuses under company ownership. Our model
suggests that when effort needs to be directed at information acquisition, then delegation can
be necessary to induce information acquisition by the agent. Further, some of the measures
that have been used to measure the importance of the agent's effort, such as capital/labor
ratio, amount of discretionary inputs and "personalized service" dummy, appear to potentially
correlate with the value of the responsiveness of the agent.
(iii) & (iv) A high cost of monitoring output or sales is positively related to com-
pany operation, while a high cost of monitoring effort directly is negatively related
to company operation: Again, these regularities conform with the prediction of the moral
hazard models with respect to the strength of incentives, while our model extends this logic to
the choice to delegate. In particular, these two results together highlight the practical fact that
16 An interesting alternative is provided by Mazzeo (2004). He highlights the point that the work on the choice
to franchise ignores the franchisee's choice to be a fully independent agent. He finds evidence that in the motel
industry, the likelihood of chain affiliation (as opposed to independent operation) is increasing in the uncertainty
of the environment, suggesting a potential insurance feature of chain affiliation.
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who gets to decide depends not only on the information available to the participants but also
on the degree of controls available. Recall that the decision to delegate was given by
r,2~ [0,2(1 
_p2 )+c ,2Aly2 4 2j ( -p2 2O
Now, the difficulty of monitoring output or sales can be associated with the difficulty of con-
tracting on the principal's (franchisor's) preferences (high ap), indeed supporting company
operation. The cost of monitoring the agent's effort is logically equivalent but slightly more
nuanced. First, if the action d is truly hidden, then the principal is de facto forced to delegate
that decision to the agent, with the only means of controlling him being high-powered incen-
tives. Second, which was the focus of our model, even if d is transferable between the agent and
the principal, if measuring the impact of that decision on the agent is sufficiently hard, then
formal delegation will take place.
Contractual allocation of decision rights
While the empirical work on franchising has tended to approach the choice to franchise from
the traditional moral hazard perspective (at the expense of considerations of the allocation of
authority), the empirical work on other contracts has tended to take a property rights approach
(at the neglect of most maladaptation problems during the execution of the contract). The no-
table exceptions are the papers by Arrunada et al (2001) and Zanarone (2005), who study the
relationship between car manufacturers and dealerships. They show for the cases of Spain and
Italy, respectively, how more control rights are allocated to manufacturers in networks where
the risk of the dealers' moral hazard is higher and the cost of misbehavior on the manufacturer
is higher, as measured by the size of the network (free-riding) and the unit price of cars (brand
value) respectively. We can consider brand value to be reflected by y, which measured how
important appropriate decisions are to the principal, while the size of the network (and poten-
tial spillovers) is weakly analogous to ao,, since an increase in potential spillovers makes the
provision of sharp incentives harder. Increase in either makes the retainment of decision rights
by the principal more likely.
A significant body of empirical work examines the allocation of control in biotech alliances.
Because of their focus on property rights, most of the results are only remotely related to our
framework. Suffice to say that while our model is quiet on asset ownership, this body of work
largely neglects any adaptation problems during the execution of the contracts. Further theoret-
ical and empirical work is clearly needed to examine both the distinction and interdependencies
among monetary payments, actual decision rights and property/control rights, which in turn
can be used both as hostages to generate endogenous "performance measures" and to reallo-
cate returns/motivate investment. An interesting study is provided by Lerner and Malmendier
(2003), who illustrate how the absence of a specifiable lead product candidate (high ex ante
uncertainty) leads to the allocation of termination and broad licensing rights to the financing
firm. The logic of their model resonates well with the maladaptation framework: the inability
to contract ex ante leads to the use of contractual terms that function to induce appropriate
conduct by the R&D firm during the execution of the agreement. In this case, control rights
are used as a hostage to induce appropriate behavior.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have analyzed the joint determination of allocation of a decision right, incentive strength
and job flexibility, as influenced by the underlying environment. First, conditional on the
allocation of the decision right, we showed that the greater the ex ante uncertainty over the
appropriate decision, the stronger the incentive strength and the greater the job flexibility
grated to the decision-maker. Conversely, the noisier the performance measures used to align
incentives, the lower the incentive strength and the lower the job flexibility granted to the
decision-maker. These results resonate well with the basic logic that as the environment becomes
more uncertain, responsiveness of the decision-maker becomes more valuable and, as a result,
indirect incentive alignment through the use of performance measures is used as a substitute
for direct controls. We suggested the distinction between volatility and noise as an explanation
for the conflicting empirical evidence on the trade-off between risk and incentives found in
the literature on executive compensation and complemented this distinction by noting the
additional considerations that arise if the agent is risk-averse.
Second, we examined the choice to delegate. In the full-information setting, we showed how
the allocation of the decision right depended on the relative importance of the decision, relative
volatility of the environment and the relative contractibility of preferences. In particular, when
the uncertainty faced by the principal increased, the likelihood of delegation decreased. We
illustrated the logic of this result with the example of offshore drilling. In the extensions, we
saw that, in contrast with the full-information case, increased uncertainty faced by the principal
at the time of contracting could lead to increased delegation if (i) an informational asymmetry
developed during the execution of the contract between the agent and the principal (specific
knowledge) and/or (ii) it became more efficient to rely on information acquisition by the agent.
We suggested the positive relationship between uncertainty and delegation as an explanation for
the positive relationship between uncertainty and the choice to franchise found in the empirical
literature, as opposed to any inherent need to provide stronger monetary incentives.
Moving beyond the risk-incentives trade-off, the predictions of the model were found to be
broadly consistent with the emerging empirical literature examining the co-determination of au-
thority and incentive strength inside firms and with other empirical determinants of the choice
to franchise. Reflecting the predictions of the model with the empirical literature, the frame-
work analyzed suggests that future empirical work needs to pay more detailed attention to the
distinctions between different types of uncertainty, co-determination of organizational variables
and the distinction between decision and ownership rights to provide an internally consistent
estimation framework. At the same time, the existing empirical work suggests that future the-
oretical work is needed to examine the interactions between decision and ownership rights and
among specific investment, moral hazard and maladaptation perspectives of contracting and
organizational structures.
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3.6 Appendix A: Extensions
3.6.1 Imperfect information
In many practical situations we would expect a natural informational asymmetry to develop
between the agent and the principal, with the principal having worse direct access to information
about local conditions. In this section we provide an illustration how such an informational
asymmetry alters the choice to delegate and the underlying contract.
First, note that imperfect information has only a small impact on the degree of job flex-
ibility and incentive strength. This result follows because the decision-maker, when making
decisions, already internalizes any imperfections in the information itself. The only purpose of
the incentive contract is to control the relative responsiveness of the agent to that information. 17
The more significant effect of imperfect information comes from the worsening of the quality
of the decisions. As a simple example, consider a situation where the agent learns perfectly
(sp, OA) and the principal learns perfectly SA but receives only imperfect information about
Op. That is, the principal receives only a signal vp = Op + -•p about the realization of his
state, where 7ip - N(0, c•2). The imperfection can be seen as arising from a variety of sources.
First, the principal can have limited direct access to information. Second, if information is
communicated from downstream, such communication takes time and the information will be
outdated by the time it is used to make decisions. Third, incentive conflicts between the agent
and the principal are likely to lead to garbling of information. 18 Finally, assume that p = 0 and
7Y = 1.
Under these informational assumptions, the solution under delegation remains unchanged.
Under employment, the decision of the principal is now given by
dP -aCASA+aD'+Ep(OpIVP)
l+aA+-aD
while the second-best decision is given by
dsB -_ Ep(OAiSA)+Ep(Oplvp)2
Matching coefficients and solving for the expected loss yields the following proposition:
17Some effects are present on levels but not comparative statics, For example, to see how the level of
incentives is affected, consider a situation where the agent has imperfect information about both sp and
Op (signals vpi and vP2, respectively). Then, when making decisions, the agent will form beliefs through
E (spjvpl, vp2). Now, if vp2 receives no weight, then the solution parallels that in section 3. If vp2 receives
a positive weight, then the correlation with Op is increased and it is optimal to provide stronger incentives. In-
deed, if the agent receives no direct information about sp but observes Op, then E (sp 0p) = Op and we actually
achieve first-best decision-making.18In a more detailed model, this degree of garbling is going to depend on the degree of expected and realized
incentive conflict and our assumption of fixed noise is not exactly representative of the problem. For more detailed
models of communication, see e.g. Dessein (2002), Alonso (2006), Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2006) and
Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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Proposition 28 The parameters of the optimal incentive contract under employment are given
by
A 2A a
2 
D
AD CA d = A.
C= A +CA CeA +A
The resulting expected loss is then given by
ELE- EL F  + [2+ ( 0).2
Thus, delegation is preferred over employment if
C2(1 + EP)(1 + 4p) or2 r2
2 22
where xep = and x,7p = .
Proof. See Appendix B m
From the proposition we see that imperfect information held by the principal simply provides
an additional source of loss, which in this example is in its consequences equivalent to an
imperfect performance measure. This should not be a surprise, since from the perspective of
expected loss, it matters very little whether a party makes poor decisions because he can be
provided only with poor incentives or whether the decisions are poor because the party in
question simply has inaccurate information.
As regards to the delegation choice, it is then immediate that if the agent's information
is more informative than the principal's with respect to Op ( Xep < xp), then delegation is
always preferred. Thus, an informational advantage held by the agent increases the likelihood
of delegation. However, note that if the relative quality of information is held constant, when
the amount of volatility faced by the principal changes, then it is still the case that an increase
in volatility will decrease the likelihood of delegation. This is because an increase in o 2 still
increases the relative importance of tracking Op closely, and if xp < xzp, the principal is still
in a better position to do so. As a result, if the informational environment is constant between
delegation and employment, even if an informational asymmetry increases the likelihood of
delegation, the informational asymmetry itself needs to increase if increasing uncertainty faced
by the principal is to lead to delegation. This, however, is a natural conclusion if the value
of speedy response and/or the accuracy of information transmission are affected by increased
volatility.
3.6.2 Information acquisition
While some information can become readily available to the parties, it often also needs to be
actively acquired. While full analysis of the information acquisition problem is beyond the scope
of this paper, the basic logic is relatively straightforward. If the agent is in a better position
to acquire information, then delegation can be a superior means to induce such information
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acquisition. We will illustrate this result with a simple example. We will assume that decision-
contingent transfers are not available, p = 0, ILA = p = 0 and that information about SA
and OA is readily available. However, effort needs to be exerted to learn sp and/or Op. We
will further assume that the joint cost function is such that given any incentives, the agent will
acquire information only about sp and the principal will acquire information only about Op.
In particular, we will assume that the agent learns sp with probability PA (and knows whether
the signal received is accurate or not) after investing
CA (PA) = -F (01,) PA (PA + ln(1 - PA)),
where F' (a1,) > 0 to capture the idea that becoming informed gets harder as the uncertainty
increases. Similarly, the principal learns Op with probability pp after investing
Cp (pp) = -F (a) pp (pp + In (1 -pp)).
Finally, we assume that if information acquisition by either party is successful, it is automat-
ically transmitted to the party holding the decision right, implying that evidence can neither
be falsified nor hidden. We will analyze the relative performance of two types of contracts. Un-
der delegation, the agent's incentives are provided only through Xp. Under employment, the
decision-making of the principal is moderated through XA but no incentives are provided to the
agent through Xp. While this distinction appears arbitrary, there is an inherent asymmetry in
the problem that supports such a solution. We will discuss the reasons for this simplification
below when discussing each of the contracts.
Delegation
Under delegation, the loss to the principal in the decision-making stage is given by
Lp = E [(Op - dA) 2 - ap (sp - dA) 2 IPA,PP] + Cp (pp),
while the loss to the agent is given by
Lp = E [(OA - dA) 2 + ap (sp - dA) 2 IPAPP] +CA (PA) .
In any eventuality, the decision of the agent is given by dA apE(sp w)+OA . Thus, if the agent-- +ap "
learns sp, then he will ignore information about Op. However, if he fails while the principal suc-
ceeds in information acquisition, then E (spiw) = Op. Finally, if both parties fail, E (spjw) = 0.
With a little rearranging, we get the first-order conditions for the two parties, which are given
by
agent: [(02 + p) ppa2p F A1APA
(1- p)(a p+Q2p 2 F( ,1ppp
principal: (1 - PA) (ap+1)2 F 1-pp
Examining first the agent's first-order condition, we see that the incentives to acquire informa-
tion are crucially tied to the strength of incentives. After all, the agent doesn't care about the
payoff to the principal unless the performance measure is used. If the agent is successful, the
reduction in variance is proportional to (aU + or). If the agent fails but the principal succeeds,
the agent is still able to utilize Op. Thus, any information acquisition by the principal weakens
the agent's incentives to acquire information: efforts are substitutes.
In a similar fashion, the information of the principal will be used only if the agent fails, cap-
tured by (1 - PA). Further, the principal's incentives to acquire information are non-monotone
in ap. First, as ap becomes positive, information becomes valuable as the agent will respond to
it. However, as ap grows, the level of payoffs to the principal that is dependent on information
goes down. In consequence, incentives to acquire information will eventually start decreasing. 19
However, for all interior ap the principal has positive incentives to acquire information because
his direct utility depends on the decision responding to Op.
To summarize, oap plays a triple role: motivate information acquisition by both the agent
and the principal and control the decision-making by the agent. Solving for the total expected
payoff gives then
E (LA Lp)=2(0,2P(1--P*) (1--P*)aP+P* C,2 02) -• (+ap,
E (LA + Lp) 2 A +-P ep (-2 + C 2)(1±a p):1 (1+ap) kA
- F A (P + n (1 - P:4))- f 2 p + In (1 - p
where (p*, p,) solve the first-order conditions above. We can see that the first-best solution
(gross of information cost) is not achieved for two reasons. First, with probability (1 - p*) (1 - p,)
both parties fail in their information acquisition and the decision made is uninformed. Second,
with probability p* the agent becomes informed and thus responds to sp, not Op, which intro-
duces the misalignment problem discussed in the previous sections.
Use of XA : Theoretically, QAXA could potentially be used to improve the delegation out-
come by managing the relative incentives of the principal and the agent to acquire information.
This, however, appears at most of limited importance. The reason for this is that if payments
based on XA are used, then the agent will have incentives to use his decision right in a subop-
timal fashion to limit such transfers. In consequence, I|AI can never be large, and the value of
any use is uncertain.
Employment
Under employment, oap = 0 and so the agent has no incentives to acquire information. In
consequence, the problem collapses into a single-agent problem where a A is simply used to
control the incentives and decisions of the principal. In this case, the principal's first order
condition is
"
9 This result follows because the payoff is Lp - apXp.
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oPPP = P)
and the expected total loss is given by
2((1-p )a2P O7A) +,2A (, 2 ( l ~ n) 2 - + A) 2 PA a 2 - -F ( U 2 p ) /O g [ p p + I n ( 1 -- p * p .
(1±aA):z (1iaA\ P apApPp-n Pp
Thus, the loss is bounded away from the minimal (gross) loss for two reasons. First, some-
times the principal fails to acquire information, which makes decisions uninformed. Second,
the noisy performance measure SA is generating constantly biased decisions. Also note that
the incentives to acquire information are decreasing in aA since increased weight placed on
the performance measure tracking the agent's preferences decreases the responsiveness of the
principal to information about his own needs.
Use of Xp : While our assumption that XA is not used under delegation appears rela-
tively innocuous, our assumption that Xp is not used under employment appears contrary to
the immediate logic. After all, it is through Xp that the agent can be motivated to acquire
information. However, the reason for this assumption parallels that of not using XA under del-
egation. First, setting ap > 0 to incentivize the agent to acquire information will cause gaming
by the principal. If the agent is provided with positive incentives to acquire information, then
the corresponding decision by the principal is given by
dp _ E(6'pJw)-apE(spIJw)+aAsA
l-ap+±A
In consequence, ap > 0 will lead to increased suboptimality of decisions. In addition to
this effect, there are three further reasons why the use of Xp is of limited value. First, if the
principal is often informed (PA is large), then learning sp by the agent will only damage the
pay-for-performance by the agent, since the decision by the principal in this case is negatively
correlated with sp. 20 Second, even if the principal is uninformed, he will still discount sp and
the net response is given by (3 - ap) sp, where / is the signal-to-noise ratio u2/ (a2 + 2p).
Third, even if the principal is rarely informed and 3 > ap, so that the decision is positively
correlated with the signal, the agent needs to be provided with strictly positive incentives to
acquire information.
To see this final result, note that if the agent is compensated through Xp, then his payoff is
apXp + LA - aAXA.
Now, if the agent succeeds in information acquisition, the loss due to Xp is reduced but the
loss due to LA - aAXA is increased because of the additional adjustment. Thus, unless aA
is very large, so that most of the adjustment cost is passed to the principal, ap needs to be
2 0 Indeed, if it is likely that the principal is going to succeed in his information acquisition, then the agent would
prefer to acquire information about Op to limit the gaming caused by principal's knowledge of sp. Further, if PA
is large, then the value of that information is going to be low and unlikely to be worth inducing in the first place.
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Figure 3-2: Active information acquisition and the boundary between delegation and employ-
ment
large to overcome this. And large ap in turn will lead to very bad decisions. This discussion
highlights the big difference in motives to learn information about (sp, Op) by the agent and
the principal. The principal is directly motivated to acquire information because his payoff is
positively correlated with that information. Thus, he has positive incentives to acquire infor-
mation under delegation for all interior ap. The agent, on the other hand, strictly prefers no
information under the employment contract, and any information acquisition by him needs to
be motivated by compensation that is strictly able to overcome this negative incentive. And
providing such incentives can be impossible (e.g. if /3 < ap, in which case no incentives can be
provided) or too costly.21
Choice of contract
The specific results clearly depend on the exact shape of F (H•) . To illustrate some of the
results, we will assume that F (a ,) = (U2 ) . That is, the cost of information is increasing in
the volatility of the environment. An example of the boundary choice is given in figure 3-2.
In generating the results, we assume that o~ = 20 while eA2  = 0.5, implying that the
preferences of the agent are almost perfectly contractible. This aspect is reflected by the
location of the boundary line under perfect information (given by A), showing that under perfect
information employment covers much of the analyzed parameter space. When information
becomes costly, the superior information collection properties of delegation shift the boundary
left (given by B). Of more interest is the observation that now the likelihood of delegation
21If the agent were able to hide information, then the incentives of the agent could potentially be improved by
altering the perceived value of information.
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can be increasing in a2, even holding the noise-to-volatility ratio a2p/ (a2p + a p) constant.
The intuition for this result is that as au grows, information becomes more valuable and thus
the superior information collection ability of delegation becomes more valuable. As the agent
becomes more able to collect information, this advantage is further amplified, as reflected by
boundary C.
Contracting with third parties The fact that the parties need to contract with each other
limits the use of XA in the case of delegation and Xp in the case of employment. If the contracts
were with respect to a third party, then the decisional disadvantage would be absent. Further,
the use of Xp in the case of delegation would no longer weaken the incentives of the principal.
However, in the case of employment, ap still needs to be large to induce information acquisition
by the agent. Indeed, to induce information acquisition by the agent, the agent should bear the
compensation based on XA, as this limits the cost of information, while the principal should
not bear the cost of Xp to avoid the decisional complications.
3.6.3 Risk-aversion
Assume now that the agent has mean-variance preferences with risk-aversion coefficient r. Fur-
ther, assume that the decision has to be taken by the agent (as an effort choice), no decision-
contingent transfers are available and that y = 1. Further, assume that the performance
measure is perfect up to an additive error term:
Xp = - (Op - dA) 2 + EXp.
The agent is then offered a contract
T(.) = B - ap ((Op - dA)2 +EX ,
where the terms of the contract are chosen by the principal to
maxE Kp - (0p - dA) 2 - T(.))
B,ap
s.t. E (KA - (OA - dA) 2 + T(.)) - rVar (KA - (OA - dA) 2 + T(.)) > 0
dA e argmaxKA- (OA - dA) 2 + T(.),
d
which, after substituting out B, is equivalent to
minE [(Op - dA) 2 + (OA - dA)2 + rVar [ap (Op - dA) 2 + oPEXp + (OA - dA)2]
s.t. dA =_ apOP+OA
a+1Taking the first-order cond tion and rearranging gives
Taking the first-order condition and rearranging gives
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Figure 3-3: Relationship between optimal incentives and uncertainty under risk-aversion
Proposition 29 The optimal incentive strength is implicitly defined by:
(, )3 [(ap - 1)(Au 2 + ao) + rap (20 0 ( 0 + 2A[ 2))] + rapo2, = 0,
where Ap 2 - (A - pp)2 and a =- Var(OA - PR).
Thus,
<0 and sign( ) =sign(1 - ap(1+ 4r(Ap2 U2)))
Proof. See Appendix B m
Thus, as in all models hidden action with risk-aversion, the strength of incentives is decreas-
ing in the noisiness of the performance measure, 0x2  . This aspect is thus unchanged, simply
shifting the source of agency problem from misalignment to risk-aversion.
What risk-aversion does change is the monotonicity result regarding the relationship between
the volatility of the environment and incentives provided. The intuition for this result is clear.
As a20 increases, the 'productive' value of incentives goes up as in the case of a risk-neutral
agent. However, at the same time, as long as op > 0, this also translates to a larger risk-cost of
incentives. Which effect dominates depends on the equilibrium ap. In particular, if ap is small,
then the increase in the value of incentives is likely to dominate, because low ap implies low
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initial pass-through of volatility of the environment to volatility of pay (since the pass-through
is proportional to a2).
The observation that the sign of Oap/Ol 2o depends on cp implies in turn that Oap/Oa2O
will depend on axp2 . Note that in essence the equilibrium strength of incentives balances
the productive value of incentives, determined by the value of inducing the agent to respond
to the realized (OA - OP), which in turn is related to ao , and the cost of providing those
incentives, determined by the overall uncertainty (a xp, a2O) . When a 2xP >> o20, then
the risk-compensation component is dominated by a . In consequence, &•p/O 2O > 0
because the productive value will dominate the marginal change. The converse happens when
OxXP << 0o and then Oap/O2Ao < 0. An example of this interaction between a2Xp and oA0
in determining the optimal linear ap is given in figure 3-3.
The comparative statics of 0•p/loO 2 0 and &ap/a2Xp < 0 are qualitatively equal to
those presented in Baker and Jorgensen (2003). This result should be no surprise since, while
the structure of the models differs slightly, the structure of uncertainty is the same in both
settings: or2 > 0, acx2  > 0 and a 2 0.22
3.6.4 Insufficient controls, job-design and second-best
The key behind the simplicity of our solution was the use of OD (d - d)2 to manage the respon-
siveness of the agent, which allowed us to derive a simple optimal linear contract and we did not
need to consider whether (SA, sp) are directly verifiable or whether only (XA, Xp) are verifiable.
Let us first consider a more general setting to illustrate more the role of decision-contingent
transfers. The ability to achieve the constrained optimum comes down to the ability to devise
a compensation policy, subject to the decision-maker's IC constraint, that induces di such that
(assuming a unique solution)
E (Up (Op, di) + UiA (OA, di) sj, Oi) = 0 Vsj, Oi.
Given the appropriate monotonicity conditions and a sufficient degree of contractibility, we
can find functions satisfying this condition, while the linearity of such a solution hinges on the
linearity between changes in the margins. With access to performance measures Xp and Xd,
we can rewrite this in the case of delegation as:
E(U~p (Op,dA) SP,OA) = apXp(sp,dA)+a dX (, dA) Vsj,Oi.
Thus, a linear solution exists if there is a linear relationship between the change in the ex-
pectation of marginal utility of the principal with respect to sp and 0 A and the change in the
marginal return to the agent given the contract offered. We can see that d buys us an additional
2 2 Risk-aversion might lead to either less or more delegation. On the one hand, the risk-aversion by the agent
limits the degree of incentive alignment. On the other hand, giving control of the decision to the agent limits the
risk-compensation required. We have not examined if either effect dominates always or under what conditions
one effect dominates the other.
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degree of freedom that allows us to manage both the relative and absolute responsiveness of the
agent. If we are not able to contract on decisions directly, both linearity and the constrained
optimality of the solution is usually lost.
The more flexible interpretation of aD (d - d) 2 is the job flexibility granted to the agent. The
basic idea is that even if decisions are non-verifiable, job design can be used to guide the behavior
of the agent by making certain actions easier to take than others. In essence, &D (d - d) 2 itself
can be a non-verifiable component that is embedded in the working environment of the agent.
This interpretation is clearly limited by our assumption of no waste. However, it is often possible
to cause destruction of utility, with the introduction of bureaucratic complexity that the agent
holding the decision right needs to overcome to implement certain decisions. While the solution
will no longer be linear due to typical screening arguments (at intermediate values of OA, when
choosing the decision we need to acknowledge the fact that the marginal waste caused by that
decision also has to be paid on all more extreme decisions, leading to convexity), it can still be
used to provide some control of the decision-maker. Further, note that the value aspect of direct
controls is unaffected whether their use is costly or not. Thus, while the shape of the optimal
contract is affected, as long as the cost is independent of the underlying uncertainty, the basic
comparative statics hold. Also, note that such destruction of utility can be used to smooth
the optimal delegation sets discussed in e.g. Holmstrom (1984) and Alonso and Matouschek
(2006), which are in essence examples of a transfer function where aD = 0 for decisions inside
the allowed set and aD --+ oc for decisions outside the allowed set.
To understand the solution in absence of any decision-contingent transfers, let us return
now back to our quadratic framework. Let w denote the contractible information and let the
contract be given by
T (.) = B + ap (w) Xp (.) + aA (w) XA(.).
Now, consider the case of delegation. Then, the optimal weight on the performance measures
is given by
'yE (Op-OA) 21w_
ap (w) = (pOA)21w]( )p and aOA (w) = 0.E[(0p-0A)21 +(+-)2,
To understand this result, recall that there are two sources of losses that the incentive con-
tract needs to mange: the GWYPF problem caused by oae > 0 and biased decisions caused
by ap < 1. When decisions could be contracted on directly, second-best decisions could be
induced since the expected bias in the decisions caused by ap < 1 could be managed through
ad and d. Now, the size of the GWYPF problem is independent of the realized states while
the expected value of incentive alignment is increasing in (OA - OP) 2 . The optimal incentive
strength then equates these two in the margin. For example, consider the case where (SA, SP)
are verifiable. The solution yields simply
2
E[(Op-OA2 SASP] IsA,sp) AsAsP
aP(SA, SP) 2 P+l-),E[(Op-OA)2 SA,SP E(, 2p +0- 2 A p "2
The incentive strength is thus simply conditioned on the incoming information to reflect the
expected size of the incentive conflict. Note also that we still don't want to condition the com-
128
pensation directly on SA to avoid introducing 2A, but that doesn't prevent us from using its
realization to condition ap.
Similar conditioning could be used also in the case where neither Sk can be contracted
on, as Xk still contain information about the size of the incentive conflict. However, using
Xk to condition the incentive strength has two additional complications. First, as the actual
realizations of Xk are influenced by the agent, one needs consider the incentive compatibility of
the slope structure intended. Thus, while the logic above holds, the actual level of incentives has
to back out the manipulation by the agent. Second, this manipulation will lead to additional
GWYPF problems, much in the same way that the error in si keeps the optimal slope away
from one. Indeed, if only Xk are verifiable and aXk -- OO, the contract becomes linear again
since Xk become fully uninformative about the underlying size of the incentive conflict. In
particular, it becomes a simple measure of the ex ante expected incentive conflict, given by
p - E(Op-OA) 2
E(Op-OA) +(1C+)2p"
Thus, the comparative statics on the strength of incentives remain the same as in the analysis
of section 3, with the exception that the incentive strength is now increasing in the volatility of
the preferences of both parties (since this increases the expected size of the incentive conflict)
and decreasing in the correlation between preferences (since this decreases the expected size of
the incentive conflict) because direct controls can no longer be used to induce the agent to use
information about OA in responding to Op.
3.6.5 Models of hidden action
As mentioned in the introduction, conditional on the agent holding the decision right, our model
is directly analogous to a model of hidden action. This similarity results from the observation
that after the states of the world have been realized, we have a globally concave problem,
where the decision that is individually optimal to the decision-maker is traded via the incentive
contract for a more favorable decision to the other agent, a situation which is identical to the
principal 'purchasing' literal effort from the agent, where the agent's default point is zero effort.
The only difference to the basic linear-quadratic formulation of the moral hazard problem is
that now the production function is quadratic, not linear, and the marginal value of effort,
measured by the distance between OA and Op, is random.
This construction is illustrated in figure 3-4. The realization of OA determines the location
of the agent's zero-cost effort level, while Op determines the level of effort at which all benefits
of effort are exhausted. The optimal effort choice would then satisfy dFB, where the marginal
cost of effort matches the marginal productivity of effort. However, the realization of s, will
alter the value of effort as perceived by the agent, leading to the GWYPF problem. Given an
incentive strength of a, the agent then chooses an effort level dA dFB.
Letting a2 > 0 but a = 0, so that the marginal cost of effort exhibits no randomness,
we get the setting of a basic random productivity model. With Var (ep) > 0,Op, = 0 and
risk-neutrality, the model becomes analogous to Baker (1992). Introducing risk-aversion and
letting Var (ep) = 0 but Var (,xp) > 0, the model becomes analogous to Zabojnik (1996)
and Baker and Jorgensen (2003). Finally, letting a 2 --+ 0 while maintaining risk-aversion and
129
Y(d) = Kp-7(Op- d)2
W(d)=B-a'y(sp- d)2
Y'(d)=C'(d) W'(d)=C'(d)
Figure 3-4: The interim problem and hidden action interpretation
Var (exp) > 0, we are back to the single-action moral hazard problem with an additive error
term (e.g. Holmstr6m (1979)).
The point of departure in our model is that the action need not be hidden. Indeed, taking
the literal interpretation of the component aD (d- d) 2 implies that the decision cannot be
hidden. However, the basic agency problem remains when three conditions are met. First,
there is uncertainty over the optimal course of action at the time of contracting. If this were
not the case, the parties could write a contract directly on the optimal decision (or use a forcing
contract to induce appropriate behavior, which is equivalent). Second, the preferences are not
perfectly contractible. Third, opportunities for renegotiation (between the time that additional
information is revealed and the decision needs to be made) are limited.
3.7 Appendix B: Proofs and derivations
Proposition 27: Optimal Contract
We derive the solution in the case of delegation, the solution in the case of employment is
symmetric. The second-best decision is given by
dgB = -YE(0plsp,OA)+OAA 1+-y
Given normality of the random variables, their joint distribution is given by
OP p U2p U2p AP
sp , N lp , 2 U2p +~U2  AP
OA IA tAP tAP 2A
130
d)2
Therefore, we can write
2 2 )-1(
(O pIsp ,O A ) = AP +( AP U + C AP SP - IL( AP 2A A - AJ'AP OT4  AUA
which after a little algebra simplifies to:
41 (1-p•2S-P)+AP (OA--A) P (- P )--OAPO2p A±P 4 (1- 2)sP+oAP•P (OA)
lIP + 2 +(1-p 2) 0'2 2 0i 04 +(1-p 2
Thus, the optimal decision can be written as:
11P ( C 2 a 2 CAP 2 p A + f7 U 1 - p 2 2pe P " p( PA()-O'AP C 4 (- ±
9APOa
dFB - yE(OpIsp,OA)+OA E ap aA 1(-1P 2)p2A "-A
A 1+7 1++
_7/p7 1 2 Y~20 (1-~p2)pO 0o12 a2+lp) ,2#P< 2U - .2APUEPAA+ P A SP A P A
(1+-) 2 2 2+(-P2 2( E')(-P A +(- P )- A)
Given a contract apXp + aDXD + B, the agent chooses a decision satisfying
dA - apsp+apDd+OA
(p+aD+l1
The rest is simply about matching coefficients so that
Otp __OtD-dlOA _,. z -Y 2 Or 2Ai o- A pUo 2 p AZA + ,YO. 2p 0'2A ( _p 2 )sp._ A( 2 .2 .1_ -p2)U- o2 .0,2 -A o2 )
aysy~apd+0 TP~U-7PA E P A 2sp8 E P2 PA TAPO p)
pp+--D +i - (i1 )P) (+p O2 a+(1-p2)o U2p)A
To simplify, let a = apD-/ •  D+1 pD 1 = 1 - a - ~, then
, -. A, AP 
.2  
A 2P (1 2 sP A +2 2-  2p A  7 AP 2p
asp + /± + 50A = &(1+y)(0,T2 2+(i-p2)o 2 •)
Matching coefficients gives
TYO'c0 (1-p 2)a (1+,) (or2 0'2 +(1-p2)g2 •2-)
EP A AP A
=( ) +(1-) Ap2 ) 2Od + 1- A2 YPA' P AA
(1+4--y) 01 +(1-p 2)-2 2U2
Now,
a p oPA (1-p 2)5- D (1-p 2 )c+2 U2 + 2 ±yP ( o2 •
ap+aD+l P A A+-YPOArP
Similarly,
6s = p±-D+l D = (1 - 6) - tap,
so that
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2 a 2j+,(1-p2 p' 2 or2 P
(1+7 A ) P Aj+(1-'p2 D(.. p. (I- 1-p2 p AP••..
(i+; (,•, +(1-p )o- +o- AP) a2(1 2  +()-p 2) 2) D2
(l•)oe +(-peAPP) i-
giving OD 2- + (-p02
2 -y(02 2 -2 )U -(1-p2) 0+2 (0, A-YpO•p
Finally, we have that
- ODd -- 0 A -paAP)(1-p2  A EP( A P AP) d
APaAUPMA - ApcA-PPPAA
aA -- PpoAorP - A -- 'YPP
Thus, the optimal contract is given by:
apXp + ODXD + B, where
27 2 2 -'P-2(lpc p -A P0p 2A7AP A)(1-p 2 ) P'7 A ( PAPAP)
~2 (2 -
ODp -YUPOA-P U "ePIUAPUAUP) -_ Ap=A--'PUPA
1-p22 r2 p ( P2 (1P' 12- 2 2 p0A2TP A2 P UA-YPaPP-Ape p( 9 +rpa ap)' aA--YPp p
The case of employment is symmetric, with an adjustment for 7-. The expected loss follows
by noting that we can write
E y(Op - di) 2 (OA - di)2) = E ( (Op - dFB + dFB - dU) 2 + (OA d FB + dFB i ) 2)
= ((1+7)E(OA - FB) + (I + )E (dF B - d ) 2
In the case of delegation,
E (dFB - dA) 2  - (YOP+OA( 1+-Y apsp+cadd+OA 21+ap+ad
To simplify the derivation, note from above that
aPSP+add+OA _ TE(OpIsp,OA)+OA
l1+aP+a d  1+,
so we have that
E (dFB - dA) 2 = (Op - E(Op Isp, OA)) 2
Recall that the conditional variance is given simply by
-2 2 -2n f av w ~E12 e22E t21,
and from above we have that
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-YU024 (i-p 2)P2 A P A~
2 2 1- 2
-12E22F21 21222 2 p
a 2 )(2
CA P - 'AP 2p
'AP GP CAP2) /I U2 ) 2(,(1_p
2 )±p 2
= )p _ _O__(_ 1-p_ )+_ 02UAP P (1p2)e
222S -1 21P E12E22 - x(i-p2)01~ _ p2) 7
7 2U2 (1-p2)X p(1+7)( (1-p )+xp)
Proposition 28: Imperfect information
dp ASA+'ADd-+EP(OPIVP) and dsB = Ep(OAISA)+Ep(Op Ivp)
1+aA aD  2
while
O22
Ep (OA ISA) = C 2 AA + A SA-CA A e AUA A
So the coefficients need to satisfy
22
C 14A±- 2SA±EP(OPIVP)
dp __ ASA+aDd+-Ep(Opvp) - + A CA+Ep(Opv)
1+aA+aD 2
which gives directly
aA-2CfA == 1C r
0D 2
cqD = 2 2
aC A +a2A
The expected loss follows as above. We can write the expected loss as
E ((Op - dFB)2 + (OA - dFB)2 + 2 (dFB - dP) 2 ),
where d = E(Oplvp)+E(OAISA)S2
so
E ((OA - E (OA ISA)) + (Op - E (OplvP))) 2 = ¼E (OA- E (OA ISA)) 2 + (Op - E(OpIvp))2)
1E ((OA - E (OA ISA)) 2 + (Op - E (OpIvp))2) S 2 2 )+(2 2[( A +O'A 0-' p-+-a 2
Solution for Information Acquisition
Delegation
Let us first consider the agent's incentives. Taking the expectations and rearranging we get
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d= AA.
\
01 a,2,(1-p2)
01 (1-p2 +,
ELA P=E (sp - E (splw))2 +E (02 +s)].
With probability PA the agent learns sp, while with probability (1 - PA) PP the agent fails
while the manager succeeds. Thus, we can write the expected loss as
a2 a2, 2)~u a2 (0~,2o,
PA P (p ) + (1 P- A) PP )
- ap~l aPT1
(+ [(1 + ap) (aU + a2) + ] - F (a2) IA PA i - PA))
which gives the first-order condition
a2  a,2 F(a~p)/3APA
2( " .q_02)] - p 1 2 F(- )• pRap + PP (ap-d+I°'P - 1--PA
For the manager, rearranging the expected loss function
E [(0p - dA)2 - (Sp _- dA)2 PAPP] + Cp (pp)
yields a first-order condition
(1-ap)( +2ap 2 F(ar ),)ppp
(1- PA) (ap+1)2  P 1-pp
The expected total performance is then given by
E (LA + Lp) =PA ((OP- dA)2 + (OA- dA) 2)
+ (1 PA) ((Op - dA)2 + (OA - dA) 2
+ (1-pA- (1- PA)PP) ((Op -dA)2 + (OA - dA)2
+ CA (PA) + Cp (pP),
which, after a little rearranging simplifies to
2(r +1p)(_ýQppQ ~ (1'"2P)(02 (o+ -2
(i+ap)2  +ýý+P
-F (a2)/A (p* + ln (1- p))- F (0,)fp (p* + ln (1- p)),
-F ( A A P P P
where p*, p*p solve the two first-order conditions above. In contrast, under perfect informa-
tion
2C,2p0r
E (LA + Lp)= (-e-,)_+ (-+- ) (a + a 2 )
or2 +02
with a =
wi ap - +UP+20 ,
Employment
Under employment, the agent becomes a passive participant. Otherwise, the analysis par-
allels that above. That is, the principal solves:
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min [ppE (Lp IOp, SA) + (1 - pp) E (Lp10, SA)] - Cp (pp)
PP
giving the principal's choice of pp
2((1+aA)F 9 3p+02 ) p
and expected total loss of
2(1laA 1+ ((1 + a) (a2 + aU2) + 2a2A2) - Op [pp + In (1 -pp)]
In contrast, under perfect information we have
(1+a) 2 ± a2) + 2a 2(4' + O4) +E A(I+aA) 2  - (I+a•A) rA2
with a* = 0.2+7+•P
Proposition 29: Risk-Aversion and Incentive Strength
minE [(Op - dA) 2 + (A - dA) 2] + rVar [p (Op - dA) 2 + cepep + (OA - A) 2
s.t. dA -- POP-OApp+l
a p+1
Substituting in the decision, we have that:
(Op - dA+ (A - •A• (OP - O)(Otp-+1) 2
The problem becomes:
m l± E (Op - A)2 p 2 Var - 0)2 2
min- ,-,E (Op - A)2 + Var (p - A)2  +ra
ap (ap+1) (ap+1) 2  "
min ( L;2E (Op0 OA 2±P+LVa(Op -OA)+ra _CP~
Thus, the first-best incentive strength is implicitly defined by
1 [(ap - 1) E (Op - OA) 2 + rapVar (Op - OA)2 + rapca = 0(oap+l) 3 C
Now, denote the distribution of Op - OA by Op - OA N (A, 2A). Then,
E (0Op - 9A) 2 = A/ 2 + c2
Var (Op - OA) 2 = 2aO (a- + 2A/t 2 )
so we can write this as
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(a+l) [a(cP - 1) (AM2 + U2 ) + rap (2- 0 (02 + 2Ap2))] + rap2 = 0.
Thus,
<0 and sig sgn (1 - ap ( + 4r (Ap2 +20)))
Which follow directly by the implicit function theorem.
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